In the second of a three-part interview with malaysiakini, historian Professor Cheah Boon Kheng analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist Party of Malaya, an entity that he has researched as part of his inquiry into the Malaysian nation-building process.

Malaysiakini: In your latest book entitled 'Malaysia - The Making of a Nation', you also credit the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its 1948 insurrection or uprising for forcing the British government to accelerate its plans for Malaya's de-colonisation. It is still a rather unorthodox or politically incorrect view in Malaysia, isn't it? Why do you say this? Can you elaborate?

Cheah: I guess this is not a 'politically correct' view. But I think historically it is undeniable that the CPM's armed struggle played a decisive role in securing Malaya's independence. The British government's records show this.

The communist insurrection made colonial rule untenable. The British realised that the only way to end the emergency, to secure their investments and strategic interests and to deny the communists victory was to relinquish power quickly to the non-communist nationalists.

'Bapa Kemerdekaan,' Tunku Abdul Rahman, was honest enough to admit and recognise the communists' contribution in securing independence. Many people, including our present political leaders, seem to forget the Tunku's views.

The Tunku negotiated with the communists at the Baling 'peace' talks in December 1955. He knew what their real contributions were - the MCP's 'concessions' which strengthened his hand in the independence negotiations in London in February 1956.

The communists had offered to lay down arms, if he could secure powers of internal security and defence in his hands. In London, the Tunku demanded those powers. This forced Britain to hand over those powers to end the 'war' quickly. Even though the communists were later to renege on their promise, it was a clever tactical move to gain a foothold in the independence talks.

In his memoirs, 'Lest We Forget: Further Candid Reminiscences' (1983), the Tunku acknowledged the communists' role.

He wrote: "Just as Indonesia was fighting a bloody battle, so were the communists in Malaya, who, too, fought for independence. With the difference that the communists of Malaya were not the indigenous people of this country and they were fighting to set up a communist regime, which the believers in the faith of Islam could not support, nor could those orthodox people who believed in democracy and freedom.

"So the struggle for the independence of this country was carried out by the communists alone and they fought a subversive as well as a shooting war, losing many of their men and at the same time killing many of our men and the Commonwealth soldiers."

You have done extensive and in-depth research and written some books on the Malayan Communists and you have also interviewed Chin Peng face-to-face in Canberra in 1999. Now that Chin Peng has also offered his version of history for public discourse, what is your overall assessment of the rights and wrongs as well as strengths and weaknesses of the Communist Party of Malaya from 1930 to 1989?

Naturally, in fighting the 'war' for national liberation up to 1957, many lives were lost and sacrificed and the communists committed many wrongs, especially the terror and violence.

Some could argue that this was justified for the sake of independence. However, after 1957, the 'war' became almost like a civil war, between the nationalists and the communists.

The communists failed to understand nationalism as a powerful force. They saw it more as a reactionary and opportunistic force, based on ethnicity and culture. Their ideal was a socialist state, based on the working class and the peasantry.

They strove to bring about equality and social justice, and believed that a class approach could solve all political and social problems. The CPM, however, suffered from being a predominantly Chinese party, with very few Indian and Malay members.

Only in 1955 did it make a symbolic gesture to put up a Malay as the party's chairperson and an Indian as vice-chairperson. Otherwise it was insufficiently sensitive to race, language and culture issues.

The party was also anti-intellectual. It did not welcome intellectuals into the party's leadership. From 1936 to 1947 the party was under the control of Lai Te (photo), a British Special Branch informer. Chin Peng in his memoirs confirms Lai Te's role, but fails to talk about the party's major weaknesses.

The failure of the MCP demonstrates once again the failure of a non-communal political organisation in Malaysian politics. Its only success was in forming a united front government in Singapore with the People's Action Party from 1959 to 1961.

This was achieved by CPM members acting independently of its central command. It happened at a time when the CPM was very low on morale and contemplating winding up its affairs and demobilising its army.

What happened in Singapore 'embarrassed' the party leadership in southern Thailand and in China. This is probably why Chin Peng ignores this episode entirely in his memoirs, 'My Side of History' (2003).

For many years, you have written and published many books on various aspects of the modern history of Malaya/Malaysia with a consistently clear-eyed focus on the problems of nation-building in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-lingual post-colonial society. In your observation now, how far has the nation-building process succeeded or not succeeded?

Nation building is an ongoing process. It is not a project that is never completed. It is always evolving, changing in form and substance with twists and turns. For historians who usually take a long view, 47 years of nation-building is rather a short period.

Even a more established nation like France underwent a crisis in national identity during its general election in 2002. The French had to decide whether they wanted France to be a more exclusive or open society.

In the second round of elections, the majority rallied and rejected exclusivity, and voted to open up the society to coloured immigrants and others. For a young nation like Malaysia, nation- building has been quite positive, quite remarkable. There is a lot of bargaining, compromises, 'give and take'.

If the nation building process has not succeeded, or not succeeded fully yet, then what should be done? What are the obstacles?

I think in Malaysia's nation-building history, one cannot afford to lose sight of ethnicity. Malaysia's political process is based on communalism. I think most non-communal political organisations have not made much headway. This truth has been demonstrated in a lot of studies done by political scientists.

Malay political dominance is a reality. I believe once this is accepted more multi-cultural practices could increasingly occur to accommodate other ethnic and cultural groups. The (Tourism Malaysia) advertisement, 'Malaysia, Truly Asia' is a step forward. It should be extended into many other areas, not just tourism.

The focus on nation building unavoidably involves the discourse on inter-ethnic or inter-communal relations. Are inter-ethnic or inter-communal relationships now better than in the past?

Inter-ethnic relationships in Malaysia are certainly improving. However, an ethnic revival is always around the corner when the economy is down, or when issues like bumiputera rights, Islamic state, education quotas, Indian poverty, English language, dress code in schools and women's rights are highlighted in the media.

We must be able to debate these issues, but it has not always been easy to do so in a calm and rational manner.

Note: The third and concluding part in this series will be published on Thursday.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia. He is a former DAP member of Parliament for Kampar (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily). He read political science and economics at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.