Thai King always wins
Thailand is facing its third and greatest crisis since World War II and by far the greatest test of its monarch’s power. It is difficult for outsiders to comprehend how so revered but distant a leader can wield such extraordinary powers, despite his merely ‘constitutional’ role and numerous other constraints on his action.
Thailand is facing its third and greatest crisis since World War II and by far the greatest test of its monarch’s power. It is difficult for outsiders to comprehend how so revered but distant a leader can wield such extraordinary powers, despite his merely ‘constitutional’ role and numerous other constraints on his action.
The secret is not in the innate role of the throne, but in the style of this particular king. Twice before, in 1974 and 1992, when mobs in the street threatened state order in their demands for a more democratic polity, Rama IX, or Bhumipol, waited day upon day to test the resilience of those he sought to favour, and to see if those he opposed could be forced to fade.
In 1974 students demanded an end to a particularly third-rate triumvirate, who had nonetheless empowered enormous economic growth. After bloodshed reached an intolerable level, by Thai standards, the King sent all three packing - to Boston and Taipei. He’d known them well and worked through them but realized their time had passed. And the King’s power grew immeasurably in that decisive move.
Similarly in 1992, students seized the high ground against a coup-installed military regime, and again only after several hundred deaths did the king summon the two contenders to the palace and cause them literally to crawl on the carpet to the elevated place of the monarch, all but foretelling their agreement to his dispensation.
He waits anew. This time he has a bigger task: the damage to the economy and political system by the two years of demonstrations is far greater, and his own goal is much bigger. He wishes to bury forever the prospects of the only political leader in his 50-year reign to stand up to him and attempt to supplant him - Thaksin Shinawatra, self-made billionaire, ex-police general who developed a huge base in the Thai countryside through demagogic policies and increasingly strident opposition to the ‘forces of the status quo,’ as he said, a direct jab at the throne itself.
Three players
In fact the crisis is a bit more complicated, for there are three players, each a descendant of forces set in motion when the absolute monarchy was overthrown in 1932.
First, the monarchy. From 1932 until about 1963, 17 years after the present king’s accession, the throne was a faint glimmer of past glory. A junta that seized power in 1957 began to use Bhumipol, but he proved cannier in using them, and that has been the pattern. He is now 80 and frail but intends to stick around until he’s won this recent and, for him, final round.
Secondly, there emerged from the ‘promoters’ who made the 1932 coup a group of Mussolini-like semi-fascists, whose direct descendant is not the army, but Thaksin himself.
From 1948 a third group of Thai emerged around a progressive promoter, Pridi Panomyong, who founded a great university and inspired young democrats, but who wasn’t able to maintain power against the better armed rightist group, who restored themselves to power. But students abroad encouraged democratic roots in the kingdom, they demanded reforms and elections in country-wide demonstrations late in 1973, forcing the king’s hand to prevent chaos. They have matured - if we call it that - into the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the PAD, which now occupies airports, government buildings, and has brought business virtually to a standstill.
There was always, though, a ‘permanent government’ of foreign-educated princes, ever expanding their ranks but never ceasing to rule, even today through great-grandsons of kings keeping a tight hold on day-to-day power.
But there seems to be a huge contradiction. Thaksin overwhelmingly won the elections he contested. Why are the ‘democrats’ in such opposition to him? It would be tempting to say, with Lenin, that he is the ‘principal enemy.’ They suspect not without reason that if left to his own devices he would rule eternally, with the iron hand that exercised in the 1930s. Tolerance has never been Thaksin’s virtue.
Thaksin’s ability to elicit the animosity of the throne came naturally, given the enormous electoral mandate he acquired in the countryside. In a variety of public and less-public ways he made known that the national adoration of their monarch was old-fashioned; why should this old man have so much influence when he, Thaksin, commanded so much admiration everywhere outside Bangkok?
King Bhumipol is a gentle man but has never countenanced opposition gently. It was he that signalled the army to move in Sept 2006 to depose Thaksin. But the government all but placed in power by him failed to move in the signal way desired.
Secondly, the ‘democrats’ were never quite so pure. Of course there is a spectrum of views in the PAD including some very virtuous professed democrats. But there are also unscrupulous party hacks that make the organization work. And most of the professedly ‘democratic’ opposition haven’t flinched at such trivial details as military coups, martial law, and whatever else needed to rid the country of Thaksin or his allies forever.
An enormous price
It is a question of ‘who, whom’ and they intend to continue ruling, as they have done more or less continuously since 1974, through their allies in the ministries and delegates in the parliament. Thaksin was seen as an illegitimate upstart, ‘he is not one of us,’ a famous prince said to me.
Why and how have they been able to show such amazing determination? It’s simple. The army is divided, though not very much. It is taking its cue from the palace, as it has done at least since 1980, not from the government that rules in Thaksin’s name. So it all but openly permits the chaos that has for the present ruined the travel industry and slowed down the economy.
And the demonstrators know that if not God the king is plainly on their side. This time, more than 1974 and 1992, it would be trivial to say that democracy is what is at issue. It’s whether or not those others, ‘unworthy to bear the dust under his shoes,’ as the royal inflection goes, can finally be worn out. Just wait - the king will wave his magic wand and the crisis will be over. The army - or some other appropriate delegate - will take power, and the country will find the patience to wear out the endurance of an expiring Thaksin, who in exile loses wealth and legitimacy by the day.
Thailand is paying an enormous price for this crisis, but in the end the King’s determination to ensure a legacy where his type of people will rule, and Thailand will return to rapid economic growth and the iconic smiles by which it is known - with a bit of democracy thrown in. The king’s move in the next few days will be worth watching.
PROF W SCOTT THOMPSON is a national security expert who served four American Presidents and is a professor emeritus at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the author or editor of 13 books on world political issues and resides in Washington, Bali and Manila.
