Renegades, rebels and apostates
Salbiah AhmadPublished: Feb 24, 2001 10:09 AM | Updated: Jan 29, 2008 6:21 PM
Jihad is often associated with the waging of war. But jihad has a wider meaning. In one Sunnah (the normative practice of the Prophet), it is said that the best form of jihad is to speak the truth in the face of a tyrannical and oppressive ruler.
There is no dearth of examples about speaking out in historical Islam.
Ibn Khaldun, (d. 808 H/1405 AD) was dismissed from public office four times. He served as a teacher and judge for about a quarter of a century in Egypt from 794 H/1382 AD. His acts of rebellion or recalcitrance emanated from his concern that the law was enforced with its ideals abandoned and superseded by the social habits and self-interest of men in authority. He deplored the spread of bribery, irregularities in judicial procedure and other corrupt practices.
It was reported that even the infallible imams, the founders of the various schools of thought were not spared imprisonment. Malik (d. 179 H/795 AD) and Abu Hanifa (d. 150 H/767 AD) who refused to be judges in their respective caliph's court were cited for contempt. Both feared that they would not be able to do both justice and bidding of the state.
Ijtihad, a derivative of the same root word as jihad (namely jahd) means independent juristic reasoning in developing principles and rules from the texts of the faith. Thus, exercising juristic effort in developing legal principles is a form of jihad.
Jurists developed ijtihad out of necessity. Only 500-600 of a total of 6219 Quranic verses had some legal content out of which only 80 verses dealt with legal subject-matters in the strict sense. There is scholarly dispute on the issue of the closing of the gates of ijtihad in juristic history, the time varying from third or fourth century AD to the seventh century AD.
Scholars cite interference by the state, decadence of Islamic institutions and culture as reasons for the controversial closing of the gates. Muslims exercising any effort of interpretation after this incident of history, or Muslims with differing views from the so-called majority opinion, are often accused of heresy. They faced resistance, condemnation, torture, defamation and even death.
The project where the state defines and metes out punishment for heresy, defaming the religion and apostasy raises concerns.
Traditional political theory in Islam, presumes a unity of purpose between the individual and the state. The ruler and the ruled were presumed to be motivated to follow the dictates of justice to win favour and avoid punishment in the hereafter. The state assumes a paternalistic position as guardian of the faith (as an extension of the position of the caliph in traditional political theory).
Given this scenario, one supposes that any dissent mounted by the ruled would easily be viewed as sedition (in relation to the state) or heresy or apostasy in relation to the religion. This position is made easier for the state when the system assumes that there is a single standard of what may be the Islamic ruling on the matter in dispute or the state has appropriated one juristic opinion over the others as the standard.
Ideas of limitation of the power of the state in relation to fundamental freedoms of the people is an accepted constitutional and political norm in the theory of the nation state. Scholars argue that the intellectual tradition of Islam is dynamic and the texts of the faith promote ideas of constitutionalism as we understand them today.
However, the fact remains that the Syariah or Islamic law "received" as standards, especially in matters of constitutional and political theory, largely comprises ideas forged by jurists in a particular time and in a particular place, that is seventh century, feudalistic Arabia.
Muslims in the light of laws on apostasy, deviationism and defaming of the religion are becoming increasingly concerned about state control of definition and prosecution of these laws without any apparent room for challenge because that challenge itself may be inferred as heresy. PAS, for instance, supports death for apostasy while BN laws vary.
The so-called recent phenomenon of political parties out-doing each other on matters of religion to win votes and maintain political power, has created the need to explore the ideas of the rule of law in the context of religion. Islam is no longer a matter of the private, personal sphere of the Muslim.
Scholars have identified three main areas of concern where Islam becomes part of the ideology of the state. These relate to women, freedom of belief and non-Muslims.
Much of the difficulty around these three issues revolves around the "settled views" of the majority of juristic opinion before the closing of the gates of ijtihad. Being "settled" and held by the majority, these opinions operate as the Islamic standard.
There is a growing opinion among public law scholars today that these "settled" opinions are limited to the context of the social, political milieu of that period in history or the time of the revelation.
For example, in the case of unbelief (including apostasy), settled opinions clearly advocate antagonism and jihad (persuasion, battle) based on verses revealed after the Prophet's migration to Medina in 622AD. The period of revelation, as reflected in these verses show the need for internal cohesion of the fledging and vulnerable Muslim community in a hostile environment of persecution of the new faithful.
The Medinan verses (3:28, 4:144, 8:72-73, 9:23,71 and 60:1) also prohibited Muslims from taking unbelievers as friends, helpers and supporters (awliyya). In 5:51, Muslims were not to take Jews and Christians as awliyya, as they are awliyya for each other, and any Muslim who turns to Christians and Jews for friendship and support becomes one of them (in unbelief).
These settled opinions still find support among Muslims regardless of the fact that the circumstances operating during that historical period may not hold true in present day Malaysia.
Imam Shafii (d.204 H/ 819 AD), the founder of the Shafii school of law, which is the predominant school of thought among Muslims in South East Asia, had in fact varied his juristic opinions when he moved from Iraq to Eqypt.
This was necessitated by the differences between the two environments and societies. If Shafii had seen fit to do this in his lifetime, it is inconceivable that this reasoning becomes unavailable today on the basis of "settled juristic opinion".
Muslims must begin to acknowledge the problems. Furthermore, the problems should not be resolved as a matter for the Muslims to sort out among themselves or for the state to decide.
When Islam becomes the ideology which informs the state in terms of its politics, law or governance, it is important that an autonomous and independent civil society is present. Without these checks and balances, the state would inevitably seek to entrench its power. Religion provides a means to do this.
There is no dearth of examples about speaking out in historical Islam.
Ibn Khaldun, (d. 808 H/1405 AD) was dismissed from public office four times. He served as a teacher and judge for about a quarter of a century in Egypt from 794 H/1382 AD. His acts of rebellion or recalcitrance emanated from his concern that the law was enforced with its ideals abandoned and superseded by the social habits and self-interest of men in authority. He deplored the spread of bribery, irregularities in judicial procedure and other corrupt practices.
It was reported that even the infallible imams, the founders of the various schools of thought were not spared imprisonment. Malik (d. 179 H/795 AD) and Abu Hanifa (d. 150 H/767 AD) who refused to be judges in their respective caliph's court were cited for contempt. Both feared that they would not be able to do both justice and bidding of the state.
Ijtihad, a derivative of the same root word as jihad (namely jahd) means independent juristic reasoning in developing principles and rules from the texts of the faith. Thus, exercising juristic effort in developing legal principles is a form of jihad.
Jurists developed ijtihad out of necessity. Only 500-600 of a total of 6219 Quranic verses had some legal content out of which only 80 verses dealt with legal subject-matters in the strict sense. There is scholarly dispute on the issue of the closing of the gates of ijtihad in juristic history, the time varying from third or fourth century AD to the seventh century AD.
Scholars cite interference by the state, decadence of Islamic institutions and culture as reasons for the controversial closing of the gates. Muslims exercising any effort of interpretation after this incident of history, or Muslims with differing views from the so-called majority opinion, are often accused of heresy. They faced resistance, condemnation, torture, defamation and even death.
The project where the state defines and metes out punishment for heresy, defaming the religion and apostasy raises concerns.
Traditional political theory in Islam, presumes a unity of purpose between the individual and the state. The ruler and the ruled were presumed to be motivated to follow the dictates of justice to win favour and avoid punishment in the hereafter. The state assumes a paternalistic position as guardian of the faith (as an extension of the position of the caliph in traditional political theory).
Given this scenario, one supposes that any dissent mounted by the ruled would easily be viewed as sedition (in relation to the state) or heresy or apostasy in relation to the religion. This position is made easier for the state when the system assumes that there is a single standard of what may be the Islamic ruling on the matter in dispute or the state has appropriated one juristic opinion over the others as the standard.
Ideas of limitation of the power of the state in relation to fundamental freedoms of the people is an accepted constitutional and political norm in the theory of the nation state. Scholars argue that the intellectual tradition of Islam is dynamic and the texts of the faith promote ideas of constitutionalism as we understand them today.
However, the fact remains that the Syariah or Islamic law "received" as standards, especially in matters of constitutional and political theory, largely comprises ideas forged by jurists in a particular time and in a particular place, that is seventh century, feudalistic Arabia.
Muslims in the light of laws on apostasy, deviationism and defaming of the religion are becoming increasingly concerned about state control of definition and prosecution of these laws without any apparent room for challenge because that challenge itself may be inferred as heresy. PAS, for instance, supports death for apostasy while BN laws vary.
The so-called recent phenomenon of political parties out-doing each other on matters of religion to win votes and maintain political power, has created the need to explore the ideas of the rule of law in the context of religion. Islam is no longer a matter of the private, personal sphere of the Muslim.
Scholars have identified three main areas of concern where Islam becomes part of the ideology of the state. These relate to women, freedom of belief and non-Muslims.
Much of the difficulty around these three issues revolves around the "settled views" of the majority of juristic opinion before the closing of the gates of ijtihad. Being "settled" and held by the majority, these opinions operate as the Islamic standard.
There is a growing opinion among public law scholars today that these "settled" opinions are limited to the context of the social, political milieu of that period in history or the time of the revelation.
For example, in the case of unbelief (including apostasy), settled opinions clearly advocate antagonism and jihad (persuasion, battle) based on verses revealed after the Prophet's migration to Medina in 622AD. The period of revelation, as reflected in these verses show the need for internal cohesion of the fledging and vulnerable Muslim community in a hostile environment of persecution of the new faithful.
The Medinan verses (3:28, 4:144, 8:72-73, 9:23,71 and 60:1) also prohibited Muslims from taking unbelievers as friends, helpers and supporters (awliyya). In 5:51, Muslims were not to take Jews and Christians as awliyya, as they are awliyya for each other, and any Muslim who turns to Christians and Jews for friendship and support becomes one of them (in unbelief).
These settled opinions still find support among Muslims regardless of the fact that the circumstances operating during that historical period may not hold true in present day Malaysia.
Imam Shafii (d.204 H/ 819 AD), the founder of the Shafii school of law, which is the predominant school of thought among Muslims in South East Asia, had in fact varied his juristic opinions when he moved from Iraq to Eqypt.
This was necessitated by the differences between the two environments and societies. If Shafii had seen fit to do this in his lifetime, it is inconceivable that this reasoning becomes unavailable today on the basis of "settled juristic opinion".
Muslims must begin to acknowledge the problems. Furthermore, the problems should not be resolved as a matter for the Muslims to sort out among themselves or for the state to decide.
When Islam becomes the ideology which informs the state in terms of its politics, law or governance, it is important that an autonomous and independent civil society is present. Without these checks and balances, the state would inevitably seek to entrench its power. Religion provides a means to do this.
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