exclusive Strong objections were made by United States government officials in 1967 against a proposed meeting between a Malaysian minister and the then US president to resolve the rubber price crisis which was having a severe impact on the Malaysian economy.

Recently declassified confidential documents of the US government revealed that President Lyndon B Johnson was told not to entertain any Malaysian request for a meeting to discuss the fall in rubber prices.

The Malaysian government had sent then Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin in September 1967 to discuss with Johnson the serious problem posed by the sale of US rubber stockpile. Malaysia claimed that the US stockpile sale was pushing rubber price down, at the time at its lowest level in 18 years.

This, however, was described as "nonsense" by Johnson's top aide Walt Rostow in a confidential memorandum dated Sept 14, 1967, to his president.

"During the past 12 months, we have cut our stockpile sales from 170,000 tons a year to the current 70,000 tons ... these sales simply are not a significant factor in the current rubber market," said Rostow in the memorandum.

The memorandum and other confidential documents are part of the US State Department's 'Foreign Relations of the United States' series, which include reports on US involvement in Southeast Asia from 1964 to 1968.

The series were distributed by mistake to libraries around the world and the US government is now trying to recall them.

The documents involving Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were recently purchased by a research group at the George Washington University, who posted it on their [#1]website[/#] last Friday.

Rostow advised the president against meeting Tan, suggesting that the Malaysian government's request for the US to suspend the sale of their stockpile should be rejected.

"I think it is best that he get that answer from a lower level. It is probable that the Malaysians will, at some stage, try to make us the whipping boy for their rubber problems. I, therefore, think, it best that you avoid any personal involvement in this matter," he said.

Back-door attempt

Rostow also said that the Malaysian ambassador to the US, Ong Yoke Lin, will make "strenuous efforts" to arrange for an appointment through "the back door and must be cut off at the gulch".

However, the Malaysian government kept pressing for a meeting and sent Foreign Ministry permanent secretary Mohd Ghazali Shafie to Washington at the end of September with the task of securing a high-level meeting.

His efforts were documented in another memorandum prepared by the US National Security Council on Sept 29, 1967 which stated that Ghazali made a 'vigorous presentation', claiming that "communist propagandists are attempting to poison US-Malaysia relations by using our stockpile disposals as evidence that the US is not really helpful to Malaysia.

"The Malaysian government wants to remove, once and for all, this irritant in the US-Malaysia relations."

The memorandum stated that one possible outcome to the crisis would be for Malaysia to buy the entire US stockpile and that US officials were "informally sounding out the Malaysians on this".

The document added that if the Malaysian government could not agree to the proposal, then "Tan should not see the president".

Tan arrived in Washington at the end of September and held seven meetings with the US State Department, Treasury Department and other US officials.

About turn

Then US Secretary of State Dean Rusk told Johnson in a memorandum dated Oct 9 that he was impressed by the way Tan and his colleagues "have begun to search for a realistic solutions to the problem".

He recommended that the president grant "at least a courtesy appointment" to Tan, adding that the Malaysian minister had given an undertaking that he would "make no requests of you with respect to rubber".

Rusk also told the president that the Malaysian government was willing to buy the whole of 360,000 tons of US stockpiled rubber, but at a price which the US government could not accept.

Rusk also said that Johnson should meet Tan as "Tan faces real problems in returning to Malaysia if ha can offer no credible explanation as to why he remained 10 days in Washington and failed to see you".

He also told Johnson that Tan was prepared to express appreciation for the reductions the US made in rubber stockpile disposals the preceding year.

Following this memorandum, Johnson did meet Tan on Oct 10 and in an about-turn, and the Malaysian minister expressed his concerns regarding the rubber crisis.

Three proposals

A memorandum of the conversation during the 25-minute meeting stated Tan explained that the crisis had badly affected Malaysian rubber small-holders and has created grave social and economic effects.

Tan gave three proposals to Johnson - to buy up the entire US rubber stockpile, for Malaysia to have the first refusal to buy the stockpile (which was not acceptable to the US) and to buy on the open market.

No decision was made at the meeting with both sides agreeing to continue the dialogue, though Johnson was keen to discover Malaysia's financing arrangement for any possible purchase.

The US president also assured Tan that he would ask his officials to determine the lowest price at which the US stockpile could be sold to Malaysia.

Johnson was told by his aides that Malaysia could make financial arrangements with the Export-Import Bank and the possible discounts that could be given.

Johnson rejected giving too much of a discount as he "would be obliged one day to justify sale to the Congress" adding that US was facing a US$30 billion deficit due to the Vietnam war.