Konfrontasi again? - Let us not muddle our connected history
The sight of angry Indonesians burning the Malaysian flag and chanting the slogan 'ganyang Malaysia' ('Crush Malaysia') brings back painful memories of the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) between Malaysia and Indonesia that took place between 1962 to 1965.
Already we have seen the predictable response from both sides: The Indonesian press with the exception of a few notable newspapers has been stoking the flames of public anger, goading the more bellicose sections of Indonesian society towards what can only be a diplomatic and political disaster for the country. On the Malaysian side, a significant section of the Malaysian community including the media, on-line bloggers and vocal social commentators have whipped up xenophobic sentiments of the mob, blaming Indonesians for all that is wrong in the country.
Before the situation gets out of hand, some pertinent and timely questions need to be raised: Does the Indonesian media seriously think that all of Indonesia's problems ranging from systematic state-sponsored violence to the breakdown of law and order in its provinces are caused by Malaysia?
And does the Malaysian media and society seriously believe that all our problems in Malaysia from our divisive communitarian politics to our corrupt political institutions are caused by the Indonesians? Let us not forget that the biggest culprits in the these matters, particularly the oft-repeated cases of political-business links and corruption among the political elite, happen to be Malaysians themselves and the Indonesians are not to be blamed!
The sight of angry Indonesians burning the Malaysian flag and chanting the slogan 'ganyang Malaysia' ('Crush Malaysia') brings back painful memories of the Konfrontasi (Confrontation) between Malaysia and Indonesia that took place between 1962 to 1965.
Already we have seen the predictable response from both sides: The Indonesian press with the exception of a few notable newspapers has been stoking the flames of public anger, goading the more bellicose sections of Indonesian society towards what can only be a diplomatic and political disaster for the country. On the Malaysian side, a significant section of the Malaysian community including the media, on-line bloggers and vocal social commentators have whipped up xenophobic sentiments of the mob, blaming Indonesians for all that is wrong in the country.
Before the situation gets out of hand, some pertinent and timely questions need to be raised: Does the Indonesian media seriously think that all of Indonesia's problems ranging from systematic state-sponsored violence to the breakdown of law and order in its provinces are caused by Malaysia?
And does the Malaysian media and society seriously believe that all our problems in Malaysia from our divisive communitarian politics to our corrupt political institutions are caused by the Indonesians? Let us not forget that the biggest culprits in the these matters, particularly the oft-repeated cases of political-business links and corruption among the political elite, happen to be Malaysians themselves and the Indonesians are not to be blamed!
The most worrying trend of late, however, is the tendency to conjure up the trope of the Konfrontasi between Malaysia and Indonesia. The fact that some of the extreme right-wing Indonesian groups have opted for the historically and ideologically loaded slogan 'ganyang Malaysia' has not helped; for the slogan was and remains most closely associated with the anti-Malaysian movement in Indonesia during the Konfrontasi era. For this reason, we need to take a short trip back in history and revisit the event itself.
'Konfrontasi' remembered
The Konfrontasi between Malaysia and Indonesia was, in fact, a complex series of events that actually involved a multiplicity of actors and political factors, both domestic and international. As in the case of most political-historical phenomena, it was an event that should be studied from a number of perspectives.
It should be remembered that Indonesia proclaimed its own independence right at the end of the second world war, as the military forces of Imperial Japan were beating a hasty retreat before the advance of the Western allied forces (America, Britain and Holland).
The architects of Indonesian independence were Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta, though it should be remembered that the Indonesians were supported by their counterparts in Malaya as well. (Many Malayans had crossed the Straits of Melacca to join the Indonesian nationalists and militias such as the Pembela Tanah Air (PETA).
Shortly before Soekarno and Hatta were to return to Indonesia, they met up with the Malayan nationalist leaders Ibrahim Yaakob and Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy in Taiping, Perak on 12 August 1945. Both sides agreed to work together towards a joint declaration of independence for Indonesia and Malaya, but as fate would have it the return of the British to Malaya in 1945 forestalled Malaysia's independence by another 12 years.
Indonesia unilaterally declared its own independence on Aug 17, 1945, while the Malayan nationalists launched their Malayan Nationalist Party (PKMM) on the same day. The flag of the PKMM was similar to that of the Indonesian republic (the Sang Seka Merah-Putih), and till today a semblance of this can be seen in the flags of PAS and Umno, both of which adopt the same red and white bands running across it horizontally.
Even then, the rapport between the Indonesians and their Malayan counterparts remained strong: some Malayan leaders like Ibrahim Yaakob even went as far as emigrating to Indonesia, to help Soekarno and the nationalists build their new Republic and to defend it against the Dutch colonial army that was bent on re-colonising it.
While this was happening, Malaya was inching its way towards attaining its own independence but at a price. The British Military Administration (BMA) installed in Malaya was less accommodating towards the Malayan nationalists and at the outset of the Emergency (1948-1960), the BMA banned the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as well as the fledgling Malayan Islamic party, Hizbul Muslimin. The Malayan nationalists were forced underground, opening the way for the rise of the Malay conservatives of Umno and their counterparts in MCA.
Why 'Malaysia' was a problem
Malaysia achieved its independence in 1957, under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman, President of Umno and head of the Perikatan (Alliance) coalition. The Federation was later expanded to include Sarawak and Sabah in 1963. The birth of the Federation of Malaysia was met with a cold response from its neighbours, particularly Indonesia and the Philippines.
Soekarno was then the President of Indonesia, though his own government was forged on the basis of a loose instrumental coalition between the Nationalists, Communists and Islamists. (This coalition was often referred to as Nasakom Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme.)
For the leaders of Indonesia and the Philippines then, the Malaysian Federation was an anomaly of sorts: While Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam and the other newly independent countries of Asia including India and Pakistan were decidedly opposed to the machinations of the former Western colonial powers, Malaysia (under Tunku) was fervently pro-Western and anti-Communist. Malaysia's territorial integrity was secured thanks to the Tunku's pro-Western stance and our active collaboration with the Western powers, notably Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America.
For the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) under the leadership of Dupa Nusantara Aidit, Malaysia's close links to the West smacked of neo-colonialism. The fact that Malaysia's Prime Minister was an Oxbridge-educated Anglophile only made things worse. Malaysia, seen through the eyes of D.N. Aidit and the PKI, was a Western Trogan Horse that was intended to weaken the entire Southeast Asian region, and for this the PKI launched its anti-Malaysian campaign.
The 'Konfrontasi' that began in 1962 was therefore a result of Indonesia's complex domestic politics and the inevitable outcome of Soekarno trying to accommodate the demands of the PKI in his own government. It was the PKI that launched the first anti-Malaysian demonstrations in Jakarta, culminating in the attacks on the Malaysian embassy (as well as some Western embassies and consulates) and the burning of the Malaysian flag.
The slogan 'ganyang Malaysia' was the clarion call of the radical youth wing of the PKI, though even then the PKI did not express any hatred towards the Malaysian people, but rather the political leadership of the country. (The PKI in fact expressed solidarity with Malaysian workers and student movements, and strongly supported the banned MCP.)
Unable to control the more vocal and violent sections of the PKI, Soekarno was forced to follow in the train of anti-Malaysian hysteria and violence. The Konfrontasi campaign itself was a blunder both in military and diplomatic terms. As far as its actual military objectives were concerned, it led to a series of botched cross-border attacks, mostly in East Malaysia and some parts of the Malaysian peninsula.
The PKI infiltrators who were sent across the border were soon rounded up and liquidated by Malaysian civilians working with local military and militia units. Diplomatically the costs were even higher: Indonesia was no longer seen as a fledgling postcolonial state trying to carve its place in the world, but rather as a bully that was flexing its muscles and imposing its will on a smaller neighbour.
The Konfrontasi also brought to the surface internal tensions between the Indonesian Communists and the Nationalists and Islamists. The contestation for power within Indonesia led to the fateful coup attempt attributed to the pro-Communist Lt. Colonel Untung in 1965, which resulted in a backlash of truly horrific and unprecedented proportions.
As the nationalist-led Indonesian army (Abri) fought to regain control of the capital of Jakarta, Soekarno was sidelined and eclipsed by Soeharto; and the rank and file of the PKI were wiped out by militia units from the nationalist and Islamist parties: between half a million to one million members and supporters of the PKI were butchered in an orgy of violence.
The fall of Soekarno and the demise of the PKI (and all other secular leftist groups) in Indonesia paved the way for the rise of Soeharto, the army officer-turned-President, who was supported to the hilt by his American backers till May 1998. Malaysian-Indonesian relations gradually stabilized and were normalized by an entente cordiale between right-wing leaders on both sides.
'Ganyang Malaysia' again?
It is for these reasons that we need to be circumspect about the deteriorating conditions between Malaysia and Indonesia today. The use of the slogan 'ganyang Malaysia' by right-wing nationalists groups in Indonesia at the moment has nothing to do with the rhetoric of the Konfrontasi of the past. Indeed, the rise of such right-wing groups in Indonesia was something that the Malaysian government and successive Malaysian leaders have been happy with, even if at a distance.
The fact remains that the right-wing leadership of Malaysia, since the fall of Tunku, have been supportive of Soeharto and his clique of right-wing nationalists from the beginning. This was simply due to their common fear and loathing of the Indonesian Communist party and other left-wing groups, be they in Indonesia or any other part of Asean. It was also for that reason that the government of Malaysia (and all the other right-wing governments of Asean) also turned a blind eye when Indonesia's army forcibly annexed East Timor in 1974, for fear of East Timor falling into the hands of a leftist government and becoming the 'Cuba of Asean'.
The recent history (post-1965 onwards) of inter-Asean government relations indicates that despite the froth and bluster of the nationalist rhetoric used by all these countries, there exists an unstated understanding that Asean's governments must remain united on the same ideological platform of right-wing nationalism. For so long, Asean was united on the basis of a common hatred for Communism and leftist forces. Today, in the wake of the Cold War and the demise of Communism, there seems little to keep the Asean pact together.
So if we in Malaysia today are taken aback by the right-wing rhetoric of the Indonesian extreme nationalists, perhaps we ought to ask ourselves: What role has Malaysia and the other countries of Asean played in the advancement of right-wing interests in Indonesia? Did we not pay lip service to the right-wing regime of Soeharto? And if this brand of extreme nationalism today is in search of new enemies and targets abroad, are we not somehow responsible for fostering its growth and development, thanks to our own passive neglect for what was happening in our neighbour's house?
Endnotes
1) For a more comprehensive account of the events that led to the Konfrontasi and the role played by the Malaysian and Indonesian actors in the event, see: Farish A Noor, 'Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS, 1951-2003', MSRI, Kuala Lumpur, 2004. (Volume I, chapters 1 and 2; pp. 1-212).

