Msian foreign policy a critical exploration (Part 1)
James Wong Wing OnPublished: Dec 3, 2004 4:45 AM | Updated: Jan 29, 2008 10:21 AM
Since its independence in 1957, the foreign policy of Malaya/Malaysia has been going through several stages of changes and re-orientations.
From 1957 to early 1970, the administration of the first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western as the West was itself united in its global containment of the former Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Then, the combination of the Cold War with the Afro-Asian decolonisation process defined the international environment where foreign policy choices were made.
It was anchored on the Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) which allowed British Commonwealth troops to be stationed within the Malayan/Malaysian territory, although Malaya/Malaysia refused to join the US-sponsored Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (Seato).
Since its independence in 1957, the foreign policy of Malaya/Malaysia has been going through several stages of changes and re-orientations.
From 1957 to early 1970, the administration of the first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western as the West was itself united in its global containment of the former Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Then, the combination of the Cold War with the Afro-Asian decolonisation process defined the international environment where foreign policy choices were made.
It was anchored on the Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) which allowed British Commonwealth troops to be stationed within the Malayan/Malaysian territory, although Malaya/Malaysia refused to join the US-sponsored Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (Seato).
Meanwhile, AMDA was invoked for the first and only time to involve British Commonwealth troops operating on the ground against what is said to be the 'secret war' of Sukarno's Indonesia against Malaysia, especially in Sarawak.
The fundamental shift came after the Tunku administration effectively ended in 1970. It was felt that, like it or not, China has to be strategically accommodated in an emerging tri-polar world. That line of reasoning also coincided with the Nixon-Kissinger grand strategy of working more closely with China to strengthen the containment regime against the former Soviet Union, later expressed in the US-China-Asean political and diplomatic united front against the extension of former Soviet Union's sphere of influence in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos as well as Afghanistan in 1979-1989.
So, President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China in 1974. Earlier in 1971, AMDA was superseded by a looser framework of defence cooperation known as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).
Meanwhile, Malaysia also began to play an increasingly active role in organisations like the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).
The 22-year rule of former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad further strengthened that posture of Malaysia being a developing nation which could strike a balance between the West and the non-West. Later, Mahathir went further by implementing not only the 'Look East' but also 'Buy British Last' policy in the early 1980s.
As the radicalising effects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, 1979-1989 War of Resistance in Afghanistan and ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict took hold in the hearts and minds of Muslims, globally as well as in Malaysia, the country's foreign policy also began to gravitate towards kinship solidarity with the Muslim world.
However, according to one school of observation, Mahathir also entered into "a strategic deal" with the United States in 1984.
The final implosion and disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1991 then marked the end of the 44-year Cold War. While some, like American political scientist Francis Fukuyama celebrated 'the end of history', others like Samuel Huntington felt that 'a clash of civilization' was probably imminent given the ideological vacuum left behind by the disappearance of
the essentially bipolar international order.
The 10-year post-Cold War period between 1991 and 2001 was abruptly terminated by the war-like terrorist attacks in the American homeland on September 11, 2001. It was followed soon by the US-led military counterattack against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and then the 2003 US-led war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. While Malaysia condemned the terrorist attack in the American homeland, it also officially opposed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
For good or ill, the world has certainly entered into a different era which is very distinct from the Cold War. It is often said or theorised that this is an era of American unilateralism or 'unilateral moment'. This has implications for the making or readjustment of Malaysia's foreign policy and
its conduct of international as well as regional relations.
To explore these implications, malaysiakini recently interviewed (before the US presidential election result was known) Dr Johan Saravanamutthu, who is a professor of political science at the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) and dean of the research on social transformation.
His books include the first major study of Malaysia's foreign policy, Asean regional non-governmental organisations, and the nexus between industrialisation and the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. He has also written numerous articles pertaining to regional security, foreign investment, the role of major powers, the Cambodian peace process, and the rise of the middle class as a factor in politics. His most recently edited volume is entitled New Politics in Malaysia (with Dr Francis Loh).
Saravanamutthu's critical survey of Malaysia's foreign policy under the 22-year administration of Mahathir is published in Reflections The Mahathir Years edited by Bridget Welsh (Washington DC, SAIS, 2004).
Reproduced below is the first of a two-part series of the interview:
Malaysiakini: Since its inauguration in 1967, Asean has been seen as one of the cornerstones or anchors of Malaysia's foreign policy. However, since its enlargement, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 as well as the change of regime in Indonesia, Asean seems to be losing its coherence and unity of purpose.
Members of Asean now also seem to be dealing with one another more bilaterally than multilaterally. Do you agree with this observation? If the observation is true, then what are the causes of Asean's loss of coherence and unity of purpose?
Johan: I agree. Despite the Bali Accords II which among others proposed an Asean Security Community, Economic Community etc, much of this remains lip service. Enlargement has been problematic because with Myanmar (Burma), we are reduced to working with the lowest common denominator - a movement downwards not upwards - in organisational development .
Mind you, the more purposive economic goals of Asean (Afta, Asean+3) and Abdullah's call for movement towards an EU-like structure, while a tall order at this time, are moves in the right direction. Perhaps, in the long run, the Asian economic tail will wag the Asean political dog. There's an Asean human rights working group and talk that Indonesia wants to push for an Asean Human Rights Commission. This will be a good development as long as it avoids tagging itself to the 'Asian' values red herring.
The non-interference principle, Asean way, consensual decision-making, fuzziness of political values and gaols, while useful for its early developmental phase, are now a hindrance towards a rules-based community like the EU.
Another observation is that now members of Asean also seem to be dealing with major powers like the United States and China separately, instead of as a regional group. Does it, or does it not, mean that Asean has effectively lost not only its coherence and unity of purpose but also its political identity?
No, this is not quite true. Asean always has dialogue partners and it's a good modality. Newer partners include India and of course the Asean+3. The Asean Regional Forum formed in 1994 was a good modality to include big powers in one major forum in the post Cold War environment. Problem is, it hasn't moved beyond confidence building measures (CBMS); it needs to be serious about conflict management, conflict resolution, peacekeeping , etc including tackling the problems in southern Thailand and Philippines, etc. The East Timor fracas was not handled by Asean but the UN and Australia. It should have been done through the ARF.
To be sure, there are bilateral military relationships of Asean countries with big powers (Singapore, Philippines and even Malaysia) and in my view these should be minimised if these countries are serious about the Asean project. It's a bit of a 'Catch-22' problem. Until Asean is effective as a security system, the US will continue to feature prominently. We need prime
movers (like France and Germany in the EU) to make Asean multilaterism really work. Indonesia and Malaysia can take the lead.
There is also an observation that Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, may become a diplomatic and political battlefield again between the United States and its allies on one hand and China and its friends on the other in their regional balance-of-power game. What is your comment on this observation?
Asean could play an important role here if it is already not doing so. China is already courting Asean economically (Asean-China FTA by 2010) and we could use the China card against the US politically and economically. It's the old game of non-alignment which still has some relevance in this context.
In truth, however, everyone is courting China and China herself is courting all and sundry including the US. (The Taiwan issue is to my view usually overblown by hawks on the US side). The term used now is 'bandwagoning'. It's not wrong for Asean to bandwagon rather than play the old strategic game of 'balancing'.
(Part 2 will be published on Dec 7)
From 1957 to early 1970, the administration of the first prime minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was strongly anti-Communist and pro-Western as the West was itself united in its global containment of the former Soviet Union and People's Republic of China. Then, the combination of the Cold War with the Afro-Asian decolonisation process defined the international environment where foreign policy choices were made. It was anchored on the Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) which allowed British Commonwealth troops to be stationed within the Malayan/Malaysian territory, although Malaya/Malaysia refused to join the US-sponsored Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (Seato).
Meanwhile, AMDA was invoked for the first and only time to involve British Commonwealth troops operating on the ground against what is said to be the 'secret war' of Sukarno's Indonesia against Malaysia, especially in Sarawak.
The fundamental shift came after the Tunku administration effectively ended in 1970. It was felt that, like it or not, China has to be strategically accommodated in an emerging tri-polar world. That line of reasoning also coincided with the Nixon-Kissinger grand strategy of working more closely with China to strengthen the containment regime against the former Soviet Union, later expressed in the US-China-Asean political and diplomatic united front against the extension of former Soviet Union's sphere of influence in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos as well as Afghanistan in 1979-1989.
So, President Richard Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China in 1974. Earlier in 1971, AMDA was superseded by a looser framework of defence cooperation known as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).
Meanwhile, Malaysia also began to play an increasingly active role in organisations like the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).
The 22-year rule of former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad further strengthened that posture of Malaysia being a developing nation which could strike a balance between the West and the non-West. Later, Mahathir went further by implementing not only the 'Look East' but also 'Buy British Last' policy in the early 1980s. As the radicalising effects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, 1979-1989 War of Resistance in Afghanistan and ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict took hold in the hearts and minds of Muslims, globally as well as in Malaysia, the country's foreign policy also began to gravitate towards kinship solidarity with the Muslim world.
However, according to one school of observation, Mahathir also entered into "a strategic deal" with the United States in 1984.
The final implosion and disintegration of the former Soviet Union in 1991 then marked the end of the 44-year Cold War. While some, like American political scientist Francis Fukuyama celebrated 'the end of history', others like Samuel Huntington felt that 'a clash of civilization' was probably imminent given the ideological vacuum left behind by the disappearance of
the essentially bipolar international order.
The 10-year post-Cold War period between 1991 and 2001 was abruptly terminated by the war-like terrorist attacks in the American homeland on September 11, 2001. It was followed soon by the US-led military counterattack against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and then the 2003 US-led war against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. While Malaysia condemned the terrorist attack in the American homeland, it also officially opposed the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For good or ill, the world has certainly entered into a different era which is very distinct from the Cold War. It is often said or theorised that this is an era of American unilateralism or 'unilateral moment'. This has implications for the making or readjustment of Malaysia's foreign policy and
its conduct of international as well as regional relations.
To explore these implications, malaysiakini recently interviewed (before the US presidential election result was known) Dr Johan Saravanamutthu, who is a professor of political science at the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) and dean of the research on social transformation. His books include the first major study of Malaysia's foreign policy, Asean regional non-governmental organisations, and the nexus between industrialisation and the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia. He has also written numerous articles pertaining to regional security, foreign investment, the role of major powers, the Cambodian peace process, and the rise of the middle class as a factor in politics. His most recently edited volume is entitled New Politics in Malaysia (with Dr Francis Loh).
Saravanamutthu's critical survey of Malaysia's foreign policy under the 22-year administration of Mahathir is published in Reflections The Mahathir Years edited by Bridget Welsh (Washington DC, SAIS, 2004).
Reproduced below is the first of a two-part series of the interview:
Malaysiakini: Since its inauguration in 1967, Asean has been seen as one of the cornerstones or anchors of Malaysia's foreign policy. However, since its enlargement, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 as well as the change of regime in Indonesia, Asean seems to be losing its coherence and unity of purpose.
Members of Asean now also seem to be dealing with one another more bilaterally than multilaterally. Do you agree with this observation? If the observation is true, then what are the causes of Asean's loss of coherence and unity of purpose?
Johan: I agree. Despite the Bali Accords II which among others proposed an Asean Security Community, Economic Community etc, much of this remains lip service. Enlargement has been problematic because with Myanmar (Burma), we are reduced to working with the lowest common denominator - a movement downwards not upwards - in organisational development .
Mind you, the more purposive economic goals of Asean (Afta, Asean+3) and Abdullah's call for movement towards an EU-like structure, while a tall order at this time, are moves in the right direction. Perhaps, in the long run, the Asian economic tail will wag the Asean political dog. There's an Asean human rights working group and talk that Indonesia wants to push for an Asean Human Rights Commission. This will be a good development as long as it avoids tagging itself to the 'Asian' values red herring.
The non-interference principle, Asean way, consensual decision-making, fuzziness of political values and gaols, while useful for its early developmental phase, are now a hindrance towards a rules-based community like the EU.
Another observation is that now members of Asean also seem to be dealing with major powers like the United States and China separately, instead of as a regional group. Does it, or does it not, mean that Asean has effectively lost not only its coherence and unity of purpose but also its political identity?
No, this is not quite true. Asean always has dialogue partners and it's a good modality. Newer partners include India and of course the Asean+3. The Asean Regional Forum formed in 1994 was a good modality to include big powers in one major forum in the post Cold War environment. Problem is, it hasn't moved beyond confidence building measures (CBMS); it needs to be serious about conflict management, conflict resolution, peacekeeping , etc including tackling the problems in southern Thailand and Philippines, etc. The East Timor fracas was not handled by Asean but the UN and Australia. It should have been done through the ARF.
To be sure, there are bilateral military relationships of Asean countries with big powers (Singapore, Philippines and even Malaysia) and in my view these should be minimised if these countries are serious about the Asean project. It's a bit of a 'Catch-22' problem. Until Asean is effective as a security system, the US will continue to feature prominently. We need prime movers (like France and Germany in the EU) to make Asean multilaterism really work. Indonesia and Malaysia can take the lead.
There is also an observation that Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, may become a diplomatic and political battlefield again between the United States and its allies on one hand and China and its friends on the other in their regional balance-of-power game. What is your comment on this observation?
Asean could play an important role here if it is already not doing so. China is already courting Asean economically (Asean-China FTA by 2010) and we could use the China card against the US politically and economically. It's the old game of non-alignment which still has some relevance in this context.
In truth, however, everyone is courting China and China herself is courting all and sundry including the US. (The Taiwan issue is to my view usually overblown by hawks on the US side). The term used now is 'bandwagoning'. It's not wrong for Asean to bandwagon rather than play the old strategic game of 'balancing'.
(Part 2 will be published on Dec 7)
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