The recent outbreaks of widespread anti-Japan demonstrations and sentiments in China and Japan's response to the situation have again highlighted the sweet-and-sour strategic relations between the two Asian giants.

As former Chinese premier Chou Enlai (1898-1976) is now often quoted as saying, Sino-Japanese relationships had been defined by 3,000 years of civilisational exchanges and only 50 years of conflicts. The 50 years of conflicts evidently refer to the period between the 1894-1895 First Sino-Japanese War which ended with Imperial Japan occupying and colonising Taiwan and the 1945 defeat of Imperial Japan by the Allies, which included China and the United States.

After the end of the Pacific War, while Japan submitted to American occupation and joined in an anti-communist alliance with the United States, China became communist and briefly allied itself with the former Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s. That defined the Cold War fault-line in Northeast Asia which also saw the division of the Korean Peninsula into the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and also the 1950-1953 Korean War.

However, after the break-up of the Sino-Soviet alliance in late 1960s and early 1970s, China forged an anti-Soviet united front with the United States to check what both China and the United States perceived to be 'Soviet expansionism'. That Sino-US united front lasted until 1991 when the former Soviet Union imploded and disintegrated.

Between 1991 and 2001, while the right-wing segments in United States, Japan and their allies began to perceive China as the next major threat to their interests and values, China itself, especially its hardliners, also reversed and reciprocated the threat perception. North Korea's nuclear ambition and Taiwan's allegedly pro-Japanese independence movement further complicated the realignment.

But, in the aftermath of the Sept 11 terrorist attacks inside the American homeland and with the US military mobilisations against global terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq in the past four years, the global attention to the Northeast Asian situations had been diverted.

Now, the focus has returned with a big bang even though global terrorism is still believed to be lurking in the shadows.

To explore the shifting strategic relations among China, the United States and Japan in the wake of the widespread anti-Japan demonstrations in China as well as the Japan's response to the situation, malaysiakini interviewed Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia's Prof Lee Poh Ping who is a senior fellow of the university's Institute of Malaysian and International Studies and also the president of the Malaysian Association of Japanese Studies (MAJAS).

Lee has been a veteran scholar and observers of the Japanese politics and international relations in Northeast Asia for the last 30 years.

Malaysiakini: There is a perception and even strong belief that Japan is now actively attempting to forge alliances with Southeast and South Asian countries to encircle and contain China. Is it true? If not, why is there such a perception and belief? If yes, what are the reasons of Japan doing so?

If Japan is indeed attempting to forge alliances with Southeast and South Asian countries to encircle and contain China, what are its strategies and tactics? What leverages is Japan using, or could use, to achieve its strategic objective, if any, of containing China?

Given China's understanding of Japan's geo-strategic goals and geo-political strategies, in the past as well as the present, and also given China's relative increase in economic power, diplomatic skills and military strength in recent years, would Japan succeed in its strategic attempt, if any, to encircle and contain China?

Lee: I will try to answer the three questions together. It depends on what is meant by containment. If you mean as in the Cold War, the political, security and economic isolation of China then I do not think that this is possible or that it is even the Japanese intent to do so.

Economically speaking, there was little or no economic relationship between both during the Cold War. Now both countries are so economically intertwined (Japan-China total trade in 2004 has already exceeded Japan-US total trade) that any attempt by Japan to unravel this economic relationship will cause such economic hardships that it is difficult to imagine for Japan or for that matter, China, even considering such an unraveling.

But what has happened is that as China grows stronger economically, it will also make itself felt in the political and security arena. Japan fears that this will intensify not only dispute over the interpretation of history but also rivalry over territory, search for energy sources and influence in Asia. Japan, with the coming of a new generation that feels less guilt about its war past and worried that the US is too distracted elsewhere to notice this rise of China, is now trying to do something about it.

The strategy is first to further entrench the US-Japan alliance by removing any ambiguity about the Japanese willingness to aid the Americans militarily should war break out between the US and China over Taiwan. Obviously Japan feels it cannot confront China alone. Then, Japan will assert itself, sometimes aggressively, in bilateral disputes with China. And with regard to Southeast and South Asia, it will consider diplomatic and economic means to counter Chinese influence. As to what these means are or how they will be deployed, I am not sure that the Japanese have thought that through. They will probably adapt according to developments in these areas.

Will Japan succeed in this strategy? That depends on how China develops and what it does. If China continues to develop economically at the present rate and conversely, if Japan continues to stagnate economically, it is conceivable the US might come to terms with China and leave Japan in the lurch. It is not likely in the near future but could happen in the long run.

But more important is what China does in these areas. If it continues with the present strategy of ensuring that these areas benefit from its economic rise and does nothing to antagonise them politically or security-wise then Japan, or for that matter, the US will find it difficult to push the 'China threat'. If on the other hand, China were to be foolish enough to throw its weight around or even to appear violent within China itself, as in the recent anti-Japanese demonstrations, too often, then it will give an opening to Japan and the US to attack its image as a power that will rise peacefully.

If seen from China's perspective, that Japan is attempting to forge alliances in Southeast and South Asia while the United States seems to be gaining power and influence in Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa appear to show a coordinated strategy on the part of the United States and Japan to encircle and contain China. How true is this assessment? Or is it just a wild conspiracy theory?

I would not say this is a wild conspiracy theory as it seems more than a coincidence that as the US is seeking and establishing bases in Central Asia, thus getting nearer the Chinese border, Japan is also attempting to counter China in South and Southeast Asia, areas bordering China. But to what extent these moves are coordinated or represent tentative steps, as in the case of Japan, I am not sure. The Chinese are probably aware of a possible US-Japan encirclement beyond the Far East. They have however not made a big noise over this, suggesting that if any such joint encirclement exists, they will counter it in a quiet way.

If there is indeed an US-Japan attempt to build a Grand Containment regime against China, what role would France, Germany and Russia play in the New Cold War, given the fact that France, Germany and Russia also seem to be sharing China's vision of a multi-polar international order?

One cannot exclude the possibility that the global system could turn into one where the US and Japan are on one side and France, Germany, Russia and China are on the other. Indeed the tremendous pressure the US (Japan is also going along) is exerting on the EU not to lift its arms embargo on China probably reflects an innate US fear that such lifting could be a precursor to some EU, Russian and Chinese agreement to counter the dominance of the US. If this happens then it is a serious dent on Huntington's 'clash of civilisation' theory as France, Germany and the US, according to Huntington, belong to the West which is supposed to be antagonistic towards China.

Traditionally, the Japanese right-wing has not only been hostile to China but also latently anti-Western and anti-American. Also, despite the popular image of China being critical of the United States and the West during the early period of the Cold War in 1950s and 1960s, it did show strategic pragmatism or flexibility in forging an anti-Soviet alliance with the United States and the West in the 1970s and 1980s. How should the United States then balance its relations with China on one hand and Japan on the other in the long run?

It is well you mentioned the Japanese right-wing. I think it is important to separate it from mainstream Japanese opinion which I gather is still pacifist in orientation. The problem is that with the increasing anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean mood of the Japanese public, the right-wing will exploit this to push its agenda of making Japan a so-called 'normal' country. This right-wing is also aided by certain forces in America that see China as the long term threat to American hegemony in Asia. These forces are only too happy to see Japan helping the US contain China even if a right-wing Japanese government (which could turn against the Americans in the long run) might emerge. This is a dangerous game for America to play for if Sino-Japanese hostilities erupt into war, all sides, including the US, will lose.

What is needed is for the US to drop its intent to contain China and work with it and Japan to manage China's rise in the international system. On bilateral Sino-Japanese relations, Japan should be aware of the sensitivity of the Chinese and Koreans to any action on its part that glorifies their war record or downplays the atrocities the Japan committed. If interpretations of this record differ, perhaps some joint Chinese-Japanese scholarly group or a third party should be set up to set the record straight.

China on its part should acknowledge that, however difficult Japan finds it to come to terms with its past, Japan nevertheless has been since the War a model of a peaceful nation using aid rather than military force as the main instrument of its foreign policy, and this can change if Japan is denied what it increasingly regards is its rightful place in the world. As China's rise needs to be managed, so is Japan's emergence from an economic power to one with political and security responsibilities. Such cannot be done peacefully if China is hostile towards it.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia. He is a former DAP member of parliament for Kampar (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily). He read political science and economics at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.