According to Malaysia's Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar, who spoke to the media ahead of the Dec 11-12 Asean Summit to be held in Kuala Lumpur, the annual meeting would not be just another "talkshop".

Syed Hamid also said a "grassroots approach" would be adopted to create "a feeling of regional community".

It is indeed pertinent at this juncture in the 38-year history of Asean to respond to the rather widespread question of whether the regional grouping has become a "talkshop" for the political, bureaucratic and academic elites from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma - and in particular, the first five founding member-nations.

Founded in 1967 as a softer or more nuanced version of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Cold War, Asean had indeed made some progresses in functional areas of regional cooperation which culminated in the declaration of the Asean Free Trade Zone (Afta) in 1992 at the Fourth Asean Summit in Singapore.

However, after the end of the Cold War, Asean seems to have lost its coherence, purpose and direction. It began with the controversial 1997 enlargement of the original grouping to admit Indochinese countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma.

For those who favoured and advocated passionately for the inclusion, the entry of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma fulfilled the long-cherished dream of Asean's founders to have the regional grouping truly project its geographical identity. But those who opposed it, felt that the Indochinese states levels and models of economic development as well as political systems would erode the original coherence and direction of Asean.

The 1998 fall of the 32-year Suharto regime in Indonesia and the beginning of a period of democratisation as well as political, economic and social instability also caused grave concern about whether Asean would lose its leadership that is vital for the preservation of its coherence and unity of purpose. The concern is not without basis for it was Suharto's Indonesia, in whose capital the Asean secretariat is based, that had been providing de facto anchorage for Asean since its founding in 1967.

Fundamental challenge

In fact, the fundamental challenge to Asean's coherence and unity of purpose came much earlier with the end of the Cold War in 1991.

Asean was founded as a non-communist, if not anti-communist grouping, faced with a collective fear for the Domino Theory as Indochina's wars of national liberation were being waged, and also in the larger strategic context of the East-West Cold War as well as the later triangular contest among the West, the former Soviet Union and China. Then, Asean, given the diversity or plurality in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, cultural traditions and historical heritage, was united by a common fear.

In particular, its coherence was strengthened by the fear of a politically and militarily resurgent China which is geographically close to the region and whose ethno-cultural and ideological unity, revolutionary zeal as well as historical continuity of the essential polity was believed to be a security threat to the smaller, ethno-cultural more diversified and historical fragmented polities in the Southeast Asian region. That fear was further exacerbated by the Cold War propaganda mounted by anti-Chinese and anti-communist forces.

However, the 1972 Sino-US rapprochement and the 1979 formation of the China-US-Asean united front against the former Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia began to change the regional landscape as well as the perception of China. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1991 and the universally popular wariness of American hegemony have caused China to be felt in some powerful quarters in Southeast Asian countries, in particular Malaysia, to be the only geopolitical counterbalance in, at least, Southeast Asia.

Malaysia, for example, began to accelerate its political tilt and diplomatic gravitation toward China in 1992.

Of course, China has also taken a new look at Asean. Initially, it was perceived to be an anti-China bloc on its southern flank to be denounced and confronted if necessary but gradually, especially after 1979, it began to see the grouping as its anti-Soviet friend, if not ally, to be engaged with.

Effects of 9/11

However, a more confusing pattern began to emerge as the result of the drastic shift of American policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington DC and New York as well as the war in Iraq. While some non-Muslim countries in Asean, particularly Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, seized the opportunity to renew their security relations with the US, the Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia have been confronted with an increasingly anti-American sentiment on the ground, while Asean's Indochinese members are contented with sorting out their own internal problems.

The renewal of the security relations with the US on the part of Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines in the name of fighting global terrorism has, most likely than not, undermined the geopolitical calculation of balancing the China-US relations to their respective national interests.

And with China becoming increasingly self-confident in economic terms and also concerned with its border security as the result of what its sees as potential revival of Japanese militarism as well as the right-wing shift in the domestic politics and foreign policy of the US. The Chinese concern is also compounded by the fear of the revitalisation of the US-Japan security alliance.

The Chinese concern is epitomised in what it sees as an American and Japanese attempt to effectively control the Straits of Malacca which is now also a vital sea-lane of communication and transportation for an economically resurgent China whose demand for oil from the Middle East has increased. It is rather evident that Malaysia, Indonesia and China have adopted a different political position on the Straits of Malacca from the US, Japan and Singapore.

There is also the issue of geo-economics which sees the China-Asean Free Trade Zone competing with the American-sponsored Asia-Pacific Economic Caucus (Apec).

So, it is quite clear that members of Asean, having lost its Cold War coherence and unity of purpose, are now further pulled into different directions by geopolitical and geo-economic forces in the context of China-US 'strategic competition'.

Would the ethnically, religiously, linguistically and culturally diversified Asean be able to withstand the centrifugal forces of China-US geopolitical and geo-economic competitions in the coming years is certainly a very interesting issue to watch and follow.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia. He is a former DAP member of parliament for Kampar (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily). He read political science and economics at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.