After exploring Malaysia's defence policies in the past, Dr Chandran Jeshurun shares his observations of some of the critical issues relating to this country's defence and armed services.

Q: In your essay, you observe that the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) have been modernised since the 1980s and shifted its force level, structure and posture from the Army-based counterinsurgency to one that is more conventional, and balanced between the Army, Navy and Air Force. What are the reasons, internal and external, for the shift? Has the shift caused any inter-service rivalry?

A: Yes, there has been this major shift, if you would like to call it that, from an old established structure of the MAF to its 21st century functions and this has willy-nilly meant that the Army has had no choice but to accept equal status with the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). As everyone now knows, the position of Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) itself, which had traditionally been an Army preserve, is now open to the other two service chiefs as their ranks have been raised to that of a four-star general during (former premier Dr) Mahathir's (Mohamad) time. Inter-Service rivalry has always been an unavoidable reality in the MAF due to the Royal Malay Regiment's (RMR) distinguished past and most of the decision-and policy-making positions being monopolized by the Army.

However, it is difficult to speculate about which of the three services will emerge as the predominant one as the pattern of actual combat scenarios is still uncertain. At one time, soon after the Gulf War when US air power was used with devastating success, it looked as if the RMAF would get a powerful new boost in its role as a major strike force. But being a nation with huge maritime resources and strategic interests, one can also see the potential for the RMN to become the premier service of the future.

Threat perceptions

Q: Is the shift of the force level, structure and posture of the MAF that began in the 1980s still relevant to the post-Cold War environment of international and regional security which is now based on rapid reaction, expeditionary forward defence, asymmetrical or non-conventional warfare, network or 'swarming' warfare and coalition warfare which is centered on the concept of inter-operability among allied forces?

A: I cannot respond to this question with confidence as the actual threat perceptions of the MAF are not publicly known. Needless to say, all the calculations on which the transformation of the MAF to a conventional force structure in the late 1970s have had to be re-assessed in this new millennium. I have tried to argue that the ' full spectrum capabilities' that the defence minister spoke about last year and Mahathir's own earlier statement that the MAF will give a 'bloody nose' to any outside source attempting to encroach on our sovereignty demonstrate a fundamental change in defence posture.

My tentative answer would be that there is undoubtedly a strong element of positioning ourselves for any inter-operability possibilities. But like it or not, there is also a marked commitment to being a credible independent defence force in the face of any conceivable external threats.

Q: The perceived or real external threats in the past were rather clear, but how about now?

A: Since the time of the 'domino theory' Malaysia has never faced any serious military threat, so far as we know. One gets the feeling that we have lagged behind the feverish military build-up in the region, particularly in Singapore, and that the minimum that ought to be done is to be able to cope with possible cross-border threats. There is no doubt that the element of overseas UN peacekeeping responsibilities that was fine-tuned under Mahathir has also had some considerable effect on modernization of the MAF. There are no 'threats' as such from either of our neighbours or from powerful external sources but the recent exchanges over US and Australian involvement in our external defence domain have clearly shown that Malaysia firmly rejects any such scenario. And, to top it all, military planning has to address the 'terrorists' threat as well.

Ethnic imbalance

Q: In your essay, you observe that, despite the initial attempt to create a multi-ethnic armed force to operate along side with the Royal Malay Regiment, there has been an increasing ethnic imbalance in the composition of the MAF, whether at the level of the rank-and-file or high command. What are the reasons for this evident ethnic imbalance? What can be done to rectify the situation so that MAF is seen to be national, rather than Malay only?

A: 'Ethnic imbalance' has been historically an almost institutionalised feature of the MAF's character even before 1957. The raising of the Royal Armoured Corps, since the time of Templer, and the expansion of other units such as the Royal Artillery, Royal Signals and the Royal Malaysian Rangers from the 1960s onwards invariably meant that there was always a small but significant number of Chinese, Indian, Eurasian and Sabahan/Sarawakian officers and rank-and-file in the MAF. In fact, both the RMAF and the RMN had a special attraction for the other communities as seen in the number of high-ranking officers in those services who were not Malays. My own feeling is that, when the RMC made it a policy that not only those enrolled in its Cadet Wing but also in it its Boys Wing should do military service in 1970, there was a steady decline in the number of applications from those who were not Malays. But this is not a subject that can be fruitfully pursued in any rational discussion without facts and figures as well as an understanding of changing socio-economic circumstances and I would hesitate to comment on it in a public forum such as this. Since you also ask what could be done to 'rectify' this state of affairs, my only response would be that there should be a genuinely felt need at a national level to address the whole issue of whether our security forces need to be reasonably representative of an ethnically differentiated society.

Q: What do you think are the reasons behind the non-Malays disinterest in joining the armed forces? Is the lack of material incentive the only reason? What about other non-material or psychological factors such as the lack of political identification with the Malay/Muslim-predominated state and society?

A: There has been a fair amount of discussion in the available literature as to the reasons that have led to this unfortunate disparity in the ethnic composition of the MAF. For every one of the negative reasons proferred as to this phenomenon, mostly quite racial in tone in the way they are expressed, my experience is that one can also find a number of much more balanced explanations. The factors that you have mentioned may well be the operative ones but I feel that there is a deeper socio-political and economic base on which individual citizens decide whether to serve in the military or not. That question awaits a serious and organized study at an inter-disciplinary level.

Q: Given the Malay predominance in the armed forces at all levels, does it not mean that Malaysia's strategic culture and threat perceptions are not really reflective or representative of the true national reality, identity and interests which are objectively multi-ethnic and multi-religious?

A: OK, now we come to the rather esoteric subject of strategic culture. How do you define it and what are its core elements? When it was suggested that its roots lie in the intrinsically Malay experience of history since 1511, there was a howl of protest that this completely ignored the others who have become an integral part of our society. (I had been so bold as to venture such a viewpoint in a Chapter entitled ' Malaysia: the Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture' in Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan, 1999). Yes, the commonality of individual historical perceptions of threats among different ethnic groups, for example, has a vital impact on a nation's collective strategic
culture. Frankly, I think we are, intellectually at least, quite some distance away from anything like a consensus on how this sort of highly speculative exercise can be usefully pursued.

National service

Q: What are your assessments of the recently enforced national service for randomly selected youths?

A: When it was first broached, the general impression that most people had was that it would be some sort of diluted version of the somewhat over-zealous national service scheme of our southern neighbour. In military studies, national service is synonymous with national conscription which is a citizen's duty within a certain age range to serve in defence of the nation.
And, of course, in our multi-racial society such an experience for the younger generation of serving as members of a Reserve Force and especially the military training that it would entail could conceivably, but not necessarily, enhance the level of national unity through inter-ethnic integration. The British, in fact, did implement such a scheme at the height of the Emergency but it was marked, in the political circumstances of the time, by an unexpected exodus of many youths of Chinese descent to the mainland by the shiploads, if contemporary accounts are to be believed.

Volunteerism in military service goes back to the pre-Second World War years when a healthy climate of camaraderie appears to have resulted in the formation of such units as the Federated Malay States Volunteer Force (FMSVF) that included not only Asians but also a significant number of British officials. The FMSVF and other such units rendered unstinting and heroic service in the campaign against the Japanese invasion and many paid with their lives. To some extent, this noble tradition was passed on to the Home Guards of the Emergency and became institutionalized as the Askar Wataniah. Most members of this purely voluntary reserve force were Malays although others also joined both at the rank-and-file level and as officers. Both the Home Guards and Askar Wataniah played a supportive role in the Emergency and the latter continue to serve as border patrols. Unfortunately, the Askar Wataniah was always something of an 'anak tiri' (stepchild) within the MAF and its status was only changed when the concept of a Reserve Force or 'Pasukan Simpanan' was implemented in the early 1980s. Its credibility as an effective National Reserve that can support the regular troops in battle is a subject worth studying in some depth if one wants to understand the concept of national service?

Q: In your essay, you also mention about 'the growing number of reports of financial mismanagement and constant rumors of corruption scandals in connection with arms procurement'. Can you elaborate and discourse this observation with more specific details?

A: I am sorry I cannot do this because all the information on these matters is privileged. Apart from the recorded cases of criminal charges in our courts or of military court-martial involving financial irregularities, the rest of the reports on corruption and financial mismanagement in arms
procurement and in military-related contracts are the mostly based on hearsay? Nevertheless, I have mentioned in my published works that the government has been continuously challenged in the Dewan Rakyat about purported corruption scandals related to major arms procurement deals since the 1970s. It is not a subject that can be openly discussed without hard and irrefutable evidence as the court case of Lim Kit Siang over the purchase of the Spica-M fast attack craft from Sweden proved some years back.

Polish tanks

Q: In an era when the possibility of the outbreak of large-scale inter-state conventional warfare is said to have been reduced considerably and significantly, and Malaysia is engaged in institutionalized defence cooperation with the United States as well as Singapore, Australia, Britain and New Zealand within the framework of FPDA, why does Malaysia still need to engage in what seems to be a massive programme of arms procurement and build-up of what you describe as 'offensive capability for all three military services' in recent years? For example, what would be the use of the Polish tanks which are clearly designed for conventional and large-scale land warfare on flat and clear land like in Iraq or Poland?

A: As I stated above, we are now moving into an entirely new level of defence capability aimed at matching the best that 'the other side' can deliver against us should such an eventuality ever occur. Without further elaboration, all I can say is that our Polish tanks, for example, will all be deployed in Peninsular Malaysia only and, maybe, mainly in the south.

Q: The sources of Malaysia's arms procurement seem to be very much diversified in terms of national origins such as USA, UK, Poland, Russia, Italy, France, Belgium and China. One concern is how to re-configure, standardize and synchronize these different weapons systems and their operating or supporting platforms for effective and realistic operations in Malaysia's different terrain and climatic conditions?

A: It is the bane of the MAF that it can never offer any credible rationalisation as to the ultimate diversity of its arms sourcing strategies. Experience in the distant past when the first of the French Panhard APCs were acquired, leaves one with the impression that there is insufficient coordination in force modernization whether it applies to the Army, the RMN or the RMAF. Niether Mindef (Ministry of Defence) nor the high command of MAF has ever clearly explained how they intend to handle this rather complicated mix of military hardware and be combat-ready at the same time. Most informed opinions in military circles have been very critical of the unavoidability of major operational chaos in the absence of any centralised control.

Q: Do you think parliamentary and media scrutiny of the decision-making process and procedure of arms procurement and other defence-related issues nowadays is sufficient as compared to the past? Do you think that Malaysia's practices of transparency and public accountability on military affairs and defence policy, including arms procurement programmes, is compatible or on par with international standards?

A: One can have all the Defence White Papers that one wants and one can scrutinize the annual Military Balance of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London to one's heart's content but the truth is that no defence establishment worth its salt will ever divulge its inner details and plans for public scrutiny. We have on the whole been a relatively open system in the sense that people like Tan Chee Khoon and other backbenchers in the Dewan Rakyat have had no restrictions placed on them in asking the most embarrassing questions of the minister of defence and military spending since days gone by. The impression that one gets these days is that there
is less interest in Parliament in such financial details and in the government's accountability for major arms transfers, a trend that became apparent during the past twenty-two years in particular.

Q: After Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi came into power, Malaysia' s defence and security relations with the United States and Australia seem to have improved rather significantly as evidenced by the high-profile port visits of USS Blue Ridge and the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C Stennis of the US Pacific Fleet as well as more prominent media coverage of joint military exercises between Malaysia and Australia. What does this mean for the future direction of Malaysia's defence and security policies?

A: Frankly, I would not read too much into these post-Mahathir developments with regard to the US and Australia. There is insufficient hard evidence at the moment to suggest that some major shift in emphasis in our external defence relations is in the offing. Moreover, it is difficult to see defence policy being so closely linked to foreign policy in the future as it had been under Mahathir.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia. He is a former DAP member of Parliament for Kampar (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily). He read political science and economics at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.