Merrily singing chorus of Malay unity
Chandra MuzaffarPublished: Jan 29, 2001 9:27 PM | Updated: Jan 29, 2008 10:21 AM
They are all singing the same tune now. "Let's have Malay unity first; then we will have national unity. Malay unity is the basis of national unity." Dr Mahathir Mohamad is of course the lead singer. A number of his colleagues in Umno have joined the chorus. Even the president of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) is lustily belting out the same lyrics.
As is to be expected, a few academics and scholars have also decided to sing the same song. One would have expected them to provide some depth and breadth to the issue of Malay unity.
Why is Malay unity essential to national unity? How will the unity of one ethnic group help to foster understanding and empathy among the various communities? The inability of pro-Establishment intellectuals to explain, examine and analyse the issue raises a basic question about these men and women. If they have not thought through the idea of Malay unity and its relationship to national unity, how can they be regarded as intellectuals - since the ability to think and to reflect is one of the defining characteristics of the intellectual?
The truth is Malay unity will not lead to national unity. Before we set out the arguments on this, let us look at Malay unity in its historical context.
Context
There were at least two occasions in post-war Malaysian politics when the ability of the Malays to unite on the basis of a common platform proved to be decisive. The first was the infamous Malayan Union episode of 1946. This British colonial plan to consolidate their rule over Malaya after World War II would have opened the floodgates to Chinese and Indian immigrants aspiring to be citizens and changed the demographic character of what was essentially a Malay polity. The Malays also rejected the union because it stripped a crucial symbol of Malay history and government - namely the Sultans - of any substantive role. If the community had not mobilised and achieved that degree of internal unity and cohesion, it would not have succeeded in defeating the colonial scheme. It was out of this mass mobilisation that the United Malays National Organization (Umno) emerged as the nation's major political force.
Umno also played a pivotal role in the second episode. By galvanising the Malays, it ensured that the most vital dimensions of the Malay polity in history - the Malay language, Islam and the Sultans - would remain defining characteristics of the new Malayan (later Malaysian) nation.
It was important that the identity of independent Malaya reflected the historical roots of the nation, especially since the Chinese, Indians and other non-Malays were now going to be granted citizenship on very liberal terms.
At the same time, it was agreed among the leaders of the Malays and the other communities, and the departing colonial power, that the "special position of the Malays" would be protected. "Special position" as conceived by the political actors who shaped the new Malaya and the new Malayan Constitution, was in essence an affirmative action policy programme aimed at strengthening the socio-economic status of the marginalised Malay community.
The strength and solidarity of the community also helped in persuading the other communities to accept the fact that the core of national political leadership would be Malay. Unlike other aspects of the Malay polity like the Malay language and Islam, this is not embodied in the Malayan or the present Malaysian Constitution. But convention, shaped by history, demography and electoral politics, has always ensured that the prime minister and deputy prime minister would be from the Malay community.
Without the unity displayed by the community between 1946 and 1957, expressed largely through Umno, it might not have been possible to integrate vital dimensions of the Malay polity into the basic features of the newly independent, multiethnic Malayan nation.
It should be emphasised in this regard that any attempt to create a Malayan or Malaysian nation by ignoring or downplaying the defining characteristics of the precedent Malay polity would have come to nought. In any case, it would have been patently unjust to the Malays since so much of their history, identity and personality is interspersed in that polity of the past.
After Merdeka
If Malay unity was important during a certain critical phase of our history, how crucial is it in post-Merdeka Malaysia?
Aspects of the Malay polity, it is true, have been challenged at various points in the last four decades. Between 1957 and 1965, for instance, non-Malay based parties such as the Labour Party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) questioned the position of Malay as the sole official and national language of the country and sometimes even the concept of "special position".
However, the most concerted challenge came from the People's Action Party (PAP) with its concept of a "Malaysian Malaysia". It drew together a handful of parties into what was called the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) and raised fundamental issues pertaining to the Malay basis of the Constitution and the nation. It has been argued in some quarters that the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 (the PAP was the ruling party in Singapore) was the inevitable consequence of the "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign.
What is perhaps equally significant is that in defending the 1957 Constitution and the government's approach to nation-building, Umno was supported by non-Malay parties such as MCA and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). In other words, it was not just a Malay political group that sought to preserve the constitutional foundation of the Malaysian state. Non-Malay groups were prepared to endorse the Constitution partly because it also protected their languages, religions, economic interests and political roles.
The readiness of Malay and non-Malay parties to defend both the Malay aspects of the Constitution and its delicate ethnic balance was apparent in the years immediately after Singapore's separation. The 1971 Constitution Amendment Act illustrated this in a most vivid fashion. The ruling Alliance led by Umno with MCA and MIC as partners proposed in the wake of the 1969 ethnic riot that clauses in the Malaysian Constitution pertaining to the status of Malay as the sole official and national language; the special position of the Malays and the Bumiputra of Sabah and Sarawak; citizenship; and the position of the Malay Rulers should be "entrenched", meaning by which neither the people nor Parliament nor any other Legislature or Executive body would be able to amend or abrogate them at any time, in the present or the future. Only the Conference of Rulers would have the power to make any changes to the entrenched clauses.
When a vote was taken on the entrenchment of the four constitutional clauses, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and the non-Malay based Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) which was then also in the opposition, supported the proposal. It shows that by 1971 there was already same agreement among a substantial segment of the Malay and non-Malay communities as reflected in the stands of both Malay and non-Malay political parties in the government and the opposition that the Malay basis of the Constitution should not be challenged just as the accommodation of non-Malay interests and aspirations in the same document should not be questioned by anyone.
Multiethnic consensus
The 1971 consensus transcending ethnic and party boundaries has grown and developed in the last 30 years. This is why though there have been oblique and sometimes direct criticisms of say the special position of the Malays and Bumiputra, many political and non-political groups representing Malays and non-Malays have often risen to the defence of the relevant provision in the Constitution.
In this connection, it is instructive that the four-party opposition Barisan Alternatif (BA) representing all the ethnic communities in Peninsular Malaysia has openly endorsed the basic principles of the Malaysian Constitution, including those pertaining to the special position of the Malays and Bumiputra and the legitimate interests of the other communities; the status of Malay as the sole official and national language and the right to use and study other languages; the position of Islam as the religion of the Federation and the freedom to practise other religions; and the position of the Rulers as constitutional monarchs.
The question one should ask at this point is this: If a consensus among communities has evolved over four decades or so about the basis of the Constitution, especially those features drawn from the Malay polity of yesteryear, what is the purpose of pleading with the Malays to unite on an ethnic platform to defend the rights of the community?
There are very few multiethnic societies in the world which have been able to achieve consensus on intrinsically divisive ethnic questions pertaining to the identity and character of the nation. When we have achieved such a consensus in one of the most complex multiethnic societies on the planet, why are we seeking to separate Malays from the others in the name of Malay unity? Isn't this an assault upon the nation-building process itself, a process which has resulted in a measure of agreement upon certain ethnic fundamentals?
Since Mahathir is the initiator of Malay unity talks, isn't it legitimate to ask: Why is he trying so hard to destroy a multiethnic consensus that is the fruit of the labour of generations of Malaysian leaders from the early 1950s onwards?
Motivation
Besides, the moment one promotes and propagates Malay unity, others will also be tempted to pursue other kinds of ethnic unity: Chinese unity or Indian unity or Kadazan unity or Dayak unity. In a multiethnic society like ours, this will only lead to greater ethnic polarisation. In a situation where ethnic polarisation is already so serious, do we want to further divide our society?
More than dividing and dichotomising our society along ethnic lines, any campaign to "unite" the Malays at this stage could well undermine the larger quest for justice and fair play within the community itself. For a significant segment of the Malay community, including the majority of the Malay middle and even the upper classes, have become very conscious of injustices within the community perpetrated by a section of the Malay elite.
To put it in more precise language, for the first time in modern Malay political history, a lot of Malays who would otherwise be regarded as beneficiaries of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Umno-led government are critical of the abuse of power, the corruption, the authoritarianism and simply, the arrogance associated with the Mahathir regime.
Needless to say, the catalyst for this growing awareness of the injustices of the ruling elite is the Anwar factor. What this means is that it is the unjust, inhuman and cruel treatment of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim since Sept 2, 1998, which has opened the eyes of Malays at all levels of society, but especially those who were once part of the Establishment, to the wrongdoings around them.
This growing political consciousness can go in two ways. It can develop into a mammoth force within the Malay community to incorporate sectors which hitherto have not been touched by the reformasi struggle and expand beyond the community to embrace the Chinese and Indians on the peninsula and the Kadazans and Dayaks in Sabah and Sarawak as well, within the next two or three years.
There are signs to show that this is beginning to happen. In the Sanggang state by-election in early 2000, for instance, the Chinese vote for the BA candidate increased by about 2 percent. In the Teluk Kemang parliamentary by-election in the middle of the year, the BN majority was reduced by 40 percent largely with the help of the Chinese vote. In the Lunas state by-election at the end of 2000, BA wrested the seat from BN because of a huge swing in the Chinese vote.
Is it a mere coincidence that Mahathir broached the idea of Malay unity talks with PAS and Keadilan soon after the BA victory in Lunas? It is obvious that he fears the growth of a massive movement for political change inspired by a vision of justice transcending ethnic boundaries. He knows that it is a movement which has the potential to succeed because it has begun to cross ethnic boundaries.
It is the failure of past political movements - whether it was the socialist movement of the 1950s and 1960s or the Malaysian Malaysia movement of the mid-1960s or the Islamic movement of the last three decades - to break that formidable ethnic barrier that has prevented an all-embracing, truly multiethnic, grassroots-based grouping from defeating the Alliance and now the BN coalition. It is to thwart such a challenge to his position and the position of Umno and BN that Mahathir has launched the "Malay unity" proposal. Mahathir, lest we forget, has always believed in nipping in the bud any threat to his power.
Clash of old and new
This then is the other route that the present movement for change can take. It is possible that it will be checkmated through primordial appeals to ethnic unity. The emotional pull and power behind the idea of Malay unity - given its validity and legitimacy until a few decades ago - could be manipulated by the Mahathir regime to stymie a multiethnic movement for social justice.
Those grave injustices which the Malay community are deeply concerned about, at the heart of which is the Anwar issue, will then be banished to the sidelines as everyone focuses upon achieving unity which ipso facto must demand the subordination of the internal dichotomy between right and wrong, of the internal contradiction between truth and falsehood.
This will suit Mahathir fine: When the critical challenges of corruption and abuse of power; of bailouts of crony corporations and grandiose ego-boosting mega projects, which expose the moral bankruptcy of the regime, cease to be the political passions of the Malay community. He will no longer feel threatened by the gigantic wave of reform. Mahathir may even be able to perpetuate his power a little longer.
But the impact of Malay unity upon national unity will be disastrous. It will destroy the strongest, indeed the noblest, foundation for unity in a multiethnic society: unity rooted in a common, all-encompassing struggle for social justice. It is such a struggle, to reiterate an earlier point, that is now beginning to take shape and form in Malaysian society. This is why it is wrong to suggest that Malay unity will somehow lead to national unity. On the contrary, as have been shown here, Malay unity is inimical to national unity.
In the ultimate analysis, however, it is not just a question of Malay unity or national unity. In reality, it is a struggle between two different types of politics and two different visions of society. It is a struggle between the old type of ethnic politics which we have known for so long, which every now and then manipulates communal sentiments and evokes, though subtly, latent fears of "the other", and a new type of multiethnic politics that, while cognizant of history and the social realities in our country, is nonetheless inspired by a profound commitment to justice for all Malaysians.
At the root of the first type of politics is a jaundiced view of the imperative primacy of communal identity. At the root of the second type of politics is an enlightened vision of the enduring bond of our common human identity.
For that is the essence of our struggle for justice: to enable all of us, irrespective of ethnic origin, to be truly human.
DR CHANDRA MUZAFFAR, an academic, is currently the deputy president of Parti Keadilan Nasional.
As is to be expected, a few academics and scholars have also decided to sing the same song. One would have expected them to provide some depth and breadth to the issue of Malay unity.
Why is Malay unity essential to national unity? How will the unity of one ethnic group help to foster understanding and empathy among the various communities? The inability of pro-Establishment intellectuals to explain, examine and analyse the issue raises a basic question about these men and women. If they have not thought through the idea of Malay unity and its relationship to national unity, how can they be regarded as intellectuals - since the ability to think and to reflect is one of the defining characteristics of the intellectual?
The truth is Malay unity will not lead to national unity. Before we set out the arguments on this, let us look at Malay unity in its historical context.
Context
There were at least two occasions in post-war Malaysian politics when the ability of the Malays to unite on the basis of a common platform proved to be decisive. The first was the infamous Malayan Union episode of 1946. This British colonial plan to consolidate their rule over Malaya after World War II would have opened the floodgates to Chinese and Indian immigrants aspiring to be citizens and changed the demographic character of what was essentially a Malay polity. The Malays also rejected the union because it stripped a crucial symbol of Malay history and government - namely the Sultans - of any substantive role. If the community had not mobilised and achieved that degree of internal unity and cohesion, it would not have succeeded in defeating the colonial scheme. It was out of this mass mobilisation that the United Malays National Organization (Umno) emerged as the nation's major political force.
Umno also played a pivotal role in the second episode. By galvanising the Malays, it ensured that the most vital dimensions of the Malay polity in history - the Malay language, Islam and the Sultans - would remain defining characteristics of the new Malayan (later Malaysian) nation.
It was important that the identity of independent Malaya reflected the historical roots of the nation, especially since the Chinese, Indians and other non-Malays were now going to be granted citizenship on very liberal terms.
At the same time, it was agreed among the leaders of the Malays and the other communities, and the departing colonial power, that the "special position of the Malays" would be protected. "Special position" as conceived by the political actors who shaped the new Malaya and the new Malayan Constitution, was in essence an affirmative action policy programme aimed at strengthening the socio-economic status of the marginalised Malay community.
The strength and solidarity of the community also helped in persuading the other communities to accept the fact that the core of national political leadership would be Malay. Unlike other aspects of the Malay polity like the Malay language and Islam, this is not embodied in the Malayan or the present Malaysian Constitution. But convention, shaped by history, demography and electoral politics, has always ensured that the prime minister and deputy prime minister would be from the Malay community.
Without the unity displayed by the community between 1946 and 1957, expressed largely through Umno, it might not have been possible to integrate vital dimensions of the Malay polity into the basic features of the newly independent, multiethnic Malayan nation.
It should be emphasised in this regard that any attempt to create a Malayan or Malaysian nation by ignoring or downplaying the defining characteristics of the precedent Malay polity would have come to nought. In any case, it would have been patently unjust to the Malays since so much of their history, identity and personality is interspersed in that polity of the past.
After Merdeka
If Malay unity was important during a certain critical phase of our history, how crucial is it in post-Merdeka Malaysia?
Aspects of the Malay polity, it is true, have been challenged at various points in the last four decades. Between 1957 and 1965, for instance, non-Malay based parties such as the Labour Party, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) questioned the position of Malay as the sole official and national language of the country and sometimes even the concept of "special position".
However, the most concerted challenge came from the People's Action Party (PAP) with its concept of a "Malaysian Malaysia". It drew together a handful of parties into what was called the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) and raised fundamental issues pertaining to the Malay basis of the Constitution and the nation. It has been argued in some quarters that the separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 (the PAP was the ruling party in Singapore) was the inevitable consequence of the "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign.
What is perhaps equally significant is that in defending the 1957 Constitution and the government's approach to nation-building, Umno was supported by non-Malay parties such as MCA and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). In other words, it was not just a Malay political group that sought to preserve the constitutional foundation of the Malaysian state. Non-Malay groups were prepared to endorse the Constitution partly because it also protected their languages, religions, economic interests and political roles.
The readiness of Malay and non-Malay parties to defend both the Malay aspects of the Constitution and its delicate ethnic balance was apparent in the years immediately after Singapore's separation. The 1971 Constitution Amendment Act illustrated this in a most vivid fashion. The ruling Alliance led by Umno with MCA and MIC as partners proposed in the wake of the 1969 ethnic riot that clauses in the Malaysian Constitution pertaining to the status of Malay as the sole official and national language; the special position of the Malays and the Bumiputra of Sabah and Sarawak; citizenship; and the position of the Malay Rulers should be "entrenched", meaning by which neither the people nor Parliament nor any other Legislature or Executive body would be able to amend or abrogate them at any time, in the present or the future. Only the Conference of Rulers would have the power to make any changes to the entrenched clauses.
When a vote was taken on the entrenchment of the four constitutional clauses, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and the non-Malay based Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) which was then also in the opposition, supported the proposal. It shows that by 1971 there was already same agreement among a substantial segment of the Malay and non-Malay communities as reflected in the stands of both Malay and non-Malay political parties in the government and the opposition that the Malay basis of the Constitution should not be challenged just as the accommodation of non-Malay interests and aspirations in the same document should not be questioned by anyone.
Multiethnic consensus
The 1971 consensus transcending ethnic and party boundaries has grown and developed in the last 30 years. This is why though there have been oblique and sometimes direct criticisms of say the special position of the Malays and Bumiputra, many political and non-political groups representing Malays and non-Malays have often risen to the defence of the relevant provision in the Constitution.
In this connection, it is instructive that the four-party opposition Barisan Alternatif (BA) representing all the ethnic communities in Peninsular Malaysia has openly endorsed the basic principles of the Malaysian Constitution, including those pertaining to the special position of the Malays and Bumiputra and the legitimate interests of the other communities; the status of Malay as the sole official and national language and the right to use and study other languages; the position of Islam as the religion of the Federation and the freedom to practise other religions; and the position of the Rulers as constitutional monarchs.
The question one should ask at this point is this: If a consensus among communities has evolved over four decades or so about the basis of the Constitution, especially those features drawn from the Malay polity of yesteryear, what is the purpose of pleading with the Malays to unite on an ethnic platform to defend the rights of the community?
There are very few multiethnic societies in the world which have been able to achieve consensus on intrinsically divisive ethnic questions pertaining to the identity and character of the nation. When we have achieved such a consensus in one of the most complex multiethnic societies on the planet, why are we seeking to separate Malays from the others in the name of Malay unity? Isn't this an assault upon the nation-building process itself, a process which has resulted in a measure of agreement upon certain ethnic fundamentals?
Since Mahathir is the initiator of Malay unity talks, isn't it legitimate to ask: Why is he trying so hard to destroy a multiethnic consensus that is the fruit of the labour of generations of Malaysian leaders from the early 1950s onwards?
Motivation
Besides, the moment one promotes and propagates Malay unity, others will also be tempted to pursue other kinds of ethnic unity: Chinese unity or Indian unity or Kadazan unity or Dayak unity. In a multiethnic society like ours, this will only lead to greater ethnic polarisation. In a situation where ethnic polarisation is already so serious, do we want to further divide our society?
More than dividing and dichotomising our society along ethnic lines, any campaign to "unite" the Malays at this stage could well undermine the larger quest for justice and fair play within the community itself. For a significant segment of the Malay community, including the majority of the Malay middle and even the upper classes, have become very conscious of injustices within the community perpetrated by a section of the Malay elite.
To put it in more precise language, for the first time in modern Malay political history, a lot of Malays who would otherwise be regarded as beneficiaries of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the Umno-led government are critical of the abuse of power, the corruption, the authoritarianism and simply, the arrogance associated with the Mahathir regime.
Needless to say, the catalyst for this growing awareness of the injustices of the ruling elite is the Anwar factor. What this means is that it is the unjust, inhuman and cruel treatment of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim since Sept 2, 1998, which has opened the eyes of Malays at all levels of society, but especially those who were once part of the Establishment, to the wrongdoings around them.
This growing political consciousness can go in two ways. It can develop into a mammoth force within the Malay community to incorporate sectors which hitherto have not been touched by the reformasi struggle and expand beyond the community to embrace the Chinese and Indians on the peninsula and the Kadazans and Dayaks in Sabah and Sarawak as well, within the next two or three years.
There are signs to show that this is beginning to happen. In the Sanggang state by-election in early 2000, for instance, the Chinese vote for the BA candidate increased by about 2 percent. In the Teluk Kemang parliamentary by-election in the middle of the year, the BN majority was reduced by 40 percent largely with the help of the Chinese vote. In the Lunas state by-election at the end of 2000, BA wrested the seat from BN because of a huge swing in the Chinese vote.
Is it a mere coincidence that Mahathir broached the idea of Malay unity talks with PAS and Keadilan soon after the BA victory in Lunas? It is obvious that he fears the growth of a massive movement for political change inspired by a vision of justice transcending ethnic boundaries. He knows that it is a movement which has the potential to succeed because it has begun to cross ethnic boundaries.
It is the failure of past political movements - whether it was the socialist movement of the 1950s and 1960s or the Malaysian Malaysia movement of the mid-1960s or the Islamic movement of the last three decades - to break that formidable ethnic barrier that has prevented an all-embracing, truly multiethnic, grassroots-based grouping from defeating the Alliance and now the BN coalition. It is to thwart such a challenge to his position and the position of Umno and BN that Mahathir has launched the "Malay unity" proposal. Mahathir, lest we forget, has always believed in nipping in the bud any threat to his power.
Clash of old and new
This then is the other route that the present movement for change can take. It is possible that it will be checkmated through primordial appeals to ethnic unity. The emotional pull and power behind the idea of Malay unity - given its validity and legitimacy until a few decades ago - could be manipulated by the Mahathir regime to stymie a multiethnic movement for social justice.
Those grave injustices which the Malay community are deeply concerned about, at the heart of which is the Anwar issue, will then be banished to the sidelines as everyone focuses upon achieving unity which ipso facto must demand the subordination of the internal dichotomy between right and wrong, of the internal contradiction between truth and falsehood.
This will suit Mahathir fine: When the critical challenges of corruption and abuse of power; of bailouts of crony corporations and grandiose ego-boosting mega projects, which expose the moral bankruptcy of the regime, cease to be the political passions of the Malay community. He will no longer feel threatened by the gigantic wave of reform. Mahathir may even be able to perpetuate his power a little longer.
But the impact of Malay unity upon national unity will be disastrous. It will destroy the strongest, indeed the noblest, foundation for unity in a multiethnic society: unity rooted in a common, all-encompassing struggle for social justice. It is such a struggle, to reiterate an earlier point, that is now beginning to take shape and form in Malaysian society. This is why it is wrong to suggest that Malay unity will somehow lead to national unity. On the contrary, as have been shown here, Malay unity is inimical to national unity.
In the ultimate analysis, however, it is not just a question of Malay unity or national unity. In reality, it is a struggle between two different types of politics and two different visions of society. It is a struggle between the old type of ethnic politics which we have known for so long, which every now and then manipulates communal sentiments and evokes, though subtly, latent fears of "the other", and a new type of multiethnic politics that, while cognizant of history and the social realities in our country, is nonetheless inspired by a profound commitment to justice for all Malaysians.
At the root of the first type of politics is a jaundiced view of the imperative primacy of communal identity. At the root of the second type of politics is an enlightened vision of the enduring bond of our common human identity.
For that is the essence of our struggle for justice: to enable all of us, irrespective of ethnic origin, to be truly human.
DR CHANDRA MUZAFFAR, an academic, is currently the deputy president of Parti Keadilan Nasional.
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