Holbrooke lands in troubled waters
Richard Holbrooke, US President Barack Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, arrived last week in Pakistan for a four-day official visit. The duration of the visit is significant, as is the fact that Holbrooke chose to kick off his itinerary with Pakistan before visiting India and Afghanistan.
Not just geographically but, it seems also geopolitically, Pakistan lies at the centre of the special envoy's brief. This can both be positive and negative depending on how the game is played by all the actors in the days and months ahead.
Richard Holbrooke, US President Barack Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, arrived last week in Pakistan for a four-day official visit. The duration of the visit is significant, as is the fact that Holbrooke chose to kick off his itinerary with Pakistan before visiting India and Afghanistan.
Not just geographically but, it seems also geopolitically, Pakistan lies at the centre of the special envoy's brief. This can both be positive and negative depending on how the game is played by all the actors in the days and months ahead.
In terms of US expectations, Obama has a three-pronged strategy for the region: first, using force in a way that can translate into utility of force; second, linking the use of force with economic and development incentives as part of a larger dialogue; and finally, taking a regional approach to disputes that may be fuelling negative activity by non-state actors.
Obama also needs to win in Afghanistan. He wants to wind down in Iraq and fight the "right war" because winning in Afghanistan is what, according to his campaign promises and assessment by his advisors, would secure US interests by taking out Al Qaeda.
The nomination of Holbrooke, a seasoned diplomat known for getting the job done since he clinched the Dayton Accords which brought peace to Bosnia, shows the seriousness of Obama's intent to put in place his three-pronged policy.
Simultaneously, there is an attempt to nuance the initial enthusiasm over what is "do-able" in Afghanistan as opposed to what may be "desirable".
This relates to moving away from the high ideals of bringing modern democracy to Afghanistan ("nation-building") and settling for more traditional structures which can assure peace and extract – hopefully – guarantees that Afghans will not allow their soil to be used by international terrorist groups.
"We are not going to be able to rebuild Afghanistan into a Jeffersonian democracy", Obama said last week. "What we can do is make sure that Afghanistan is not a safe haven for Al Qaeda. What we can do is make sure that it is not destabilising neighbouring Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons."
This last bit is instructive. Far from Pakistan destabilising Afghanistan, there is a danger that the ongoing war in Afghanistan could destabilise Pakistan. While official Pakistan may pooh-pooh the concern in Obama's statement regarding the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists, the fact is that he has got the direction of the danger right.
A decentralised state
Pakistan's tribal belt traditionally was a quiet area. It burst after Islamabad had to send in troops as part of the larger effort in the region to flush out terrorist elements. However, that effort has developed multiple layers and its Pashtun nationalist factor got mixed up with other, more nefarious, factors. One of the ways in which Pakistan's Northwestern areas can be stabilised again is by winding down in Afghanistan. And the best way to do it, despite its own increasing difficulties, is to lower expectations regarding what can and cannot be done in that country.
That is where Obama's reference to Jeffersonian democracy becomes significant. Afghanistan has traditionally been a decentralised state. To try and turn it into a Westphalian state is a doomed venture at this stage. Lowering the bar in Afghanistan has the merit of using a disaggregated approach, which is flexible and can pull in even moderate elements of the Taliban in an ultimate effort to put together a broader government acceptable to the ethnically and ideologically disparate elements in that country. At the same time, such an effort would make it easier for the United States to isolate those elements that remain irreconcilable to this movement.
This approach should be welcomed by Pakistan because Islamabad has always insisted on taking a holistic view of the problem of terrorism. Therefore, Islamabad should view the centrality accorded by Obama to Pakistan in a positive light. It shows that Pakistan is the country that forms the bridge between South and West Asia, a geographical fact that we can and should use to our advantage.
The success of Holbrooke's mission depends on an appreciation of this fact. A state that is central to a solution to the problem of terrorism and regional cooperation in general must be accorded the importance it deserves. And "importance" translates into an understanding of Pakistan's security concerns and the resolution of those disputes that have so far prevented states in the region from extending cooperation to each other.
The proposal by Bangladesh to have a regional force to deal with terrorism is a good one, but its actualisation requires the degree of trust and confidence that the region currently lacks. Holbrooke's task is therefore cut out for him. He did a good job in Bosnia but the Balkans, despite Serb savagery, were still much easier to deal with than this part of the world where at least two states are armed with nuclear weapons and that fact reduces the ability of external actors, even one as powerful as the United States, to influence their behaviour.
This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) with permission from Pakistan’s The Daily Times.

