One of the main grouses concerning MCA's takeover of Nanyang Press is that it would stifle voices of criticism and replace them with voices of sycophantic support for MCA.

MCA President Dato' Seri Dr Ling Liong Sik was reported by The Star on Saturday to have said that "MCA knows how to behave" and would not interfere with the running and editorial policies of Nanyang Siang Pau and China Press .

If this is true, why was nine top management staff of the two dailies including editors "advised" to relinquish their posts by next week? (See The Sun 's front-page report of May 27). This disconcerting development, contradictory to what Ling said, was not even reported in The Sunday Star .

This proves the allegation that it would be hard for a newspaper to give accurate and objective reports that are adverse to its political master's agenda.

If MCA's purpose in bringing Sin Chew Jit Poh , Nanyang Siang Pau and the China Press within its fold is to serve its propaganda objectives of turning criticism to support, the deal has so far proven the opposite.

The Sun reported on May 27 that 14 Chinese NGOs and associations had come out publicly to oppose the takeover; that within MCA, grassroots were unhappy about it. Judging from the negative flak from MCA's traditionally strongest supporters, far from doing good, the takeover wrecks more political harm.

This is the dilemma of Malaysia's political elite. The many years in power have formed in them unchangeable and ingrained habits. They still have the idea that control over media will fix the problem of eroded support.

As it worked in the past so it must work for the present or the future. The elite cannot take a different track to blend with the changed mood in the country. They just do not know how to win much less recover lost popularity. And this dilemma is not confined to MCA leaders. Take for example Umno's.

Since Anwar Ibrahim's ouster and conviction, there is widespread political disquiet particularly amongst Malays. All at once, Umno is subject to divergent and incompatible imperatives. Its quest to recover lost Malay ground is in conflict with its quest to garner Chinese support to balance the loss of Malay support. Only one but not both objectives may be pursued vigorously. Which should it prioritise?

For example, to meet the expectations of the Chinese community and get their electoral support would clash with the raison d' tre of Umno. Yet to champion Malay rights means humiliating Suqiu, defending the quota system and Vision School that will alienate Chinese support and deepen their distrust of MCA and Gerakan.

When faced with such dilemma, Umno has tilted towards the championing of Malay rights because that is its raison d' tre . This strategy however does not guarantee recovery of lost Malay support if the grouses are not addressed sincerely.

For example, the institutionalisation of Suhakam to counteract concerns of abuse of power has been neutralised by the invocation of the unpopular Internal Security Act (ISA) viewed by many as abuse of power.

The opposition's call against cronyism and lack of corporate governance and transparency has so far been answered by controversial bailouts involving MAS and Time dotCom's failed initial public offering, and now privatisation of Pos Malaysia (without open competitive bidding).

As return of lost Malay political support is not assured, the ruling coalition now tries other measures that are not dependent on recovering lost Malay votes - but the garnering of other types of votes. To consolidate its position in Sabah, Chinese amongst Akar members are admitted to Umno. This is not extended to the peninsula in fear of alienating existing Malay support within Umno.

Meanwhile, the Electoral Commission will carry out constituency delineation. Hopefully based on demographic factors, more parliamentary and state seats will be created in areas, (say) Johor, in which traditional supporters of Umno reside and vote.

Women voters as a class are also wooed by appointing more women to important government positions and amending the Constitution to protect them against discrimination.

As for the Chinese and other non-bumiputras, it is hoped that their support will be grudgingly given more in fear of PAS's Islamisation policies rather than love for the Barisan Nasional. Ironically, this would mean that if for whatever reasons, PAS leaves the Barisan Alternatif coalition, it would be BN's worse nightmare.

This will pave the way for all those who oppose PAS' policies (non-bumiputras, women and more modern Malays) to support BA. Never mind that PAS can rejoin BA if the latter wins the elections.

The best bet then for the ruling coalition, whilst PAS remains within the BA, is to discard old habits that are today unpopular, and address in a sincere and meaningful way the legitimate grouses of an awakened populace demanding democratic rights and the government's accountability.

From these perspectives, MCA's insistence to take over the two Chinese dailies is a reflection of the general leadership dilemma of being ingrained in old habits and unable to adapt to much less ride with the new mood and sentiments amongst the awakened constituencies.