PAS - Once bitten, never shy? (Pt 2)
All political parties aspire for political power. It is an obvious fact, but seeing it in print or better still reading it out loud does gives the fact life. And for PAS, political life as a middling party is frustrating.
All political parties aspire for political power. It is an obvious fact, but seeing it in print or better still reading it out loud does gives the fact life. And for PAS, political life as a middling party is frustrating.
That is what presently PAS is. A party that fights tooth and nail for the Malay Muslim vote.
The 2008 elections - plus its lead-up and events proceeding it - have given impetus to the party after being deflated by the 2004 election defeats. It has also given the party fresh problems. The new ground they have won has bequeathed the party a series of new challenges.
Build on it, and they may become real contenders for leadership of any coalition running the country, bungle the opportunity and they will be right back to where they were in 1978 - or worse become irrelevant.
By changing in the near future, PAS would be fighting tooth and nail for all our votes.
Analysts have summed up Turkey as such: a long-standing secular country which is willing to accept an Islamic-based but not Islamic-dictated leadership. All that is necessary is for the party with the right credentials to fulfill that need.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) runs Turkey presently, but not without a long struggle to be that Islamic based government. It evolved from a series of Islamic parties from the 1990's onwards. The military influenced secular courts have continuously banned seemingly religious parties. AKP is still under scrutiny.
Its President - a life-long Islamist - Recep Tayyip Erdogan explains his own ideological quandary: "Before anything else, I'm a Muslim . . . I have a responsibility to God, who created me, and I try to fulfill that responsibility, but I try now very much to keep this away from my political life, to keep it private.
"A political party cannot have a religion, only individuals can... religion is so supreme that it cannot be exploited or taken advantage of." (Deborah Sontag, The Erdogan Experiment, New York Times, May 11, 2003).
PAS currently does not have the constitutional obstacle AKP faces but they do have the demographic obstacle. The Umno overture is all about keeping a Malay only appeal, for both Umno and PAS. Does PAS want that future?
As exemplified by the election results - even with non-Muslims crossing the vote divide this time - PAS is reduced to making comprehensive charges only in Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Pahang. These are the only states large enough and conservative enough Malay populations for PAS to go it alone. Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Melaka have ethnic hurdles for them going alone, though they have pockets of control in those states.
Johor will always be the bastion of Umno and the last place Umno will fall. Borneo has, despite the massive Islamisation, picked the path of regionalism and ethnicity over religiosity.
In summary, if PAS was a poker player - mind the pun - it is always playing with a few cards fewer than other players despite killer aces up it sleeves.
Which makes the discussion of PAS being offered the post of MB in Perak and Selangor, at one go, all the more interesting to decipher.
Before, we looked at the elements of ideology and politico-historical past with Umno. Here, the analysis will revolve around the experiences of similar Islamic parties and the realpolitik of the situation, and provide a summary to what PAS is better off doing.
Similar Islamic parties
There is no carbon copy of PAS out there. But there are similarities amongst the Islam related parties that have succeeded and those who have struggled or worse, been crippled.
There are no real success stories of an out and out Islamic party gaining real successful ground in a modern and relatively successful multicultural economy like Malaysia. Therefore, PAS has always been forced to pave its own way.
Since its adoption of a deep religious undertone after the debacle of 1978 in which it lost Kelantan, PAS looked more and more at Iran, Egypt, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
But all these countries struggle. Iran is an isolated theocracy, Egypt still battles the setting up of any religious party despite housing Al-Azhar and Pakistan is a mess. More pertinent, they are not as multicultural as Malaysia.
It is in Turkey and Indonesia that you will find parties of an Islamic leaning working within democracies using democratic means.
The Turkish experience as shown by Erdogan’s metamorphosis from an orthodox Istanbul mayor to a more nationalistic and secular leader is salient.
The Islamist parties there have been banned 24 times in the past 50 years - and though they have increased in acceptability, it is only by Erdogan’s vision of making the party more Islamic-inspired and less Islamic that the party has reduced objections from the military.
Erdogan’s AKP is still due to be adjudicated by a constitutional court, but the signs are looking good for them, especially since they have incorporated European Union friendly policies into their governance.
It is our brothers across the straits who make for more interesting examination. The National Awakening Party (NAP) in Indonesia led by former republic president, Gus Dur.
The party has close ties to Nahdatul Ulama, an Islamic organisation. However, contrary to its sister organisation, it is a secular party. In Indonesia, with a much more clear cut Muslim population, selling a purist Muslim vision that brooks no dissent is likely to get broad support.
Yet the NAP sees its obligation as Indonesians first before it sees itself as an Islamic driven party. There are no allegations that Golkar or Parti Demokratik Indonesia are any less Islamic. NAP wants people to support them because their Islamic driven ideas work, and not because they are merely Islamic ideas and the other parties cannot make the same claim.
Strategem
Back home, we still have the offer on the table. The unity dialogue.
Umno made the offer to PAS without considering the implication it has on the other BN parties. Therefore in a union with Umno, would PAS only need to heed Umno? More importantly, are the offers - both in Perak and Selangor - actually genuine without typical BN consensus style decision making?
In both cases, Umno is looking for a partner to tip the scale over to a BN majority. BN’s 27 seats in Perak and 20 seats in Selangor currently, with PAS onboard will result in an eight seat majority in Perak and a tie in Selangor.
If PAS turned its back on Pakatan now, it only gains more executive councillor seats in Perak - probably another two - and will still be unsure of forming government in Selangor.
The Islamic party is far from saying yes to Umno, but the fact it is talking about it, not discounting further meetings with Umno and allowing dissenting views more space in the party’s external communication suggests the party is milking the limelight as much as it can.
For what?
There have been calls for Malay unity from Prowaris, Gapena and other race focussed groups - traditional bellwether of Malay politics - but that does not factor in the other players emerging in the battle for public perception through non-mainstream lobbying. The various websites, blogs and student activists, who are less likely to promote an absolutist race agenda.
The truth is more elusive. Neither the calls for a return to a polarised Malaysia with Malays leading the rest from a distance or the more progressive voices mainly from alternative media, tells conclusively on what Malays want from Umno, PAS, PKR or even DAP.
The real pressure point might be numbers. The opposition insist that while BN have a healthy majority in Parliament - 140 seats compared to Pakatan’s 82 - their real power base come from the almost clean sweep in Borneo. BN only has 85 seats to Pakatan’s 80 in the Peninsular. And in terms of electoral votes, Pakatan outdoes BN on the mainland.
The sticky part is that the Malay vote is more in favour of Barisan Nasional.
So the simple math analysis as is put out to the undiscerning person is that most Malays are still Barisan Nasional supporters, ergo Umno supporters.
Which is a fair point, but the advantage is minute as the split is almost half for Umno-led Barisan and PKR led Pakatan.
There are frivolous suggestions that PAS is acting like a kid with ride passes at the amusement park, and it is getting on all the rides available to max out the experience with no clear objective.
The six and eight state seats won respectively in Perak and Selangor show that in more sober terms, PAS doesn’t have wide enough support in the state. Does it want to use the backdoor option - getting BN back in power - so that it can have one more menteri besar position?
Votes are not directly transferable. The goodwill generated by people like Khalid Samad and Lo Lo Ghazali will dissipate, as those who made that leap of faith to vote for PAS will never do so again.
PAS strategists must ask two questions:
a. How will a u-turn to Umno affect PAS’ inroads into states it has not been victorious in since independence?
b. If you break from an alliance four months after the general elections without a valid reason, are you really a reliable political party even to your own members?
We were just talking
The classic answer which is getting a bit passe is that they are just talking, and in Islam, the invitation to talk must be welcomed.
Yet, the invitation to talk cannot be seen in isolation. Politics is about perception and sometimes the feelings people build from their perception will stay long with them.
Umno would be up in arms if any of its MPs were in any secret talks with Anwar Ibrahim because Anwar is trying to win numbers to form government.
So if it is permissible for Umno to not allow its people from talking to PKR or Anwar, why would it be okay for them to do the same with PAS leaders?
And if Umno practises double standards, is PAS legitimising the behaviour by talking to them? And if it is Malay unity at stake, surely PAS should ask Umno to bring in PKR, DAP and Gerakan who all have Malay members in them?
PAS might have taken for granted the unity in the party for 30 years as a given. The unity, even through Memali, Operasi Lalang, the Umno split, Semangat 46, Anwar’s reformasi, the war on terror and Abdullah Badawi’s early years is due to the party not splitting its image.
The party might be simple, but in that, it keeps its members without monetary inducements. Increase the subterfuges with secret meetings, changing alliances and mergers - you risk an internal rift.
Take for example the Moro National Liberation Front’s split to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the PLO split to Hamas and PAS’ split to Berjasa.
The historical splits have always been associated with the parent party veering away from a principle tenet of the party in order to make gain.
There are no sureties in politics, however PAS must learn not to rock its own boat for a whim.
First knock
The absurdity has to end.
Umno asked PAS to talk in the aftermath of the elections to woo it. PAS is duty-bound to inform PKR and DAP since they formed an electoral pact together. There is no point divvying up the contest seats in the lead up to the elections, only to see your partner deserting you for a discussion with the very party you waged an election campaign against.
PAS is under the illusion that as a true Islamic party, it has to stand on the moral high-ground. That it is willing to talk even to its political enemies. But still, it is naive not to consider the timing, situation and stakes involved.
Being courteous does not mean you open the door at the first knock, that is just common sense.
PAS must realise all of this reeks of a party being a bit of a prima donna. It is very unsettling for its political partners and those who voted the party in.
PAS is the king maker in Perak and Selangor, but trying to use the role to usurp more for itself will suggest a selfish streak in the party.
The party has to see beyond the next election and into what it must become, a party that is both a valid choice for all Malaysians and when in power, a party that delivers real policies. Central to that challenge is a tendency not to alienate Malaysians and reliability in political promises - to both partners and voters. Neither is being enhanced by secret meetings, no matter how much goodwill it is investing in them.

