The Huntington flaw
In a world inundated with real or imagined threats from the so-called Islamic fundamentalism, it is only natural that some have chosen to respond to future challenges along civilisational lines. One of the greatest deficits in the Huntingtonian argument is found in its vague, condescending and contradictory definition of what, really, constitutes a civilisation.
Should today's China be largely characterised by Confucianism? It could very well be to a certain extent, but that is not all. Mainland Chinese society is, by and large, deeply influenced by a variety of folk religions, alongside Buddhism, Taoism and, of course, Confucian thoughts.
Meanwhile, it can no longer be denied that nearly six decades of communist rule has produced a large segment of population that is more inclined towards atheist beliefs and sceptical of idealism. For all its increasingly liberal pretence, the Chinese Communist Party remains warily suspicious of religious influence. Ironically, it has begun to resort to Confucianism in its pursuit of a more traditional recipe in dealing with the host of social problems engendered by 25 years of reform policy.
At the other end of the social spectrum is the formidable wave of religious movements in the wake of the bankrupt communist ideology. As Deng Xiaoping once famously opined, "Open the windows, breathe the fresh air and at the same time fight the flies and insects".
In a world inundated with real or imagined threats from the so-called Islamic fundamentalism, it is only natural that some have chosen to respond to future challenges along civilisational lines. One of the greatest deficits in the Huntingtonian argument is found in its vague, condescending and contradictory definition of what, really, constitutes a civilisation.
Should today's China be largely characterised by Confucianism? It could very well be to a certain extent, but that is not all. Mainland Chinese society is, by and large, deeply influenced by a variety of folk religions, alongside Buddhism, Taoism and, of course, Confucian thoughts.
Meanwhile, it can no longer be denied that nearly six decades of communist rule has produced a large segment of population that is more inclined towards atheist beliefs and sceptical of idealism. For all its increasingly liberal pretence, the Chinese Communist Party remains warily suspicious of religious influence. Ironically, it has begun to resort to Confucianism in its pursuit of a more traditional recipe in dealing with the host of social problems engendered by 25 years of reform policy.
At the other end of the social spectrum is the formidable wave of religious movements in the wake of the bankrupt communist ideology. As Deng Xiaoping once famously opined, "Open the windows, breathe the fresh air and at the same time fight the flies and insects".
Deng was referring to the negative effects and social ills that came with his bold 'open door' policy. Now that the 'flies' and 'insects' have become 'locusts' that are devouring the crops and fruits of the economic miracle, many ordinary Chinese are finding solace in the source that the human race knows best - religion. Hence the phenomenal growth of Christianity and the breathtaking sweep of the Fa Lun Gong sect across the country.
In short, it is no longer adequate to define China as a Confucian society. Over the years, it has grown too diverse and fragmented, with new cultures and values contesting with ancient and time-honoured traditions and beliefs for the loyalty of the populace.
At the same time, it is easily overlooked that China is also made up of regions and populations whose cultures and civilisations are far different from those of the Han Chinese. As rightly pointed out by Professor Sun Ge of the Chinese Academy of Social Science, what the world or the overseas Chinese recognise as coastal regions are areas that have more in common with Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, collectively known as Northeast Asia.
Further west, Xinjiang's religion and culture are more Central Asian and even West Asian in nature, while Tibetan society is dominated by its unique Tibetan-Buddhism with strong similarities with the northern part of South Asia. As for the Yunnan and Guizhou provinces, the ethnic and cultural diversity as well as 'hybrid-ity' there has long been arousing the keen interest of anthropologists worldwide.
Seen in this light, it would be intriguing to gauge which China did Samuel Huntington have in mind when he classified China as a Sinic and Confucian civilisation.
Prosperous democracies
Turning to South Korea, it is ludicrous for one to regard it as being 'nationalistic in a deep Confucian way'. Confucius was a great thinker who left the generations after him a rich and long-lasting legacy. Although I do not fully agree with his teachings, the ancient Chinese sage's 'noblest' idea is perhaps his emphasis on a hierarchical yet orderly society. I can understand should the ancient sage be incensed at one's disrespect for the monarch and for one's own parents, but I find it hard to imagine him beating his chests while chanting nationalistic slogans.
If the intricacies of world politics are to be analysed and understood within the Clash of Civilisations theory, it would be perplexing to know that South Korea remains firmly anchored in the defence and strategic aegis sponsored by the US. The same can be said of Taiwan, a country that is Chinese in many respects.
Quite clearly, Huntington's sensationalising claim that the post-Cold War world will be characterised by clashes between civilisations is utterly inadequate in explaining why, being two 'Sinic' states, South Korea and Taiwan have been stable and prosperous democracies for nearly two decades. Is the Harvard professor and his faithful suggesting that the 'Sinic' civilisation as they understand it is inherently incompatible with the 'core element' of western civilisation democracy?
And can one make sense of the conflict between China and Taiwan of modern times despite that they, to paraphrase in a typical Chinese way, drink from the same cultural well?
It is clear from Huntington's book that civilisations are a priori static, monolithic and immutable. His view, as such, is ignorant of empirical evidence to the contrary and runs counter to historical facts.
Devoid of external factors, Sinic civilisation, at its zenith during the Tang Dynasty, would not have become a reality. Buddhism, which gained credence then, is an Indian import, while one of the most celebrated poets of the time, Li Bai, had a strong Turkic influence.
The Judeo-Christian civilisation of the west that Huntington is so jealously guarding is, needless to say, rooted stoutly in Judaism. But it has other significant contributors too. The Greeks, for one, brought Egyptian education and influences to the Western world.
While some would argue the Opium War between the Qing Dynasty and Britain was a showdown between two civilisations, I prefer to see it as a historical fate of an ancient civilisation, unable or unwilling to renew itself. It fell victim to a colonialist state that was a successful industrialised power in every sense of the word. It was a clash of interests, not civilisations.
Japan, alarmed by the tragic fate of China at the time, began to modernise itself, using the American, German, French and British models. Its industrialisation drive was so remarkable that it went on to wreak havoc on the very cultural source of its own civilisation, bringing disastrous consequences on itself.
Debunk the theory
Looking back at his career, Huntington was at his best when he adhered to writing on the complex relations between states, the military and politics. But his record on world politics is pathetic.
Many in the US and Japan may warm to his argument that Japan can be a positive contributor to the West in balancing and countering the rise of China and the Islamic civilisation. It is worth reminding his followers that it was this same Huntington who once made a forceful assertion in the 1980s that the biggest threat to the US in the post-Cold War world would be Japan's (then) invincible economic power. He could not have revised this view sooner.
Huntington is also amazingly wrong in categorising South Africa as part of the 'Free World', ie, a staunch ally of America during the Cold War era. That the black population of the Rainbow Nation was living under the tutelage of apartheid clearly escaped him. Or is this not at all puzzling given that African Americans were only granted full universal suffrage in the 1960s in a country that was regarded by Huntington as deeply entrenched in western democracy.
In a similar vein, when one parrots Huntington and brands the Islamic world as a threat to western civilisation, it is more than curious to notice one's ignorance of the fact that many of the corrupt and autocratic Islamic countries from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan have long been valued partners of the US. Who, in addition to the conservative clerics and authoritarian Muslim rulers, is denying the right of the average Muslim to vote, anyway?
Finally, Huntington wrote in the Wall Street Journal on June 16, 2004 that the US, being a country founded by Christians, has reasons to expect non-Christian faiths to respect it a Christian society. One need not repeat the catastrophic sacrifice of the native Indians for this 'Christian' cause.
In light of his flawed arguments time and time again, it is high time the Huntingtonian theory be revised, debunked, or even discarded. Period.

