Living as we do in the post-economic crisis era where nothing seems to make sense anymore, one would be hard-pressed to find examples of a Malaysian success story that has not somehow gone disastrously wrong.

Yet it was not too long ago that Malaysians were told that there was nothing that was beyond the scope of their achievements. It seemed as if Malaysia, and Malaysians, were capable of anything. This wave of popular enthusiasm and collective fervour was embodied by the slogan "Malaysia Boleh !" (Malaysia Can Do It!).

Coming as it did during the closing stages of the 20th century, the slogan seemed to reflect a new-found confidence among the Malaysian public at large. It was as if after decades of self-contempt and lack of determination, the people of the country had finally begun to rouse themselves in order to mobilise for the future.

But like all narrative devices, the near-magical fetish-like attraction and power of the slogan "Malaysia Boleh " could be explained in a rational way. If "Malaysia Boleh " had any relevance and currency among the Malaysians themselves, it was only because they had been told "Malaysia Tidak Boleh " for so long by their own leaders.

In a acrobatic discursive twist worthy of Orwell himself, Malaysia's political leadership suddenly declared that the nation - which had been diagnosed as backward, poor, lagging behind in the economic race - was suddenly awash with latent talent just waiting to be unleashed upon the rest of the world.

But we need to remember that earlier on it was precisely the same powers that be who declared that Malaysians - and the Malays in particular - were chronically backward and subservient, and that there was a need for a "mental revolution" in order to lift the people out of the quagmire.

It was during the early 1970s that the Umno leadership of the country published the book Revolusi Mental (Mental Revolution), edited by the then secretary-general of the party, Senu Abdul Rahman. The writers who contributed to the text of Revolusi Mental presented an image of the Malays as an inherently backward, ill-educated and pathetic race that was trapped in a dark world of superstition, blind deference to authority and lack of economic sense.

They argued that nothing short of a radical mental revolution would be able to save the Malays from themselves - something that was echoed in an earlier text by a certain Dr Mahathir Mohamad whose prognosis of The Malay Dilemma put the blame for Malay backwardness on a host of variable factors ranging from genetics to historical determinism.

The net effect of books like Revolusi Mental was that it gave the impression that the Malays were somehow unable to fend for themselves or survive in the modern world without the help of a patron-class of rulers. It also served as the ideological justification for a number of positive-discriminatory policies that came under the umbrella of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

However, the long-term effect was the same: The neo-feudal ideology of patronage helped to create and reinforce the impression that the Malays were somehow unable to cope with change and development without the help of the state and the Umno party in particular.

The state's tutelage would then help to lift the Malays out of their moral and spiritual morass, and eventually lead them to the blissful land of "Malaysia Boleh" with the ruling powers that be close at hand to watch over them. Or so they thought.

No more overawed

Today, it would appear that the once-popular theme of "Malaysia Boleh" is being contested on all fronts. Malaysians, it seems, are not all that impressed with what has passed as Malaysia's record of spectacular achievements so far.

For some reason, the Malay farmers of the North don't seem all that overawed by Malaysians who choose to parachute over the North or South Pole. Likewise the Malay fishermen whose harvest of fish are being depleted thanks to foreign competitors do not seem all that impressed with Malaysians who sail around the world single-handedly. And so on.

Lurking behind the scenes, however, is another success story that was given little if no publicity at all over the years. By this we refer to the rise of a certain Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the country's main Islamist opposition party. Few, if any, local political commentators have cared to point out that the rise and development of PAS over the past 50 years happen to be one of the few Malay success stories of our time - and with no government support either.

Lest it be forgotten, we need to remind ourselves of the fact that PAS began as a splinter movement that broke from the ranks of Umno in the early 1950s. By then, the divide between the Anglophile elite of Umno - led by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj and Tun Abdul Razak Hussein - and the more conservative Islamist trend within the party was painfully clear for all to see.

But it was Umno that first helped to bring PAS together by organising a number of pan-Malayan ulama congresses, in its effort to win support from the Islamists among the Malay nationalists as well as to pre-empt the possibility of an Islamist opposition from emerging in the country.

The move eventually backfired though, as the ulama and imam who attended the numerous Umno-sponsored ulama congresses had ideas of their own. On Nov 24, 1951, they finally decided to break away from the Umno fold (though many of the early members of PAS held dual membership to both organisations).

During the first five years of the party's history (from 1951 to 1956), PAS was desperately poor in every respect. The party's first leaders - Ahmad Fuad Hassan and Dr Abbas Elias - tried their best to run and manage the party on the most meagre of resources. At one point the party could not even afford a typewriter, much less an office of its own.

During this time, the party was so poor of finances that it could not afford to pay any of its workers. Election candidates had to campaign on their own, and all they received were some posters and banners. There were no hotel receptions or big gala dinners - the leaders of the party slept in the homes of friends or even in the mosques and surau that came their way.

Later during the 1960s and 1970s, the party managed to extend the scope of its activities further afield. With the entry of Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy as the party's third president (and Dr Zulkiflee Muhammad as the vice-president), PAS began to win a little more support from the Malays of the peninsula.

Asri Muda was particularly important in this respect because he was the one who managed to lay the groundwork for PAS' activities and membership networks in the northern states of Kelantan and Terengganu in particular.

PAS's ill-fated attempt to join the Barisan Nasional coalition during the 1970s taught the leadership of the party one vital lesson: that they could not rely on the help and support of the government without compromising some of their ideological principles along the way.

The net result of this encounter was PAS' graceless exit from the coalition and the eventual downfall of Asri Muda (who was then the fourth president of PAS). In the wake of Asri's demise, we have witnessed the rise of the new "ulama faction" who took over the leadership of PAS by storm during the early 1980s and who have been at the helm of the party ever since.

Putting aside our own feelings and reservations about what PAS stands for today and what its political agenda might be (regular readers of this column will know what the author thinks about PAS' stated aim of creating an Islamic state in Malaysia, in any case), there remain several important factors for us to consider:

It must be noted that the success of PAS is almost entirely its own. True, there have been times when the Umno-led government seemed hell-bent in destroying its own image thanks to their inept political and ideological blunders - but this does not detract us from recognising PAS' talents.

Like it or not, PAS has shown that it is possible for a Malay-based party to develop itself, expand its network of membership and institutional support both at home and abroad, state its own political demands (however problematic) and appeal to the support of the masses without the advantage of having the institutions of state and government at their command or being able to count on a political campaign fund totalling millions of ringgit.

Indeed, nowhere is this more evident as when one attends any PAS gathering or meeting. On many occasions when I covered PAS rallies and general assemblies, I could not help but notice how practically every single one of the public services were undertaken by the members of the party themselves on a voluntary basis.

During these functions, one encounters PAS stewards, traffic attendants, medical personnel, public relations officers, etc.- all working voluntarily for the sake of the party without asking for reward. If this is not an example of "Malaysia Boleh ", then one wonders what would meet the bill.

Politics of patronage

Conversely, one only has to look at the political rallies organised by the ruling parties of the dominant BN coalition to see where the politics of patronage is still at work. On most of the BN rallies I have attended and covered, I could not help but notice how members of the Malaysian police force were asked to direct traffic and help with the parking. (No doubt to make sure that the cars of VIPs would not be scratched.)

The food would be taken care of by the hotel catering staff, while the same hotel would provide other services like ushering guests and providing assistance when needed.

It doesn't take much intelligence for us to put two and two together in order to predict where this will all lead to. The success of PAS, as a predominantly Malay-Muslim party that has come to take over two states in the federation and which now happens to be the most powerful party in the alternative coalition, should tell us that political success has more to do with braving hardship and surviving trials and tribulations than being spoon-fed by political patrons.

The success of PAS provides us with proof, if any was still needed, that the Malays are not some backward race of ne'er-do-wells who could never succeed in anything without the help of the state and the Umno-led government.

Should Umno want to respond to the challenge of PAS, the way is clear: All they have to do is learn from the success and emulate the virtues of PAS - instead of trying to out-Islamise the party and by doing so upping the stakes in the Islamisation race in the country. Umno will never win in the "janggut and kopiah" race. Even if it forced all its members to don the tudung and grow their beards, Umno will remain in second position as PAS has made political Islam its main thrust and raison d'etre.

But Umno can try to return to the days when its members fought for the development agenda without getting their fingers caught in the money-pot. Meritocracy, hard work, openness, accountability and transparency all remain as sound goals and political objectives that are still worth fighting for.

But one thing Umno must learn to discard is its own hollow propaganda about the "worthlessness" of the Malays and the neo-feudal political culture that accompanies it. After all, one only has to look at PAS for proof that the Malays can thrive and prosper without living under the heels of their political Rajas. In this sense, it is PAS, and not Umno, which proves that "Malaysia Boleh!"

DR FARISH A NOOR is a Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist who is currently writing a book on the Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS. "The Other Malaysia" tries to unearth aspects of Malaysia's history and culture that have been forgotten or relegated to the margins, in order to remind us that there remains another Malaysia that is often forgotten.