The polemical article of DAP international secretary Ronnie Liu arguing that Umno leaders were not the real fighters of Merdeka has stirred up quite a bit of reaction, both from Umno Youth as well as other individuals.

While Liu's perspective appears a little too simplistic, Umno Youth's response did not appear to be any more superior or even worthy to be taken seriously. Although I find Nicole Tan's response in malaysiakini quite balanced, many of the reactions especially in the mainstream English media appear to be more or less partial to the winners.

So my contribution here intends to compensate for this imbalance for one party of the losers. I do sympathise with the undue pain and suffering felt by the victims and their relatives of both sides, but we should also endeavour to see this important and painful part of our national history from the point of view of both sides. This, I feel, would help in our slow process of national reconciliation.

Evaluation of historians

Those of us who have read the memoirs of former Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) secretary-general Chin Peng know about the negotiation between representatives of the Malaysian government and CPM under the auspices of the Thai government in Phuket in 1989.

During this, the issue of the recognition of the contribution of the CPM to the process of independence for Malaya was raised and was described by Chin Peng as 'one of the most important issues' discussed (Chin 2003: 490).

After much deliberation, Abdul Rahim Noor, then the director of Malaysia's police special branch who led the Malaysian delegation, stated that there was no dispute over the CPM's contribution to the struggle for independence. However, as to the evaluation of the extent of this contribution, he replied that it should be left to the historians and could not be done during the peace negotiation (p. 490).

So, what has been the evaluation of historians on this issue? We of course should be aware that the so-called 'historians' are not entirely neutral in their perspective. Many of those who wrote the emergency accounts were previously working as special branch agents or were with other police units.

Nonetheless, even those scholars who were anti-communists did not dismiss totally the place of CPM in our history. For instance, Lucian Pye (1956) categorised the orientation of CPM under 'people's liberation communism' in the developing world.

There are many facets to this question, of course. One can criticise the party for the unnecessary suffering, bloodshed and violence brought about by their adoption of armed struggle. But can the CPM be blamed solely for the adoption of armed struggle?

Scholars such as A Short, M Stenson and others admit that other contemporary actors cannot absolve themselves from their share of responsibility and error, such as the uncompromising attitude of the plantation owners, the ruthless and unjust way the police handled the industrial disputes and the eventual adoption of the repressive tactics of the administration.

Some others might point to the futility of the struggle of CPM since it was eventually the Alliance who managed to negotiate for Malaya its political independence. However, would the Alliance have been able to obtain independence by constitutional means without the context of Emergency?

Nobody including a historian would be able to answer with full certitude such a 'would have been' question. It is nonetheless possible to appraise some of the impacts of the context of Emergency on the subsequent political events that led to the independence of British Malaya.

Based on these elements, we could argue that the context of the 'communist threat' played an important role in determining the way our independence history unfolded. It is certain that our national history would otherwise be very different without the historical context of emergency.

'Communist problem'

Two anti-Communist initiatives of Sir Henry Gurney, the British high commissioner for the Federation of Malaya at the initial stage of Emergency, were relevant to our concern here. First of all, Gurney believed that to tackle the 'communist problem', military operation alone would not be effective. He pushed for the speeding up of local elections as a step towards self-rule of Malaya and the preparation for its eventual independence.

He had planned to introduce local elections starting from the municipal level to state council level before appointing 'members' to the federal council in order to provide local elite the experience and exposure to political administration. These measures, for him, could 'satisfy public demands for democratic as opposed to communist methods'. Such positive steps towards self-government were part of Gurney's strategies to deprive the legitimacy of the CPM to acquire independence through violent means (Fernando 2002:11-12).

Secondly, in view of the importance of Chinese support in the CPM campaign, Gurney was instrumental in bringing together leading Chinese community leaders to form the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) with the aim to rally Chinese allegiance from the CPM and co-operate with the government to fight against the communists.

Gurney was killed in an ambush by the communist guerilla in October 1951 even before the holding of the first scheduled municipal elections. However, a political momentum was set and the flow of events was beyond the control of the high commissioner succeeding Gurney, Sir Gerald Templer, who wanted to slow down the political process.

The stunning victory of the MCA-Umno co-operation in the Kuala Lumpur municipal council elections in 1952 set off a train of events which led to the emergence of the Alliance as the major political force, who subsequently led the negotiation of independence from the British.

The communist threat was also an important political context which favoured the relaxation of the citizenship requirements for the Malayan Chinese population in 1952. This was meant to be a strategy to ensure that Chinese who were politically 'neutral' have a stake in the peace and order of the country (Fernando 2002: 90).

This care to not alienate the Chinese population to the extent which could play to the advantage of the CPM was also a vital element of consideration in the Alliance intra-party constitutional negotiation, especially on the issue of the granting of citizenship rights to the Chinese. An independent Malaya with a large number of domiciled Chinese without citizenship would not augur well vis vis the prospects of ending the emergency speedily.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, then the Umno president, also indicated this scenario particularly to the radical elements in his party. He argued that in order to maintain political stability, racial harmony and inter-racial co-operation were the only way forward. In the long run, the Alliance was also worried about the spreading of CPM influence among the Malays (Fernando 2002:90-91).

Baling talks

Lastly, our historical assessment of the Baling talks. The peace negotiation with the Alliance in 1955 was initiated by the CPM. The context of the impending independence of Malaya from the British could not be ignored by the CPM who claimed to fight a battle of national liberation. The British colonial regime rejected immediately this offer of negotiation. But Tunku, the newly elected chief minister then, managed to get the talks going.

After the failed negotiation, the elated Tunku revealed to Said Zahari, the Utusan Melayu journalist who was sent to cover the event, that he did not intend to find a settlement with the CPM from the outset.

Tunku also revealed in one of his memoirs that he only intended to use the Baling negotiation as a bargaining chip with the British authorities at the London Conference anticipated at the beginning of the following year. Hence the CPM was a mere pawn in the Tunku's political game. The negotiation would enhance the stature of the latter as a politician capable of handling a notorious terrorist chief and making tough stands against communism both in the eyes of the British authorities as well as the people (Said 2001: 282-3).

After knowing these facts, is it just for us now to blame the CPM for the failure of the 1955 peace talks while Tunku gained political mileage from the event and exploited it usefully as the bargaining chip with the colonial authorities?

Chin Peng had admitted during the talks that once the popularly elected government was given the autonomous power to deliberate on matters related to internal security and national defence, the CPM could stop its war immediately.

Soon after the Baling talks, the Alliance delegation headed by Tunku left for the London conference to negotiate for terms and conditions under which independence would be granted to Malaya. In this context, the British authorities were obliged to adopt a reconciliatory attitude towards the demands of the Alliance (Cheah 2002:31-33). But after independence, Tunku from a position of strength was no longer willing to offer a negotiated settlement with the CPM.

From the above few historical elements, we cannot dismiss the CPM struggle as making no contribution whatsoever towards our national independence. We should be careful to distinguish our position as to whether we agree at all with the way the CPM struggled for independence or their ideology or the communist republic of Malaya that they intended to form, from assessing their political role in the evolution of our national history.

If the losers in our history could be given their due as well, then this would be a step forward for the intellectual honesty of our nation.

HELEN TING is doing her research on issues related to national identity. She referred to the following references in writing this article.


Cheah Boon Kheng (2002), Malaysia - The Making of a Nation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Chin Peng (2003), My Side of History; as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor, Singapore: Media Masters.

Joseph M. Fernando (2002), The Making of the Malayan Constitution, MBRAS monograph no. 31.

Pye, Lucian (1956), Guerrilla communism in Malaya, its social and political meaning, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Said Zahari (2001), Dark Clouds at Dawn A Political Memoir, Kuala Lumpur: INSAN.