At the heart of democratic policing lies the need to create multiple layers of accountability to transform police organisations from oppressive engines of a few powerful interests to a service for all. This is in line with the doctrine of checks and balances that characterise democratic systems of governance.

Internal mechanisms deal with discipline, ethics and performance, while external oversight extends across Parliament, the judiciary and the executive to the community, and widens to newer independent civilian oversight mechanisms (including human rights commissions and ombudsmen).

Working in tandem, the strength and impartiality of each of these mechanisms creates strength and credibility for the police.

Ensuring human security is the duty of the state and every country is obligated to provide an honest, effective and efficient police service. All three pillars of governance have a specific and defined role to play in ensuring good policing.

Government is entitled to provide clear policy direction, prepare policing plans, set standards or performance indicators, and establish strong accountability mechanisms.

However, the distinction between appropriate political direction from a government to a police force and inappropriate political interference in operational policing matters is significant, in law, policy and practice.

Clear delineation of roles, responsibilities and relationships between the police and the executive laid down in law helps to pinpoint accountability. It also minimises the possibility of unfettered interference seeping into policing matters and influencing their functioning.

Extending transparency

Governments are of course duty-bound to hold the police to account. But it is also the responsibility of the police themselves to ensure that internal systems guarantee discipline, performance and all round good policing.

Two mechanisms define internal accountability. The first is the disciplinary environment, which is made up of both the formal apparatus for censuring misconduct and the informal culture that pervades the establishment. The second is the comparatively new technique of performance management that aims to assess police efficiency through target setting.

In too many jurisdictions, internal accountability mechanisms do not enjoy the confidence of either the rank and file or the public. The frequency of bad behaviour and poor performance indicates that internal standard setting and compliance systems are either badly implemented or deliberately disregarded.

Extending transparency bolsters credibility. Data on the number of complaints against police officers received and resolved each year are released in many jurisdictions.

Going beyond figures and openly telling the stories behind acts of misconduct reinforces the notion that leaders will not protect or tolerate misbehaviour. In the long run, laying bare the anatomy and outcomes of internal mechanisms builds faith among the public and police.

Modern systems

Internal accountability mechanisms come into play after an act of misconduct. Changing the way police organisations function - from forces into services where the citizen 'customer' is king - requires regular attention to the whole system rather than being addressed in a piecemeal fashion.

Modern policing systems require modern management structures. Good management is grounded in principles of good governance and accountability, both individual and organisational. As modern systems of accountability are based on objective criteria, they reward merit and professionalism, constantly review performance and quickly repair weaknesses so that little room is left for misconduct.

'Performance management' uses statistics to look at the police in terms of the results they deliver. The outcomes most often measured are those that address police effectiveness, particularly the contribution the police make both to tackling criminality and creating a safe environment for the public.

Typical measures include crime figures or opinion poll data regarding public confidence in the police. Such data is then used for two purposes: internally as 'management information' to help police leaders focus on improving areas where performance is poor; and externally as a means of explaining police performance to the public.

Both can be powerful accountability tools: the former as a way of highlighting problems inside the organisation (by comparing individuals or units and by identifying trends, say in complaints against the police); the latter as a way of expressing the results the police achieve in objective terms, which can then act as the basis for discussion about how to improve.

Independent agencies

As governments increasingly embrace the philosophy of democratic policing, attempts are on to make policing more transparent, involve outsiders, build public confidence, allay fears of bias, assure impartiality of investigation, simplify receipt of complaints, reduce abuse of power and misconduct, change the internal culture and ensure ever better performance.

Countries have therefore sought to augment government and internal accountability systems with other external or civilian - meaning non-police - oversight mechanisms. It is hoped that these systems will complement existing external mechanisms and create a web of accountability from which it is increasingly difficult for police misconduct to escape without consequences.

Such bodies fall into two broad categories: organisations exclusively dedicated to investigating, reviewing and monitoring police-related complaints; and agencies such as ombudsmen and national human rights institutions (usually called commissions) that have broader mandates.

Where multiple oversight agencies contribute to police accountability, a system of co-ordination and referrals carves out jurisdictions and protects against overlapping, duplication and contradictory recommendations.

Much of how effectively complaints authorities, ombudsman's offices and human rights commissions perform their functions once again depends on how truly separate from police and executive influence they are and how autonomous and well embedded their status is in the country's legal architecture. Their effectiveness also depends upon the width and clarity of their mandate; the scope of their investigative powers; the composition and competence of their leadership and staff; and the adequacy and sources of financing.

A particularly crucial factor is their ability to compel obedience to recommendations and the attention and clear support their reports and findings receive at the hands of the government and the police. These minimum requirements are internationally recognised and summed up in the Paris Principles for National Human Rights Institutions, but apply equally to any oversight agency.

The Commonwealth has also compiled National Human Rights Institutions Best Practice guidelines. Unfortunately though, not all civilian oversight agencies in the Commonwealth abide by even these basic guidelines.

Commonwealth countries are increasingly aware that the presence of at least one external, independent civilian agency sends the message that the police will be held accountable. Civilian agencies that are solely dedicated to dealing with complaints against the police have been the most successful in holding the police to account.

Single focus agencies build up expertise, investigative techniques and the capacity to analyse patterns of police conduct and evaluate performance. In any case, how ever independent oversight is structured, political will and strong leadership of both the police and the independent bodies are essential for building a truly accountable and responsive policing system.

Accountability to community

Finally, democratic policing requires accountability to the community that it serves - in other words, it requires the consent and co-operation of the community being policed - not least because close connectivity makes policing more effective. People need to feel they can trust the police and that the police prioritise their concerns and will not subject them to abuse or corruption.

In seeking greater accountability, some civil society representatives engage and some confront, and some do both depending on the circumstance. Experience has shown that it is essential to confront those in power with hard evidence of policing problems, rather than unsubstantiated statistics and easily dismissed anecdotal stories.

Civil society groups traditionally seek accountability by documenting patterns of police abuse. They are also increasingly using international forums for naming and shaming which creates deep embarrassment at home.

Sustained support for reform and accountability comes only when there is a broad domestic constituency that understands and supports the concept of responsive and accountable policing.

Many groups therefore sensitise the police and educate the public, including providing legal awareness about constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, rights on arrest, rights of special groups like indigenous peoples, the disabled, gays and lesbians, and the steps to take when police over-reach their powers. Victims' groups give a human face to the problem of unaccountable policing and have been important catalysts in shaping public opinion.

The media's influence in developing public opinion has prompted many groups to train media personnel on the intricacies of policing. Without analysis of how police accountability can be brought about, the public is deprived of a platform for informed progressive debate and advocacy.

Creating political will requires constant engagement. Timing is vital. Opportunities abound from getting police reform into political manifestos at election time; holding winners to their promises; providing submissions to parliamentary committees; and intervening at all levels of the law making and scrutiny processes where police functioning and performance are up for discussion.

Advocates have sought ratification of treaties, the creation of oversight bodies, and enactment of laws that enhance accountability and transparency, such as right to information, whistle-blower protection and anti-corruption legislation. At the very least, civil society groups demand the right to participate in policy processes and community safety.

Community policing

Concerns about safety and security have pushed governments to relocate policing more firmly within local communities. More countries are experimenting with 'community policing'. This signifies a collaboration between the police and the community, which identifies and solves community problems.

Several factors determine success: traditionally centralised police organisations are required to shift decision-making and responsibility downward and recognise that it is front-line officers who have to make the new community policing approach work. Police and public have to interact as equals and with a sense of shared values.

In societies where power relationships are extremely uneven, community policing has to consider diversity and not be hijacked by dominant groups, otherwise there is a danger that already marginalised groups will be further victimised by the alliance between police and local privilege.

Despite the mixed reception for police reform initiatives across the Commonwealth, there is room for optimism. Growing global concern with crime and security has created fertile ground for new dialogues about police performance and accountability.

As more people feel insecure and unsafe, they become interested in knowing how the government and the police plan to protect life and property, and the need for deeper engagement between the government, police and the community becomes more urgent.

Tomorrow: Priorities in democratic policing


CHRI is an international NGO working for the practical realisation of human rights in the Commonwealth.

This is the second edited extract from its report, Police Accountability: Too Important to Neglect, Too Urgent to Delay, to be presented to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Malta next month.