Social contract waiting to self-destruct
If memory serves us correctly, the social contract - a simple unwritten arrangement fostered between Malays and non-Malays by the eternal wisdom of our founding fathers - brought about a rare unity among the multi-racial peoples of British Malaya and expedited the advent of independence on Aug 31, 1957.
It also paved the way for inclusion of Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei in an enlarged federation within just six years of the midnight air ringing with shouts of 'Merdeka!' in Kuala Lumpur.
Brunei stayed out over oil revenues and Singapore, as we will see later, left soon after. The social contract remained intact.
If memory serves us correctly, the social contract - a simple unwritten arrangement fostered between Malays and non-Malays by the eternal wisdom of our founding fathers - brought about a rare unity among the multi-racial peoples of British Malaya and expedited the advent of independence on Aug 31, 1957.
It also paved the way for inclusion of Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei in an enlarged federation within just six years of the midnight air ringing with shouts of 'Merdeka!' in Kuala Lumpur.
Brunei stayed out over oil revenues and Singapore, as we will see later, left soon after. The social contract remained intact.
Surely, the thrust of the contract was simple: since urban-based Chinese in particular had considerable economic power compared to the largely rural-dwelling Malays - who see themselves as the indigenous people - it was felt that it was only right that the Malays should hold the reins of political power as part of a quid pro quo arrangement.
They would share power with non-Malays and thereby underwrite the continued economic success of the country. Malay hopes, unlike the disastrous route taken by economic nationalists in so much of Africa, in Myanmar and Fiji, hinged on the economy going right.
Had the Malays been overwhelmingly in the majority, its unlikely there would have been a social contract of any sort. The non-Malay numbers almost matched the Malay, even after being bolstered for nearly 150 years by immigrants from the Malay archipelago Had overwhelmingly Chinese Singapore been included with Malaya, the Malays would have been in a distinct minority in their own land.
There were shades of New Zealand, Australia, Mauritius and the Americas here, all lands where the original inhabitants have been reduced to an insignificant minority that has been caught up in a vicious cycle of alcohol and drug abuse, poverty, ignorance and disease in vice-ridden shanty towns or in god-forsaken reservations apportioned the most inhospitable and difficult of terrains.
The founding fathers of Malaya, in a stroke of sheer visionary genius, saw no reason for a time-bound social contract. Neither did they see any reason for preserving the arrangement in print for posterity. The social contract, it was foreseen, would serve the nation well and melt away when its time came.
Revisionist approach
As the nation celebrates its 50th anniversary of independence, the thinking among many Malaysians is that the social contract has become a footnote in history books. They point out that not only have Malay numbers increased significantly but the community itself has considerable leverage in the context of an expanding economic pie.
The levers of the economy at the policy level are almost totally in Malay hands, albeit because of their sheer numbers, although the community continues to be edged out at the retail level. The market is a different ball game altogether.
Not so, scream a vociferous minority, who not only see the social contract as far from having outlived its purpose but insist that it also includes other aspects like the position of the Malay rulers, the position of Islam as the official religion of the federation; the position of Bahasa Melayu as the basis of Bahasa Malaysia and the sole medium of instruction in education; and the special privileges of the Malays, and by extension, other indigenous peoples in the peninsula and Borneo.
This revisionist approach among a diehard Malay nationalist core hasn't gone down well with the Indian and Chinese Malaysians in particular and they have made no bones about it in the vernacular media and other channels. Malay moderates feel its high time to take the debate behind closed doors, not so much to re-negotiate the social contract, but to remind community leaders about the history of the past so that they can reassure themselves and their people and renew their faith in the nation and a common destiny, sharing and caring alike.
Essentially, the various issues being bandied about outside the social contract are either well covered in the Federal Constitution or backed by social convention. Hence, the question of including these in an unwritten political arrangement like the social contract should not arise at all.
Generally, non-Malays are even more for the Malay rulers and see the institution as an important bulwark against mob rule and rabble-rousers. Meanwhile, the constitution remains secular, despite Islam being recognised by the otherwise colour-blind document as the official religion. The constitution guarantees complete freedom of worship.
The shifting mindset even among the religious moderates can best be seen as their coming to terms slowly and painfully with a brave, new way to combat the dangerous mix of politics with religion. Religion is religion, and politics is politics, and never the twain shall meet in Malaysia.
Breakdown of contract
The current debate over the social contract is not the first time that attempts have been made to revise history for reasons of political expediency. Nearly 40 years ago, after the searing Sino-Malay race riots of May 13, 1969 in Kuala Lumpur, many historians attributed the bloodshed to the "breakdown" of the social contract when non-Malay political parties made substantial gains in the general election held three days earlier.
Penang had fallen to the newly-formed Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, which was in fact mainly composed of ousted rebel leaders from the MCA, a key member of the ruling Alliance Party. The DAP, the Malaysian chapter of Singapore's ruling PAP, had almost half the seats in the Selangor assembly, while the PPP made similar gains in its Perak heartland.
The MCA saw no further purpose in being part of the federal government and pulled out while still remaining as a member of the Alliance. The MIC, the other key member of the Alliance, stayed put in the federal government, in the states and at local levels, even as quite a number of panicky families sold their properties for a mere song and packed their bags for India. Elsewhere, long queues of would-be migrants formed for weeks outside the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian High Commissions in particular and the US Embassy.
The MCA pullout from the federal government was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Race riots erupted first in the Chinatown area of Chow Kit which had a Malay hinterland and soon spread all over the capital. The incomplete polling was abandoned, Parliament was disbanded, democracy suspended, and a state of emergency declared by the caretaker government. There were isolated incidents everywhere. The police were hopelessly outnumbered and overwhelmed and the Malay Regiment was brought in.
There were feeble attempts in official circles to blame the communists for the riots but these quickly fizzled out. At the height of the Vietnam War, the communists were the eternal bogeyman in Southeast Asia and everywhere in the free world.
The Malay Regiment were replaced by the Federation Army and the Sarawak Regiment and calm quickly returned to the burnt-out streets of Kuala Lumpur. The Gerakan and the PPP were wooed to become members of an enlarged Alliance which was renamed Barisan Nasional (BN). The social contract was back on track. The Alliance, symbolised by a sail boat, had sunk. The BN chose the scales of justice as the new symbol.
Hardly five years before May 13, Singapore had queried the social contract as a member of the federation and was quickly ushered out. Sabah and Sarawak remained in the federation after some initial demands for a review by Sabah.
Varying opinions
Is the social contract still relevant in this day and age? Every two people have three opinions.
A simple reading of history and the demographics shows that the Malay factor will henceforth continue to be an important aspect of the nation's politics unlike in the early days when the community genuinely feared being swamped by the immigrants from India and China and their descendants.
No longer can a non-Malay be the prime minister, for example, unless with the consent of the governed, who are predominantly Malay and other indigenous peoples. Malays have also entered the money economy in a big way as a community and made considerable gains.
As the Malays prosper, and emerge more educated and universal in outlook, having a stranglehold on politics will be less and less the community's main pre-occupation and obsession. Herein lies the seeds of destruction of the social contract despite having served the nation well.
It is unlikely too that the Chinese parties in government will ever contemplate leaving the ruling coalition and should they do so, they will not be wooed back.
The Chinese in the political opposition, too long in the wilderness, are waiting in the wings for a historic opportunity to taste the spoils of office.
JOE FERNANDEZ is an educationist and former newspaper editor who feels compelled to put pen to paper when something doesn't quite jell with his weltanschauung (worldview). He readily admits that there's a demon in him at these times, urging him on. Otherwise, he's working quietly on a semi-autobiographical travelogue, and teaching English privately.

