US alarmed by M'sia-S'pore separation: intelligence report
exclusive
United States was troubled by the 1965 separation of Singapore from Malaysia because it could have destabilised the region, revealed a declassified intelligence report.The report, which was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and intelligence organisations of State and Defense departments, stated that as a result of the "increased fluidity" of the Singapore-Malaysia split, "the entire area is more unstable now than at any time in the past decade".
However, the declassified report and various other documents are now being recalled by the US government, which is concerned that the "disclosure of such information could be damaging" to its diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian countries.
On Monday, the International Herald Tribune reported that the State Department's "Foreign Relations of the United States" series, which include intelligence and confidential reports on US involvement in Southeast Asia from 1964 to 1968, were distributed by mistake to libraries around the world.
The US government was also recovering similar documents related to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus during the same period.
The daily said the documents included in the volumes were officially declassified in 1998 and 1999.
The documents involving Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were recently purchased by a research group at the George Washington University, who have posted it on their website last Friday.
Strong antagonism
The Malaysia-Singapore report also said that as a result of its new status, Singapore was more exposed to the influence of China while Malaysia was less certain about the loyalty of its Borneo components.
The report added that Britain was also less convinced of retaining its military commitment in both Malaysia and Singapore, adding that the two nations also felt that they deserved greater assistance from the US.
"Relations between the two governments are unlikely to improve in the next two or three years. We foresee periods of high tension with acrimonious exchanges," said the report, adding that foreign investment capital would not be forthcoming until the political situation was clarified.
It warned that the political relations between the two countries would be clouded by strong antagonism between their leaders and by mutual suspicions between the Malays and Chinese.
The report also predicted that the most effective way for the Malaysian government to retaliate against Singapore's intention to continue its political activity across the causeway would be via economic sanctions.
The report, which was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and intelligence organisations of State and Defense departments, stated that as a result of the "increased fluidity" of the Singapore-Malaysia split, "the entire area is more unstable now than at any time in the past decade".
However, the declassified report and various other documents are now being recalled by the US government, which is concerned that the "disclosure of such information could be damaging" to its diplomatic ties with Southeast Asian countries.
On Monday, the International Herald Tribune reported that the State Department's "Foreign Relations of the United States" series, which include intelligence and confidential reports on US involvement in Southeast Asia from 1964 to 1968, were distributed by mistake to libraries around the world.
The US government was also recovering similar documents related to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus during the same period.
The daily said the documents included in the volumes were officially declassified in 1998 and 1999.
The documents involving Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were recently purchased by a research group at the George Washington University, who have posted it on their website last Friday.
Strong antagonism
The Malaysia-Singapore report also said that as a result of its new status, Singapore was more exposed to the influence of China while Malaysia was less certain about the loyalty of its Borneo components.
The report added that Britain was also less convinced of retaining its military commitment in both Malaysia and Singapore, adding that the two nations also felt that they deserved greater assistance from the US.
"Relations between the two governments are unlikely to improve in the next two or three years. We foresee periods of high tension with acrimonious exchanges," said the report, adding that foreign investment capital would not be forthcoming until the political situation was clarified.
It warned that the political relations between the two countries would be clouded by strong antagonism between their leaders and by mutual suspicions between the Malays and Chinese.
The report also predicted that the most effective way for the Malaysian government to retaliate against Singapore's intention to continue its political activity across the causeway would be via economic sanctions.
The separation itself came as a surprise to the US, with the State Department only learning about the matter through a telegram from the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur on Aug 9, 1965, the day the Malaysian parliament announced the separation.
The report also noted that on Aug 11, 1965, Malaysia's first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, informed US president Lyndon Johnson, that he was unable to forewarn the US about the separation because "had my intentions been made known there would be trouble within the country".
Seeking support
The reports also contained various US intelligence documents on the Vietnam War as well as the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation which lasted from January to November 1964.
On the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, a confidential report prepared for the then secretary of state Dean Rusk prior to Tunku's visit to the US in July 1964, stated that Tunku would be seeking to convince the US that "Indonesia intends to carry out its avowed policy of crushing Malaysia and driving the West from the area", and that he would be seeking US support to face the confrontation.
Rusk was advised to "reaffirm our support for Malaysia and make some tangible gesture of encouragement without involving the US in either the substance of the dispute or in any substantial new commitments in Southeast Asia, and without needless aggravation of our relations with Indonesia".
In 1964, then Indonesian President Sukarno accused Malaysia of being part of a Western conspiracy to undermine his nation. His vow to 'crush' Malaysia created a period of tension between the two countries known as 'confrontation'.
A separate memorandum on the same matter sent to President Johnson by Rusk stated that Tunku would place Indonesia's 'crush Malaysia' campaign in the context of the communist strategy of driving the West out of Southeast Asia.
"You might say we are proving in Vietnam our determination to resist communist aggression," Rusk told Johnson, while asking the latter to note Malaysia's assistance to Vietnam in training and material.
Pro-Malaysia, not anti-Indonesia
Johnson was also advised to issue a joint communique to reaffirm US' support for Malaysia "without criticising or commenting on Indonesia's policy of confrontation" as it might encourage greater Indonesian intransigence.
"We should be pro-Malaysia, not anti-Indonesia," the president was told.
Johnson was reminded that "Indonesia, now and in the future, is of the utmost importance to all of us, not least to Malaysia".
In another memorandum to the president prior to deputy prime minister Abdul Razak's visit to the US in Oct 1966, Johnson was advised by one of his top aides to express appreciation for "Malaysia's understanding and support of our position in Vietnam".
Johnson was asked to keep in mind that due to "their pre-occupation with Indonesia, the Malaysians have made only a small contribution themselves".
