opinion The reported 'secret talk' between Umno president Dr Mahathir Mohamad and rebellious MCA Youth chief Ong Tee Keat in the VIP room of Kedah's Sultan Abdul Halim airport has fuelled intense speculations and possibly aroused a mixture of hope and fear among the warring factions in MCA.

MCA president Dr Ling Liong Sik was, for example, reported in the front page of China Press on Dec 15 as saying that he "believes" the Umno president "advised Ong to preserve party unity and stability". China Press, it should be noted, is now owned by MCA under the leadership of Ling.

Ling's one-sentence response to the question was a clear rebuttal to the assertion made by Ong that the "secret talk" did not touch on party matters but only "private affairs".

Ling appears to be right in his speculation that the 'secret talk' must somehow be related to MCA's 'unity and stability'.

Umno's agents

To Ling and his faction, that Ong and other 'Team B' leaders of MCA would seek the 'intervention' of 'outside powers' to their favour was perhaps not unexpected.

Throughout the history of MCA-Umno relations, the dominant faction of MCA has always been wary of alienated or frustrated dissidents being made used by Umno as 'agents-in-place'.

The establishment and continued existence of the pro-Umno Gerakan also irritates MCA's dominant faction in the same manner. As in international relations, allies do spy on one another.

What worries Ling and his faction seems to be the content of the 'secret talk': What did Ong, as a person who is knowledgeable about the contemporary decision-making process of MCA, as well as the business activities and development of some MCA leaders and their families, tell the Umno president?

To some true diehards of MCA who see the party as the ideological embodiment of 'Chinese unity', the dissidents in MCA - and those in rival party Gerakan - are sometimes suspected to be working for Umno to weaken 'Chinese unity' in return for positions in the Umno-dominated government and bureaucracy.

Of course, MCA dissidents and Gerakan would always counter that by saying that they are working 'for the overall interests of the Barisan Nasional, the country and the people'.

From Umno's perspective, it is perhaps only 'normal' for it to be 'informed' as much as possible of what happens in MCA and other component parties of BN, including Gerakan and MIC.

As a dominant party in the coalition, it cannot afford to allow its weaker allies to 'conspire behind its back' and grow stronger, more assertive and more powerful to a point where its dominance is challenged or at least, rendered irrelevant in substance.

Grand strategy

In a classically Machiavellian prescription, the grand strategy of the 'inner party' of Umno to stay in power is to ally with weaker parties, assist them to grow functionally strong enough to take on the opposition, but never to allow their political and organisational strength to outgrow its own. That grand strategy also seems to be applied to the 'outer party' of Umno itself.

Of course, when Ling repeatedly warned 'outsiders' not to 'intervene' into MCA's 'internal affairs', he most likely had these factors at the back of his mind, although he could not be very clear and straightforward in the open for obvious reasons.

However, Ling, like all the dominant factions in MCA throughout its history cannot openly blame the dissidents, Gerakan and other 'Chinese advisers, assistants and friends' of the 'inner party' of Umno who are 'independent' of the party system and directly responsible or accountable only to the Umno president.

After all, the dominant factions of MCA itself have, in one way or another, been dependent on Umno for its own political survival and commercial prosperity.

For example, just before the last general elections, a member of the dominant faction of MCA and Ling loyalist, Dr Chua Sooi Lek from Johor, openly admitted even in the Chinese-language newspaper that "we" had to "accept the reality of Malay supremacy" as represented by Umno.

Ling himself is still remembered for suggesting that Chinese Malaysians, as "a minority" must "behave accordingly".

Thus, the dominant factions of MCA, including the one led by Ling now, have never had the moral high ground to accuse in any self-righteous terms the modus operandi of its own dissidents.

Seen in this perspective, 'Team A' and 'Team B' of MCA, Gerakan and others are merely digits of the balance-of-power (or balance-of-threat) to be manipulated in the grand strategy of the 'inner party' of Umno.

Chinese hero

Another equally noteworthy development is a Nanyang Siang Pau report on Dec 15 which quoted a source in the MCA Youth as saying that it was not the Umno president who summoned Ong to see him, but it was Ong who "took the initiative" and "requested" to meet Mahathir through his press secretary, Cheng Kee Chien, and his "request" was merely granted.

The source quoted by Nanyang Siang Pau also said that the 'secret talk' between Ong and the Umno president was "focused" on "disputes and conflicts within MCA Youth", but nothing on the position of Ong as the deputy minister for youth, culture and tourism.

Again, the source, who seems to be pro-Ong, dismissed that the 'secret talk' was only related to 'some private affairs' as claimed by Ong himself when Chinese journalists met him after the 10-minute talk.

Of course, for Ong - who has been perceived by many in the Chinese civil society as being rather 'vain' to be 'summoned' by the Umno president - the 'secret' meeting does not help his effort to build up the image of a 'Chinese hero'.

For image-spinning purposes, it has to be that it was Ong himself who could make appointment with the Umno president and have direct access to the prime minister 'at his (Ong's) own pleasure and free will', without going through the MCA president.

Ong may be right. Mahathir's purpose of setting up his own team of unelected Chinese advisers and assistants seems to be for some 'useful' Chinese to have access to him directly without going through or being blocked by the top leaders of MCA, Gerakan and SUPP who have their own vested interests and political or business agenda.

Disowned and distrusted

However, Ong could also create troubles for himself by so doing. One, he could be painted as an 'Umno agent' in MCA and the Chinese community by the party's 'Team A'.

Two, his own factional allies may also be suspicious of him exploiting their anti-Ling emotion and sentiment for endearing himself personally to Umno, and in the process, making 'secret compromises' at the expenses of the entire 'Team B'.

After the 'secret meeting' with the Umno president, and still refusing to divulge what transpired, Ong could be disowned and distrusted by both 'Team A' and 'Team B' at the top and on the ground.

As for the Umno president himself, his 'secret meeting' with one of the most controversial leaders of the highly factionalised MCA may do him no good either.

His name may be misused and abused in the many more 'secret cell meetings' of the warring factions in MCA from now on to the next party elections in June or July, although all profess to love him openly.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia which produces the subscriber-based political report, Analysis Malaysia. Wong is a former member of parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily. He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew, he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute for 1998 and 1999.