How Malaysia can avoid the scourge of terrorism
Phar Kim BengPublished: Dec 23, 2004 7:41 AM | Updated: Jan 29, 2008 10:21 AM
The list of countries hit by terrorism since 9-11 is both long and diverse.
US, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, India and Russia have all been at the receiving end of the 'jihadists.'
Within the context of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines has to varying degrees been affected by the scourge too, with Singapore also discovering Jemaah Islamiah (JI) cells within its midst.
The trails of Hambali, arguably the only senior person from Southeast Asia to be in the ranks of Al Qaeda's high command, even led investigators into Cambodia. Current reports from the Far Eastern Economic Review show jihadists to be active in Cambodia's small Muslim community.
Although key members of JI, whether incarcerated in Indonesia or currently on-the-run, have operated in Malaysia, even taking Malaysian permanent residency, there has been no disclosure of any plots to destroy the country's 'soft' or 'hard' targets.
The list of countries hit by terrorism since 9-11 is both long and diverse.
US, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, India and Russia have all been at the receiving end of the 'jihadists.'
Within the context of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines has to varying degrees been affected by the scourge too, with Singapore also discovering Jemaah Islamiah (JI) cells within its midst.
The trails of Hambali, arguably the only senior person from Southeast Asia to be in the ranks of Al Qaeda's high command, even led investigators into Cambodia. Current reports from the Far Eastern Economic Review show jihadists to be active in Cambodia's small Muslim community.
Although key members of JI, whether incarcerated in Indonesia or currently on-the-run, have operated in Malaysia, even taking Malaysian permanent residency, there has been no disclosure of any plots to destroy the country's 'soft' or 'hard' targets.
Instead, the fervor of the 'jihadist' has been the sharpest in Indonesia; culminating first in the Bali bombing in October 2002, followed by another violent attack on the JW Marriot Hotel in August 2003. Most recently, the Australian embassy in Indonesia was on JI's list.
Given these incidents, a policy issue quickly emerges: What has Malaysia hitherto done 'right', that other countries in the region has somehow done 'wrong'? Can there be any comparison?
To be sure, answering why terrorism has not struck in Malaysia can be akin to asking why the proverbial dog has not barked ? (It just might.)
Indeed, with terrorism being so random in character, precisely the modus operandi to strike fear in the hearts of many, there is no telling when terrorism may strike in Malaysia.
Yet, given the extent to which Malaysia has been able to parry the challenge since 9-11, the time is right for a thorough examination of the facts. More importantly, what theories can be used to inform the facts, even though Malaysia was used as one of the staging posts for 9-11?
Long record
For what it is worth, Malaysia's records of confronting jihadic-inspired terrorism has a (long) pedigree.
In 1982, the state showed little remorse in cracking down on Ibrahim Libya and his members, as they took a turn towards religious militancy. Libya and his followers were killed in what is known as the Memali Incident.
Several months prior to 9-11, Malaysia also severely dealt with Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and Al-Mauna; the latter gained notoriety for staging two arms heists on the ammunition depots of the Malaysian armed forces in 2000 and 2001.
Prior to his retirement in Oct 2003, Dr Mahathir Mohamad even stopped the government funding of the Islamic 'madrasahs' (religious schools), ostensibly to curtail them from preaching and teaching violence.
Although the funds have since been restored by the current administration of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, there is every indication that the Malaysian state does not brook dissent in cracking down on alleged extremist activities; as when the government banned Ustaz Ashari's Al-Arqam.
Robert Pape, at University of Chicago, has argued that 'jihadist' extremism is often the strongest in authoritarian societies.
By 'strong' he meant individuals willing to take up suicide as a means of religious struggle.
Authoritarianism
Although analysts of Malaysian politics have long debated whether it has a semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian, soft-authoritarian, or authoritarian political system, these descriptions clearly point to its authoritarian bent; with William Case calling Malaysia a psedu-democracy.
Why has the authoritarian regime type not produced 'jihadists' bent on attacking Malaysia ?
To be sure, there have been cases where the 'jihadists' have preyed on the Malaysian state and society. Prior to their arrests, for instance, Al-Mauna, according to press reports filed by pro
government news agencies, had indeed attacked the Hindu temples in the northern part of Malaysia.
So, one cannot safely say that jihadists had not 'registered their presence' in the country. Yet to date the mayhem that the jihadists have sought to promote in Malaysia has been short and unsustained.
While no clear studies has been made, it appears plausible that the highly hegemonic political system in Malaysia - shaped as it is by the corporate interest of Umno - has nonetheless provided crucial room for other Islamic groups to have their say on Islamic issues.
Aside from Umno, which among others, uses its available connections with the government to articulate Islamic issues, there exists six other groups that have been given the appropriate leeway to exercise some form of (Islamic) representation too.
PAS, Abim, JIM (an Islamic student movement), Tabligh (a Sufi group), Sisters in Islam and Malaysian Muslim Professionals are but the known few.
The existence of these groups have provided what Edmund Gomez once called 'access, accommodation and ascendancy' (though applies in a capitalist context) to channel various Islamic issues in Malaysia.
Modernisation
Naturally, the existence of diverse Islamic groups, associations and parties alone, cannot account for the absence of terrorism in the country. The relatively equitable distribution of wealth among the various races, helped by an education system that is mildly secular, has also done much to displace the latent aggression.
Indeed, if the modernisation theory is applied, one could safely affirm that terrorism is weakest when modernity does not seek to discriminate nor cause more adjustment pains (either economically or culturally).
In the case of other countries in Southeast Asia, the kind of modernisation which they attempt has often lacked the nuance, and the (social) net, to protect the Muslims, leading to various pent-up pressures that are well read, and capitalised, by foreign jihadists who hail from countries that are many shades more backward and repressive.
Clearly, in staving one's country from terrorism, the sheer (coercive) power of the state has to be used. Though, having been deployed, a system that seeks to protect and promote the interest of the Muslims - be they as majority or minority - must be used in parallel too.
The latter is not necessarily a policy meant to win 'the hearts and minds' of the Muslims, as it is a crucial necessity in an age where Muslims have become 'left behind,' almost in every measure of development.
US, Spain, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, India and Russia have all been at the receiving end of the 'jihadists.'
Within the context of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines has to varying degrees been affected by the scourge too, with Singapore also discovering Jemaah Islamiah (JI) cells within its midst.
The trails of Hambali, arguably the only senior person from Southeast Asia to be in the ranks of Al Qaeda's high command, even led investigators into Cambodia. Current reports from the Far Eastern Economic Review show jihadists to be active in Cambodia's small Muslim community.
Although key members of JI, whether incarcerated in Indonesia or currently on-the-run, have operated in Malaysia, even taking Malaysian permanent residency, there has been no disclosure of any plots to destroy the country's 'soft' or 'hard' targets.
Instead, the fervor of the 'jihadist' has been the sharpest in Indonesia; culminating first in the Bali bombing in October 2002, followed by another violent attack on the JW Marriot Hotel in August 2003. Most recently, the Australian embassy in Indonesia was on JI's list.
Given these incidents, a policy issue quickly emerges: What has Malaysia hitherto done 'right', that other countries in the region has somehow done 'wrong'? Can there be any comparison?
To be sure, answering why terrorism has not struck in Malaysia can be akin to asking why the proverbial dog has not barked ? (It just might.) Indeed, with terrorism being so random in character, precisely the modus operandi to strike fear in the hearts of many, there is no telling when terrorism may strike in Malaysia.
Yet, given the extent to which Malaysia has been able to parry the challenge since 9-11, the time is right for a thorough examination of the facts. More importantly, what theories can be used to inform the facts, even though Malaysia was used as one of the staging posts for 9-11?
Long record
For what it is worth, Malaysia's records of confronting jihadic-inspired terrorism has a (long) pedigree.
In 1982, the state showed little remorse in cracking down on Ibrahim Libya and his members, as they took a turn towards religious militancy. Libya and his followers were killed in what is known as the Memali Incident.
Several months prior to 9-11, Malaysia also severely dealt with Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and Al-Mauna; the latter gained notoriety for staging two arms heists on the ammunition depots of the Malaysian armed forces in 2000 and 2001.
Prior to his retirement in Oct 2003, Dr Mahathir Mohamad even stopped the government funding of the Islamic 'madrasahs' (religious schools), ostensibly to curtail them from preaching and teaching violence.
Although the funds have since been restored by the current administration of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, there is every indication that the Malaysian state does not brook dissent in cracking down on alleged extremist activities; as when the government banned Ustaz Ashari's Al-Arqam. Robert Pape, at University of Chicago, has argued that 'jihadist' extremism is often the strongest in authoritarian societies.
By 'strong' he meant individuals willing to take up suicide as a means of religious struggle.
Authoritarianism
Although analysts of Malaysian politics have long debated whether it has a semi-democratic, semi-authoritarian, soft-authoritarian, or authoritarian political system, these descriptions clearly point to its authoritarian bent; with William Case calling Malaysia a psedu-democracy.
Why has the authoritarian regime type not produced 'jihadists' bent on attacking Malaysia ?
To be sure, there have been cases where the 'jihadists' have preyed on the Malaysian state and society. Prior to their arrests, for instance, Al-Mauna, according to press reports filed by pro
government news agencies, had indeed attacked the Hindu temples in the northern part of Malaysia.
So, one cannot safely say that jihadists had not 'registered their presence' in the country. Yet to date the mayhem that the jihadists have sought to promote in Malaysia has been short and unsustained.
While no clear studies has been made, it appears plausible that the highly hegemonic political system in Malaysia - shaped as it is by the corporate interest of Umno - has nonetheless provided crucial room for other Islamic groups to have their say on Islamic issues.
Aside from Umno, which among others, uses its available connections with the government to articulate Islamic issues, there exists six other groups that have been given the appropriate leeway to exercise some form of (Islamic) representation too.
PAS, Abim, JIM (an Islamic student movement), Tabligh (a Sufi group), Sisters in Islam and Malaysian Muslim Professionals are but the known few.
The existence of these groups have provided what Edmund Gomez once called 'access, accommodation and ascendancy' (though applies in a capitalist context) to channel various Islamic issues in Malaysia.
Modernisation
Naturally, the existence of diverse Islamic groups, associations and parties alone, cannot account for the absence of terrorism in the country. The relatively equitable distribution of wealth among the various races, helped by an education system that is mildly secular, has also done much to displace the latent aggression.
Indeed, if the modernisation theory is applied, one could safely affirm that terrorism is weakest when modernity does not seek to discriminate nor cause more adjustment pains (either economically or culturally).
In the case of other countries in Southeast Asia, the kind of modernisation which they attempt has often lacked the nuance, and the (social) net, to protect the Muslims, leading to various pent-up pressures that are well read, and capitalised, by foreign jihadists who hail from countries that are many shades more backward and repressive. Clearly, in staving one's country from terrorism, the sheer (coercive) power of the state has to be used. Though, having been deployed, a system that seeks to protect and promote the interest of the Muslims - be they as majority or minority - must be used in parallel too.
The latter is not necessarily a policy meant to win 'the hearts and minds' of the Muslims, as it is a crucial necessity in an age where Muslims have become 'left behind,' almost in every measure of development.
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