Thaksin Shinawatra: The Business of Politics in Thailand

By Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker
Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 2004.
ISBN: 974-9575-55-5. 302 pages. Price: RM65/US$15


The post-colonial history of Southeast Asia reads as a catalogue of instances when the spheres of politics and business overlapped and inter-penetrated with one another. Since the late 1960s, the Asean region's spectacular growth has been fuelled by the agents and actors of big business, be they local corporate elites or the forces of global capital the latter of which was pumped into the Asean region to help it stand up against the apparent 'threat' of Communism, during the peak of the Cold War.

Following the end of the Second World War and the retreat of the Western colonial powers, the postcolonial regimes of Southeast Asia embarked on the programme of nation-building and economic development in earnest. However the lack of a local, organic and authentic democratic culture also meant that many of the countries of the region began on a somewhat uneven footing: Malaysia and Singapore, for instance, inherited many of the repressive laws that were throwbacks from the British colonial era and neither state has really made any attempts to discard these laws that have proven politically useful time and
again.

The focus of the book by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, however, is Thailand and in particular the spectacular and unprecedented rise to power of the country's current Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Apart from being a highly detailed portrait of the man himself (backed up by hundreds of quotes and references) the book is a skilful analysis of the character of Thai politics and how the tumult of post-1997 Thai society led to the eventual rise of the man and his nationalist Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) party.

A brief history of Thai politics

Phongpaichit and Baker begin their study by looking at the background of Thai politics as it evolved in the postcolonial era: They note that since the 1960s Thailand has been governed by a succession of weak governments, almost all of them made up of loosely-assembled instrumental coalitions that were hardly ever based on strong and secure ideological foundations. (The only distinguishing factor being that most of these governments were to the right of centre and decidedly anti-Communist.)

The authors point out that: "Thailand's parties were ideologically neutral, undifferentiated coalitions of business interests manoeuvring for access to power. This pattern delivered the political system into the hands of business. At each election from 1979 onwards, more of the MPs were businessmen, until in the 1990s virtually all (of the MPs) described themselves either as businessmen or professional politicians." (Phongpaichit and Baker, pg. 13)

Thailand's only significant experiment with democracy took place between 1973-1976, when a coalition of left-leaning student movements, workers groups, trade unions, rural communes and public intellectuals managed to seize power following a series of demonstrations across the country. At the initial stages of this popular movement, the democratic alliance received the tacit support and protection of the Thai ruler. (The King opened the doors of his palace in Bangkok just when the army and police were about to march on the demonstrators, thereby saving them by affording them protection within the sacred precinct of his palace grounds.)

Despite coming to power and installing a democratic government for a brief period, the popular democratic movement was ultimately defeated during a counter-putsch in 1976 that was led by the army, police and extreme right-wing groups, including right-wing elements of the Buddhist sangha.

Since then Thailand's politics have been dominated and controlled by an oligarchy of big business and corporate interests, often working hand-in-glove with the army, police, criminal elements as well as local warlords and gangs. (A military coup in May 1992 was the second attempt to reverse this trend. Even so the coup was really inspired by high-ranking members of the Thai military and police elite who only wanted to stall the advance of business interests in order to secure and protect their own standing in Thai society and politics.)

Big business

Phongpaichit and Baker note that with the defeat of the democratic forces in Thailand the magnates and moghuls of big business were given ample opportunity to develop the country on their own terms, while stuffing their pockets at the same time. This coincided with Thailand's heedless rush into the
globalisation process, which was initially supported by captains of local industry and big business as well: "the state seemed to be declining in importance for the fortunes of big business compared to the rising influence of globalisation. (By the 1980s) external markets, external finance, foreign partnerships, new technology and new ideas were increasingly the keys to business profit In the mid-1980s (Thailand's) big business lobbies pressed for trade liberalisation and revelled in the resulting flood of cheap credit. In the 1990s they tacitly welcomed the influx of cheap, mostly illegal, foreign workers. The great boom, which began in 1985-86 and for a decade made Thailand into one of the world's most dynamic economies, was seen in large part as a gift of globalisation." (Phongpaichit and Baker, pg. 15)

Here Thailand's development was hardly any different from any of the other countries of ASEAN: Along with Thailand - Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia also followed suit and the pattern was the same across the region. ASEAN's economic boom was sustained by indiscriminate credit expansion, massive local
developmental projects designed to boost local development and manufacturing (but which were often economically unproductive and environmentally costly), closer co-operation between politics and business (leading to the blurring of the boundaries between the two), opening up of local markets to foreign capital
penetration and competition, as well as the increasing control of workers groups and society as a whole.

It was the collapse of the Thai economy in 1997 (which sparked off the East Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the other Asean economies as well) that destroyed the dreams of Thailand's landed corporate-political elite. The national economy shrank by 11 percent and thousands of new businesses went
bankrupt overnight.

In the midst of the chaos and confusion of the time, Thai society and in particular the urban business elite were in search of strong political leadership that could reverse the economic slide of the country. By then the rhetoric of the Thai political-capitalist elite had altered radically: Mustering sentiments of
ethno-nationalism and calling for national unity, Thai leaders like Chauvalit Yongchaiyudh began to look for scapegoats to blame.

At first they attacked the Chinese community of the country (as was the case in Indonesia), and then they turned their attention to the forces of global capital, arguing that it was the international market that was responsible for the country's economic collapse. It was during this time that Thaksin Shinawatra rose to public prominence, and on 14 July 1998 he launched his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) party on the platform of strong centralised government, economic nationalism and Thai populist-patriotism.

Portrait of a leader

In early 2001 Thaksin came to power and the authors read this as a return to the culture of landed money politics in the country, albeit on a scale greater than ever before: "Thaksin Shinawatra led a group of major domestic capitalists who had survived the financial crisis to capture state power with the explicit aim of using it to protect and promote domestic capital. Thaksin's rise was a logical extension of Thailand's business-dominated 'money politics', but also a dramatic change of scale. It brought some of the wealthiest elements of domestic capital into the seat of power. It superseded 'money politics' with 'big money politics'." (pg. 97)

All the while Thaksin presented himself as a 'honest patriot' and 'hard worker' who merely wanted to offer his services to his nation and to defend the rights of the ordinary Thai citizen, particularly the farmers and workers. His ethno-nationalist rhetoric spoke of the need for national unity and cohesion, and his dream to project Thailand into the first world even promising that by his second term in office he would lead Thailand in its appeal to join the OECD. (pg. 101). All of this was put together in an impressive and coherent (albeit simplistic) ideology that was labelled 'Thaksinomics', that saw the state as a company and regarded the process of government as akin to business-management. (pp. 99-133).

Phongpaichit and Baker offer us a detailed portrait of Thaksin Shinawatra and the man's origins and past. Despite his claims to a difficult childhood mired in poverty, self-sacrifice and hard work, the authors note that Thaksin's family the Shinawatras was one of the most prominent families in Thailand's second city, Chiang Mai. (pg. 25). Of Chinese (Hakka) origins, the Shinawatras migrated to Thailand in the late 19th century and Thaksin's grandfather Seng Sae Khu (aka. Khu Chun Seng) made his fortune through tax farming a common (though unpopular) occupation in those days.

Later the Sae Khu/Shinawatra clan added to their fortunes via the silk trade, plying to the tastes and interests of the Thai bureaucratic elite, and then by moving into the spheres of finance, construction and property development. (pp. 25-61).

Thus by the time he was born Thaksin Shinawatra was already a member of one of the richest, most influential and powerful families in Chiang Mai, enjoying close relations to the royal family, the army and bureaucratic elite, as well as other wealthy families in the region.

Thaksin's life

Identifying Thaksin as a member of the "new bourgeoisie", the authors outline his rapid and impressive rise to power: First through his early education at some of the best schools in the country, then through his stint at the Thai Police Academy (1967-69), then as member of staff to cabinet minister Prida Patthanathabut (who was then in the cabinet of Kukrit Pramoj), his entry into the police force and finally his eventual rise in the world of business and politics.

Thaksin's initial forays into the world of business are examined in detail by Phongpaichit and Baker, and the authors note that the future business magnate's early projects mostly ended in failure. But Thaksin's strength lay in his conviction and refusal to give up. Enamoured by modern technology, particularly in the field of computers and communications, he made his fortune by winning lucrative contracts to supply government agencies with such modern Western technology.

The real emphasis of Thaksin's party and the ideology of Thaksinomics, however, is the management of society and the re-making of Thailand's political culture(Chapters 5 and 6). Phongpaichit and Baker document the numerous attempts by Thaksin and his followers to control almost all aspects of Thai society, from the media to the youth, from domestic crime to the alleged criminal activities of Muslim groups in the restless southern provinces of the country.

All in these cases, a common theme and pattern emerges: Despite the populist rhetoric of Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai party, the actual policies of the Thaksin government have proven to be decidedly unfriendly towards the masses and Thaksin's government's treatment of the Muslim minority in the south ranks as 'the most tragic' as far as his professed aims at nation-building are concerned. (pp. 234-239)

Thaksin's government has attempted to win control of the newly-independent press of the country, through the tried and tested means of indirect financial control as well as the more common mode of intimidation. NGOs have been routinely harassed, and human rights groups, environmentalist groups and local rural collectives have been denounced as 'subversive', 'anti-social', 'unpatriotic' and 'agents of the West'. (A familiar set of accusations that is found again and again in the governmental rhetoric of other Asean countries, one might add.)

But it is in the remaking of Thailand's politics that the long-term impact of Thaksin's heavy-handed rule will be felt the most. Operating within the framework of the post-1997 Constitution that grants greater power to the Executive, Thaksin has used his position to eliminate and forestall any possible dissent within and without his party. The authors note that the developments in Thailand today are without historical precedent: No previous Thai leader or government has had so much power concentrated in such a small circle of political-business elites, and it is here that the real authority and future of Thailand now lies.

Is this the future?

Today two-fifths of companies listed on the Thai stock market have political links, placing Thailand second only to Russia where such high levels of government-business cronyism are known. (pg. 132). Thaksin's dream of creating a climate of 'calm politics' which is modelled on the Singaporean example has created a pyramidal political system where serving the populace is the stated goal of the political-business elite, but where the masses have no say in the process of government itself. Phongpaichit and Baker note that "(Thailand's) civil society that arose over the recent years (and which) proved fragile is now under attack" while "Thailand's authoritarian state has been gradually bypassed but never overthrown". (pg. 230)

The authors' final prognosis is a bleak and depressing one indeed: "The political costs of Thaksin are a larger problem (for Thailand) than the economic risks. When a country becomes a company, and government becomes management, then people are not so much citizens with rights, liberties and aspirations, but rather consumers, shareholders and factors of production. Thaksin has rolled back a quarter-century of democratic development. He hopes to transform Thailand from a beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia into another illiberal one-party state." (pg. 240)

Rich in documentary data, notes, interviews and biographical information, Phongpaichit and Baker's book on Thaksin Shinawatra is a frightening portrait of unfettered power unleashed on a weakened society in crisis. It gives a vivid account of how fragile democracies can be and how authoritarianism can rise so easily, disguising itself behind the cloak of populism and lofty aspirations. Most of all it reads as a warning for the societies of the developing world and the forces of nascent civil society in Asean. For these reasons, we do not hesitate to recommend this work to all who are interested in the question of human rights, anti-corruption, democratisation and transparency. A very important book written at the right time. Highly recommended.

DR. FARISH AMHAD-NOOR is a political scientist and human rights activist.