In an attempt to blast Shaukat Ali to smithereens, Notes From The Gulag did not offer any useful information other than the well-known facts that Malaysia has an extensive coastline, and its military spending has been a modest (and I believe, very commendable) amount when compared to our wealthier neighbour.

None of these facts justifies in any manner Kelvin Ong's clamour for US military involvement in patrolling the Straits of Melaka.

If Gulag's intention has been to instigate Malaysia into investing in more military assets for the security of the Straits, I believe he has left it a bit late, apart from the fact he has failed to understand the complexity of the problem, involving that of an apathetic and uncooperative principal who has been largely responsible for the continuing presence of piracy.

But I believe Gulag's and indeed Ong's intentions are both the same, a continuing campaign on behalf of sources south of our border, to enlist and politically make acceptable the US military into the scheme of things.

This has been most noticeable in Ong's opening line, which had straightaway called on Malaysia (and indirectly Indonesia) for an accommodation with a US military presence in the Straits. This persistent Singaporean mantra is certainly understandable, because the Straits and its commercial traffic represent for the island nation a vital bloodline.

Perhaps after all, Gulag's intention was not so much to galvanise Malaysia into investing in more naval assets. Indeed, if Gulag has been a proxy for Singaporean sources, why would he want to suggest an increased Malaysian naval strength?

But by demonstrating Malaysia's lack of adequate military resources vis-B-vis her extensive coastline, regardless of the fact that he had done it without proper context, Gulag was promoting a prescribed logic that we perforce need the US Navy.

Given that the matter of direct US military involvement in the security of the Straits had been put to rest after the recent definitive announcement by the Malaysian defence minister, and the volte-face by the Americans, with Admiral Walter Doran of the US Pacific Command claiming they had been misunderstood, one cannot fail to wonder what these proxies have been really up to?

Actually Shaukat Ali has pinpointed the heart of the problem in his letter Closet apologists in the Malacca Straits, an issue that was also mentioned by me in an earlier letter. Piracy in the Straits has been, is and will continue to be a problem of Indonesian origin.

The objective of the Singaporean campaign has been to force a resolution to this problem that has been caused and prolonged by a decidedly lack of due diligence by Indonesia.

Before we investigate into the problem further, let us consider the two different issues of terrorism and piracy in the Straits. The former is of real concern to all the four players, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the United States. None of these parties will be quibbling needlessly as to who ought to be neutralising the terrorist attack, so long as any such attack may be stopped.

Imagine a seaborne terrorist attack in the Straits on any of the ships, or even a terrorist-hijacked oil tanker steaming headlong for a collision to seal off a strategic chokepoint in the vicinity of Singapore.

If the US Navy just 'happens' to be coincidentally in the area, and takes action against the terrorists, will Malaysia and Indonesia take umbrage that the issue of sovereignty has been ignored by a 'passing' ship of a friendly power? Will these two countries be likely to split hairs over who ought to be neutralising the criminals?

Undoubtedly, the US military prefers to be strategically positioned in the region and accepted by the locals, and so does Singapore. But even with Malaysia and Indonesia publicly cold shouldering an American presence, in reality there is nothing to stop the 'odd' US destroyer or cruiser from being present when and where it matters most.

The US military has the intelligence to do this. In this regard, it is also supported capably by the intelligence services of its two regional allies, Singapore and Australia.

If the above argument holds true, then it must be the issue of piracy in the Straits that has Singapore pushing continuously for a US military presence, despite the fact that the latter is not so interested in ordinary criminality of the seas.

Malaysia has also been troubled by these seaway robbers but its concerns have not been to the extent as those of Singapore. Yes, we have the odd Malaysian fisherman kidnaped every now and then but who would be usually released after the ransom has been paid.

Yes, some ships have been robbed and hijacked but these have not stopped the traffic, for the reason the Straits of Malacca remains indispensable to shipping. Occasionally someone even gets killed yes, a tragedy that becomes a historical footnote.

But such crimes and tragedies are nothing compared to the most likely prospect of embarrassing and thus offending her powerful neighbour if Singapore were to confront her, too, vigorously on the fact that piracy is of an Indonesian origin, with Indonesian sovereign waters providing sanctuary to these criminals.

Shaukat Ali correctly raised the impossibility of 'hot pursuit' when one's neighbour is a regional heavyweight who takes exceptional offence to any foreign military intrusion into her sovereign territory.

The cold reality is that piracy in the Straits cannot be solved unless the Indonesian government plays a meaningful role. Thus far, it has indicated by its own inaction that it considers it not important enough to exercise due diligence on this matter.

Even worse than the unfortunate attitude of the Indonesian government, and perhaps related to its apathy, has been the unpleasant knowledge, that the local Indonesian military is not above replacing their uniforms with bandoliers and kerchiefs occasionally, to moonlight as Captain Henry Morgan.

Incidentally, this phenomenon is also not uncommon in the Sabahan waters, where after the crime, the local Captain William Kidd would dash back across the border, effectively denying pursuit by Malaysian security forces.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Which Malaysian or Singapore naval ship would want to initiate a frightening diplomatic furore by sinking an Indonesian military vessel during pursuit, let alone hot pursuit into Indonesian waters? This is one of the dilemmas in combating piracy in the Straits.

Singapore, more than anyone, is understandably keen to have the piracy (and possible terrorist problems) addressed forcefully, but it needs to overcome the biggest obstacle with great subterfuge.

Faced with a recalcitrant principal, it has calculated that the US military presence in the Straits, and based at Changi, may moderate any Indonesian bristling when 'hot pursuits' of pirates into Nusantara waters occur.

When one has to deal with a 500kg gorilla, it's helpful to take along a 1,000kg simian. It may even force Indonesia to clamp down on her erring buccaneers. This would just suit Singapore as well.

Indonesia does not want anyone in her waters, least of all when embarrassing facts may be discovered. Her seemingly cooperative attitude in suggesting 'joint' patrols has no other intention than to maintain a beady eye on her neighbours' navies in her waters.

'Joint' patrols on surveillance and policing matters must be the most inefficient use of scarce resources, but such types of operations allow the host country to 'control' and 'direct' the participating navies where to go.

The heart of the issue lies in very turbulent waters, heavily laid with political and diplomatic mines.