Parties that remain in office for lengthy periods often become subject to factionalism. This is because as the party's capacity to control public appointments and direct state contracting becomes ever more deeply entrenched, the power of party notables as patrons become more pronounced too.

Yet, while factionalism within Unmo is much remarked upon, it is rarely analysed by academics.

Although specialists on Malaysian politics generally agree that factions do exist in Umno, indeed in other ethnic political parties too, no attempts have been made to explain the origin or circumstances of factionalism within the context of Malaysia. Nor has there been any attempts to distinguish factionalism from mere cliquish political behaviour.

Every organisation, and certainly every political party, contains organised power groupings. Umno is no exception.

The difference that separates Umno, from say, the Labor Party in Australia which also has its factions, is the manner in which factions resolve their 'within group' conflicts.

That is whether they involve humiliation through a whisper campaign, outright accommodation, or literally, the physical annihilation of the other.

Mahathir vs Razaleigh

Regardless of the means employed to further one's factional advantage, what is nevertheless true is that once factions begin to operate, they very quickly create counter groupings that could either be a loose amalgamation of opposing members or a tight opposition group. The latter fuels future factional fights.

Indeed, once a 'tight' faction comes into play, ideological intensity to a cause, or, alternatively, a strong allegiance to a leader, can provide vital clue(s) as to whether the factionalism exhibited within the party will lead to an intense dog fight before, during, or even after a party election.

Some fights may even be conducted outside the party, as had happened twice to Umno already; the first during the Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah rivalry, the second during the Mahathir-Anwar Ibrahim rift.

Though an empirical reality, factionalism remained far too hidden to be seen as a 'factual' phenomenon, however. As such, it has been hard to theorise as to how factions emerge, or fade away in Umno. This is because factionalism has traditionally occurred behind the proverbial veil.

If the political rhetoric is kept opaque and ambiguous, as those familiar with Malay language can testify, factional fighting can only be grasped through the privileged access to the inner circle. In other words, it takes a well-connected person, indeed trained in political analysis, to understand clannish behaviour.

Indeed, it was not until Mahathir and Razaleigh who went head to head in the Umno party election in 1987, that the public and academia at large was treated to the full-blown spectre of what Professor AB Shamsul of National University of Malaysia aptly called a "battle royale."

Of the 69 contenders for the 25 Umno supreme council seats for instance, 35 publicly rooted for Mahathir, known as Team A, while another 34 openly vouched for Razaleigh whom in turn led Team B. 90 percent of the delegates were believed to have divided evenly into these two camps.

More recently in 1998, the Anwar-Mahathir rivalry that resulted from the unceremonious dismissal of the former also created an in-group and out-group dynamic that spilled into the open streets, demarcating one faction from the other.

Before this, the Malaysian public had no idea of the intensity of the fissure as both repeatedly denied any rift until the very last moment; although the root of the inter-personal conflict was speculated as early as 1995.

That factionalism exists in Umno need not be further questioned, as the annual Umno general assembly has been marked by the ritual of the deputy president telling the president that there will be no 'back stabbing'; as occasioned by the statement of Najib Abdul Razak to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi recently.

Advancing corporate interests

But why do factions exist in Umno? Indeed, what is the dynamic that explains their varied existence?

A theory of factionalism in Umno, attended by four key assumptions, could explain much of the factionalism that Malaysia has observed.

Without understanding these assumptions, or what can otherwise be termed the four axioms, one cannot get a complete picture of Umno's internecine rivalry that seems to pass from one set of leaders to the other.

First, factionalism in Umno has emerged because the individual interest, especially corporate ones, are no longer adequately served by the collective or executive leadership. Factions serve as a Trojan Horse with which infiltration could be attempted, so as to influence the shape of the policy, first at the party level, and later the government.

In a sense, factions are not born, but financially 'sponsored' into formation, to which ambitious leaders would only be too happy to comply with corporate dictates, granted that most corporate initiatives do not necessarily fall under the country`s economic welfare anyway.

Second, when certain Umno stalwarts are unable to satisfy their own interest and ambitions within the organisational hierarchy, they have resorted to building their own factions to prepare for the triennial party elections too. In this context, they corral more dedicated and capable followers within the party to give them added trajectory.

Third, there also exists an inordinate amount of charisma - defined by Max Weber as having that 'indefinable extraordinary quality' - in one leader as opposed to the other, therefore influencing one group of Umno followers to want to follow the most charismatic one, while at the same time, rejecting the others.

It is this zero-sum mentality that makes factionalism so divisive on occasions, as at stakes are not strictly policy debates, but excessive attachment to one personality over the other. In this context, factionalism occurs essentially because the protected seems to want to follow their protector only.

In the history of Umno, a majority of the leaders and party stalwarts have surprisingly been very charismatic, hence having their own factions, either developing organically or through conscious cultivation.

Sometimes these individuals exist at the same time, creating various conflicts and personal rivalries that should otherwise not have been so intense; as marked by the fallout between Mahathir and Anwar, both of whom were equally charismatic due to their well-articulated ideas on how Umno and Malaysia should move forward.

Lastly, the undercurrents of intra-organisational rivalry in Umno has become so keen that no one can survive, or alternatively, prolong his chances of survival, without at least a form of factional mooring.

This has in turn precipitated a situation where even the strongest leaders may feel perpetually insecure. To resolve such tensions, faction serve as an anchor with which one could consolidate one`s relative position. In this context, once again, it is leaders who seek the followers rather than the other way around.

Not necessarily destructive yet

For what it is worth, the kind of factionalism in Umno is not necessarily destructive yet. Due to the quirk of history, ousted leaders still have room to come back to Umno. Any fight attempted against Umno - even when conducted outside the ring - is bound to be temporary.

Although on those occasions when factionalism has become an extreme public spectacle, voters have become polarised. Opposition parties have usually gained from such factional in-fighting, but Umno has always found a way to bounce back with a strong agenda.

Indeed, the relevance of Umno, like all other political parties, hinges on three conditions.

First of all, Umno must justify its existence within the context of continuing a special and viable political systemic function - that is of 'protecting' the Malays.

In other words, if Umno can prove to the Malay/Muslim electorate that Umno is needed to defend Malay identity, interest and Islam (i.e. the 3 Is), then Umno's position is secure.

Secondly, Umno must also maintain the critical level of organisation needed to fulfil various grassroots functions. With 17,000 branches spread all over Malaysia, Umno is indeed well positioned to play such a role.

Thirdly, Umno must have sufficient capacity to adapt to changing rules, attitudes and circumstances too. Since Umno holds its triennial elections regularly, with the occasional postponements, these contests have allowed the leadership in Umno to gauge their strengths objectively.

Hence, what is ironic about Umno is that its power actually depends on regular democratic contests, rather than less.

However, due to the persistence of money politics, especially during the period of Mahathir, it can be sufficiently argued that Umno has come to fear election being dominated by financial manipulations.

Compounding such fears is of course the existence of one or more factions to capitalise on the use of money politics to capture the party positions.

Still, factionalism in Umno, regardless of money politics, will continue to occur. Institutionally, there is nothing wrong with such factionalism. They form part of a healthy party.

What makes factionalism particularly dangerous is when disgruntled Umno members resort to relying on external help to destroy its internal opponents. Or, when factionalism becomes a no-holds-barred contest, where one seeks to destroy the other with extra-institutional means.