Nature of the Iraqi war
Aemilius PaullusPublished: May 19, 2006 6:51 AM | Updated: Jan 29, 2008 10:21 AM
In the current debate over Iraq, all sides make the assumption that to succeed, the US must fight the Vietnam war again. But how valid is this parallel?
A Maoist 'people's war' is a struggle for good governance between a class-based insurgency claiming to represent the interests of the oppressed and a ruling regime portrayed by the insurgents as defending entrenched privilege. The insurgents and the regime compete for the allegiance of the people. A key requirement for success is an ideological programme. A Maoist 'people's war' is a war of ideas as much as killing the competition, and nationalism is often at the heart of the programme.
Communal civil wars, in contrast, feature opposing groups divided along ethnic or sectarian lines. They are not about class interest or nationalism. These conflicts do not revolve around ideas, because no pool of uncommitted citizens is waiting to be swayed by ideology. Albanian Kosovars, Bosnian Muslims, and Rwandan Tutsis knew which side they were on. The fight is about group survival, not about the superiority of one party's ideology or one side's ability to deliver better governance.
Whereas Vietnam was a Maoist 'people's war', Iraq is very clearly a communal civil war. This can be seen in the pattern of violence, which is strongly correlated with communal affiliation. The four provinces that make up the Sunni heartland account for 85 percent of all insurgent attacks. Iraq's other 14 provinces, where almost 60 percent of the population lives, account for only 15 percent of the violence.
The vast majority of the insurgents are ethnic Sunnis, and the small minority who are not (such as Al Qaeda) are only able to operate because Iraqi Sunnis provide them with safe houses, intelligence, and supplies. Much of the violence is aimed at the Iraqi police, which recruit disproportionally from Shiites and Kurds. Most of the suicide bombings are directed at Shiite neighbourhoods, such as Baghdad, Diyala, or northern Babil, where Sunnis have easy access to non-Sunni targets.
Many consider the insurgents to be nationalists opposing the US occupation. This is simply untrue. There is almost no anti-occupation violence in Shiite or Kurdish provinces. The Sunnis raising arms against the US, are doing so because because they see themselves as defenders against a Shiite and Kurdish-dominated government. Defence of sect and ethnic groups, not resistance to foreign occupation account for the anti-US violence.
Class and ideology do not seem to matter. Poor Shiites or Sunnis are not fighting against their richer neighbours, and there is little evidence of theocrats killing secularists of their own ethnic group. This is not surprising. The insurgents are not competing for Shiite hearts and minds. They are fighting for Sunni self-interest. Nationalism is only a secondary factor, and its main effect is to intensify the Sunnis' violence in what is fundamentally a communal civil war. This is not to claim that there are no Iraqi patriots. And this is certainly not to denigrate the efforts of those who have sacrificed much for a new Iraq. But these efforts may be in vain if the nature of this war is misunderstood.
A Maoist 'people's war' is a struggle for good governance between a class-based insurgency claiming to represent the interests of the oppressed and a ruling regime portrayed by the insurgents as defending entrenched privilege. The insurgents and the regime compete for the allegiance of the people. A key requirement for success is an ideological programme. A Maoist 'people's war' is a war of ideas as much as killing the competition, and nationalism is often at the heart of the programme.
Communal civil wars, in contrast, feature opposing groups divided along ethnic or sectarian lines. They are not about class interest or nationalism. These conflicts do not revolve around ideas, because no pool of uncommitted citizens is waiting to be swayed by ideology. Albanian Kosovars, Bosnian Muslims, and Rwandan Tutsis knew which side they were on. The fight is about group survival, not about the superiority of one party's ideology or one side's ability to deliver better governance.
Whereas Vietnam was a Maoist 'people's war', Iraq is very clearly a communal civil war. This can be seen in the pattern of violence, which is strongly correlated with communal affiliation. The four provinces that make up the Sunni heartland account for 85 percent of all insurgent attacks. Iraq's other 14 provinces, where almost 60 percent of the population lives, account for only 15 percent of the violence.
The vast majority of the insurgents are ethnic Sunnis, and the small minority who are not (such as Al Qaeda) are only able to operate because Iraqi Sunnis provide them with safe houses, intelligence, and supplies. Much of the violence is aimed at the Iraqi police, which recruit disproportionally from Shiites and Kurds. Most of the suicide bombings are directed at Shiite neighbourhoods, such as Baghdad, Diyala, or northern Babil, where Sunnis have easy access to non-Sunni targets.
Many consider the insurgents to be nationalists opposing the US occupation. This is simply untrue. There is almost no anti-occupation violence in Shiite or Kurdish provinces. The Sunnis raising arms against the US, are doing so because because they see themselves as defenders against a Shiite and Kurdish-dominated government. Defence of sect and ethnic groups, not resistance to foreign occupation account for the anti-US violence.
Class and ideology do not seem to matter. Poor Shiites or Sunnis are not fighting against their richer neighbours, and there is little evidence of theocrats killing secularists of their own ethnic group. This is not surprising. The insurgents are not competing for Shiite hearts and minds. They are fighting for Sunni self-interest. Nationalism is only a secondary factor, and its main effect is to intensify the Sunnis' violence in what is fundamentally a communal civil war. This is not to claim that there are no Iraqi patriots. And this is certainly not to denigrate the efforts of those who have sacrificed much for a new Iraq. But these efforts may be in vain if the nature of this war is misunderstood.
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