Was the MH370 tragedy a coincidence?
Lam Choong WahPublished: Jun 3, 2014 4:49 AM | Updated: Jun 3, 2014 5:49 AM
COMMENT In our Merdeka Day celebration every year, the Malaysian Armed Forces will be the main feature of the parades.
The impeccably dressed military personnel and their armoured vehicles will march in lock step past the beautifully adorned Dataran Merdeka stage as the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) jets stage coordinated manoeuvres and release smoke resembling the colours of the Malaysian flag.
Not to be outdone too is the Royal Malaysian Navy’s (RMN) smartly adorned task force marching proudly. The underlying message in all these is to impress the spectators of Malaysia’s capability to defend itself.
Also every year, during the Navy Day, Army Day, Air Force Day and Warrior’s Day celebrations, the government-controlled broadcast media RTM and TV3 will dutifully show patriotic programmes and remind the people of the sacrifices of the Armed Forces for the country. In effect, it is to build the image that the Malaysian Armed Forces are reliable and have the deterrent capabilities...
COMMENT In our Merdeka Day celebration every year, the Malaysian Armed Forces will be the main feature of the parades.
The impeccably dressed military personnel and their armoured vehicles will march in lock step past the beautifully adorned Dataran Merdeka stage as the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) jets stage coordinated manoeuvres and release smoke resembling the colours of the Malaysian flag.
Not to be outdone too is the Royal Malaysian Navy’s (RMN) smartly adorned task force marching proudly. The underlying message in all these is calculated to impress the spectators of Malaysia’s capability to defend itself.
Also every year, during the Navy Day, Army Day, Air Force Day and Warrior’s Day celebrations, the government-controlled broadcast media RTM and TV3 will dutifully show patriotic programmes and remind the people of the sacrifices of the Armed Forces for the country. In effect, it is to build the image that the Malaysian Armed Forces are reliable and have deterrent capabilities.
As a former military affairs news correspondent and media personnel involved in observing numerous military operations first hand and interviewing Armed Forces personnel as well, I too once used to believe that the Malaysian Armed Forces was a capable force.
However after much research and studying military affairs, I have realised that the parades and Armed Forces celebrations are nothing more than a façade, often failing the test of time and actual combat experience.
This is no more obvious than in the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 incident.
It is as though an invisible hand had mercilessly removed the façade of the capabilities of government institutions, exposing their ugliness to the whole world.
What was even more embarrassing was that the Malaysian government was even criticised by the notoriously secretive and opaque Chinese government as lacking in transparency and information provision.
Seen from another angle, the MH370 tragedy is a catalyst in pointing out the weaknesses of the country's defence institutions, which are badly in need of reform.
Lahad Datu tragedy
On Feb 9, 2013, about 100 armed fighters from an unknown armed organisation landed on Kampung Tanduo in Lahad Datu, Sabah, drove out the local residents and occupied the place.
A few days later, this self-declared army of Suluk descendants announced that they were on a mission to reclaim what was their ancestral land.
A few days after the group’s announcement, Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak requested a dialogue with the group in order to resolve the intrusion incident. The then Inspector General of Police (IGP), Ismail Omar, said the police had identified the intruders as descendants of the Suluk sultanate, who are from the southern Philippines and are known as the Bangsa Sulu Royal Army.
Even the then Home Affairs Minister Hishammuddin Hussein declared that the intruders were the Suluk sultanate’s hardcore supporters and that they were not terrorists or militants. He went on to guarantee that situation in Kg Tanduo was under control.
Twelve days after Hishammuddin’s assurance, the Malaysian security forces clashed with the Suluk intruder army, resulting in three police officers being injured and two Special Branch police personnel killed, and while the Suluk militants recorded 12 deaths.
Two days later, six more police officers including some from the federal police headquarters Bukit Aman were brutally decapitated and killed by another group of Suluk militants in Kg Sri Jaya Simunul, a floating squatter village in Semporna. Six Suluk militants were killed in this incident.
After the tragedy broke out, it seemed that the country had finally woken up from a nightmare. A massive number from the Malaysian Armed Forces were finally mobilised to hunt down and clear out the Suluk intruders.
Looking back, there was in fact open information already available in August 2008, indicating that the Malaysian Armed Forces and police were already aware that the descendants of the Suluk sultanate were actively recruiting people for their army in Sabah at that time.
In a news report, the then Commander of the 2nd Joint Force Command, Brig-Gen Sheikh Mokhsin, had pointed out that the Bangsa Sulu Royal Army (BSRA) was inciting the Suluk people of Sabah to join the army and that the security and armed forces have identified the BSRA as a national security threat.
“The PDRM is monitoring their activities. However to date they are only ‘touring’ Sabah and have yet to cause any discernible security threat”, a report in the Oriental Daily of Aug 11, 2008, says.
In a press conference held on 10 August 2008 the armed forces had revealed that its military intelligence had identified Sabah’s various security threats, one of them being the BSRA. However the PDRM failed to act on the information revealed, setting the stage for the 2013 Lahad Datu invasion incident.
The then deputy prime minister cum defence minister Najib Abdul Razak was also made aware of the BSRA threat. On Aug 13, 2008, he said “We are now investigating into the case concerning the Suluk sultanate descendants’ incitement of Sabahans of Suluk descent to join the BSRA”.
However from 2008 to 2013, there was no public information about whether the Malaysian security forces were taking any action to contain the activities of the Suluk sultanate's descendants to recruit Sabahans of Suluk descent into the BSRA. This too was reported by the Oriental Daily on Aug 14, 2008.
As the government was already aware of the Suluk sultanate descendants’ recruiting activities in Sabah but yet chose not to take any action on it until the 2013 Kg Tanduo intrusion took place, it shows the ineptness and failure on the part of the federal police force's estimation of the intelligence gathered.
Had the intelligence assessment been effective, our police force would have in 2008 itself been able to stop the BSRA’s terrain spying and recruiting activities in Sabah and maybe even charge anyone involved in the subversive activities. However that’s all water under the bridge now.
Losing contact with MH370
Since March 8 this year, when Flight MH370 went missing, the weaknesses of the RMAF, Immigration Department, airport security and Malaysia Airlines were on full display for the magnifying glare of the whole world.
After MH370 went missing, investigations conducted by the Immigration Department revealed that there were two Iranians who had used stolen passports to board the plane. MAS also admitted that the co-pilot had, in previous flights, invited passengers into the cockpit – which is a clear violation of aviation rules. It clearly shows the weaknesses on the part of the Immigration Department and airport security.
Even though the Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi vehemently stressed that the Immigration Department had followed all operational procedures, Interpol revealed that as the Malaysian airport security authorities had not verified with its case databases, the Malaysian authorities had not been able to identify who the people holding the stolen passports were.
Had the airport security procedures been followed through, the airport security would have been able to apprehend the suspects and also prevent cases of illegal boarding on the plane.
On the first day when the MH370 plane went missing, the first presumed spot of disappearance was in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand area. However, subsequent developments in the case show the big weaknesses of the RMAF security.
Due to unknown reasons, the RMAF’s radar monitoring personnel had neglected spotting the MH370 plane veering off its designated commercial flight route path in the northern Peninsular Malaysia. RMAF personnel also failed to notify, demand identification from the off-course MH370 plane or even scramble fighter jets to intercept it.
On the fifth day of the missing Boeing 777, RMAF chief Gen Rodzali Daud (left) admitted that the RMAF radar personnel had spotted a commercial plane veering off its commercial flight route and head towards Penang. However the air force personnel had assumed that the commercial plane did not harbour hostile intentions, so there was no further action taken.
If the RMAF chief's words are to be believed, then the country’s air defence is almost non-existent.
Any terrorist needs only to hijack a commercial plane and fly it through the Malaysian airspace to any intended spot in the country to attack it.
In the 9-11 attack, terrorists hijacked commercial flight planes and flown them off the commercial flight route and rammed them into the New York’s World Trade Centre buildings. In the MH370 incident, if terrorists had hijacked the plane and directed it to to Penang and rammed it into the Komtar tower, it would be have been unthinkable, perhaps becoming Malaysia’s equivalent of 9-11 tragedy.
RMAF Major Zaidi Ahmad, who is currently being court-marshalled for filing a police report on the Election Commission’s indelible ink fiasco, had said in a Facebook posting that RMAF did not send fighter jets to intercept the U-turned MH370 plane was because its military doctrine has not been amended, even after the outbreak of the 9-11 incident.
Zaidi also said that the Malaysian Air Force has yet to have a procedure of sending jets to intercept any commercial plane that strays from its flight path.
As military doctrine is usually classified as military secret, it would be difficult for outsiders to verify Zaidi's opinion. But what is certain is that the MH370 plane had appeared on the RMAF radar but the air force spent two to three days before certifying that the plane was indeed MH370.
Looking back on the incident, it seems like a mockery of the RMAF motto, ‘Sentiasa Di Angkasa Raya’ (Always in the air).
MH 370 – A coincidence?
On paper, this tragedy can’t be ascertained and there are a lot of unknown variables to it. However, there must be a reason for the incident, perhaps even several reasons coming together to allow the tragedy to happen: a perfect storm.
First, the failure of the Malaysian airport security to link up with the Interpol database. It resulted in two unidentified passengers using stolen passports to board MH370. Had the security measures worked, it would not only had stop the unauthorised passengers but also prevented any possible terrorist attack.
Second, since the 9-11 incident, the United States has been deploying plainclothes policemen on commercial flights and also stringently requires that all overseas incoming flights to the US to deploy plainclothes policemen as well.
MAS has also been required by the US to do so. Now, arising from the missing MAS aircraft, it seems to indicate that deploying plainclothes policemen on flights is a good deterrent to the potential hijacking of planes.
Third, when the MH370 plane flew from the Malaysian air command area into the Vietnamese air command area, all the communications on board the plane was switched off, resulting in both countries’ air commands being confused.
It resulted in both sides assuming that the plane had flown into or was still in the other’s air command area when in actual fact the plane had flown westward.
Apart from showing that the persons controlling the plane may have deliberately done so, it also showed that the areas between the air commands of different countries, long a no man’s land, have been neglected for too long by the aviation world.
Fourth, the plane flew westward through the northern Peninsular Malaysia airspace unrestrictedly. As stated above, the RMAF, for some unknown reasons, allowed an unidentified aircraft to fly through the country’s airspace. Had the RMAF followed in the US footsteps of tightening procedures on aircraft interception action in the wake of the 9-11 tragedy, then the MH370 plane would have been intercepted and not flown into the Indian Ocean.
Fifth, since 1995 when the last MAS airplane tragedy happened, in these last 19 years MAS and the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) have not faced any serious aircraft incident. In the MH370 incident, MAS, the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA), the Transport Ministry and the Defence Ministry have poorly coordinated and analysed the information from the domestic and international fronts. It has shown the ineptitude of the Malaysian side, especially in facing and handling an international aircraft accident.
Sixth, even though the probability of aircraft accidents and related deaths are very much lower compared with road accident deaths, when an aircraft accident happens, it would cause a negative impact and a far-reaching impact, as well as cast a big shadow over the concerned authorities. Therefore, the investigative works and implementation of the preventive measures to prevent future aircraft accidents are very important.
The fact that the US, United Kingdom and France, countries with big aviation industries, have specialised departments that can investigate aircraft accidents should not be surprising. However, even small countries such as Singapore, Thailand and Mongolia too have already established their air accident investigation bureaux. To date the Malaysian DCA still lacks such an independent investigative bureau that would raise the country’s air security standards.
In all, the above reasons have demonstrated that the various government institutions have been lacking in catching on with the modern developments.
Waiting for the institutional reforms
In the real world, there is no such thing as “what if?”. If we allow the “what if” logic, then the tragedy would not had occurred. By extension, that would also mean that institutional rots need not be rectified.
Just as the Lahad Datu intrusion was no accident, the reason being the failure in intelligence gathering. If the Malaysian police political arm the Special Branch can cease its aim and activities of monitoring the opposition parties and the defunct Malayan Communist Party and instead carry out intelligence gathering on terrorist activities and criminal cases, then the Lahad Datu incident may have been prevented and crime rates will drop.
Currently, what we need is not political reforms but wholesale replacement of the institutions and to institute a new Criminal and Security Intelligence Organisation in their place.
The MH370 flight tragedy was no coincidence. The biggest problem with the Malaysian security institutions is that they have been operating unaccountably for far too long and lack checks and balances and oversight mechanisms. Whenever a big incident or accident occurs, high-ranking official is held accountable, resulting in a worsening, care less attitude.
If the Malaysian Parliament was to have a select committee investigating and monitoring into the country’s security arms, such as the police, Armed Forces and other legal enforcement agencies, then the blunder by the RMAF in not intercepting the U-turned commercial plane and the airport security’s lax screening of passengers would have been investigated exhaustively and rectified.
If the Malaysian Parliament was to have a select committee to look into the transport matters, then the Genting bus accident investigation conclusion would not have been handled so carelessly. Sea and land transport safety levels would be raised and the absurd contradiction between the National Automobile Policy and National Transport Blueprint would be avoided.
Institutional reforms are a hard and slow but a necessary process. The MH370 tragedy has merely accentuated the unavoidable need for it.
LAM CHOONG WAH is currently a senior fellow at Research for Social Advancement (Refsa). He holds a Bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering from USM and a Master’s degree in strategic and defence studies, UM.
The impeccably dressed military personnel and their armoured vehicles will march in lock step past the beautifully adorned Dataran Merdeka stage as the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) jets stage coordinated manoeuvres and release smoke resembling the colours of the Malaysian flag.
Not to be outdone too is the Royal Malaysian Navy’s (RMN) smartly adorned task force marching proudly. The underlying message in all these is calculated to impress the spectators of Malaysia’s capability to defend itself.
Also every year, during the Navy Day, Army Day, Air Force Day and Warrior’s Day celebrations, the government-controlled broadcast media RTM and TV3 will dutifully show patriotic programmes and remind the people of the sacrifices of the Armed Forces for the country. In effect, it is to build the image that the Malaysian Armed Forces are reliable and have deterrent capabilities.As a former military affairs news correspondent and media personnel involved in observing numerous military operations first hand and interviewing Armed Forces personnel as well, I too once used to believe that the Malaysian Armed Forces was a capable force.
However after much research and studying military affairs, I have realised that the parades and Armed Forces celebrations are nothing more than a façade, often failing the test of time and actual combat experience.This is no more obvious than in the missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 incident.
It is as though an invisible hand had mercilessly removed the façade of the capabilities of government institutions, exposing their ugliness to the whole world.
What was even more embarrassing was that the Malaysian government was even criticised by the notoriously secretive and opaque Chinese government as lacking in transparency and information provision.
Seen from another angle, the MH370 tragedy is a catalyst in pointing out the weaknesses of the country's defence institutions, which are badly in need of reform.
Lahad Datu tragedy
On Feb 9, 2013, about 100 armed fighters from an unknown armed organisation landed on Kampung Tanduo in Lahad Datu, Sabah, drove out the local residents and occupied the place.
A few days later, this self-declared army of Suluk descendants announced that they were on a mission to reclaim what was their ancestral land.
A few days after the group’s announcement, Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak requested a dialogue with the group in order to resolve the intrusion incident. The then Inspector General of Police (IGP), Ismail Omar, said the police had identified the intruders as descendants of the Suluk sultanate, who are from the southern Philippines and are known as the Bangsa Sulu Royal Army.
Even the then Home Affairs Minister Hishammuddin Hussein declared that the intruders were the Suluk sultanate’s hardcore supporters and that they were not terrorists or militants. He went on to guarantee that situation in Kg Tanduo was under control.
Twelve days after Hishammuddin’s assurance, the Malaysian security forces clashed with the Suluk intruder army, resulting in three police officers being injured and two Special Branch police personnel killed, and while the Suluk militants recorded 12 deaths.Two days later, six more police officers including some from the federal police headquarters Bukit Aman were brutally decapitated and killed by another group of Suluk militants in Kg Sri Jaya Simunul, a floating squatter village in Semporna. Six Suluk militants were killed in this incident.
After the tragedy broke out, it seemed that the country had finally woken up from a nightmare. A massive number from the Malaysian Armed Forces were finally mobilised to hunt down and clear out the Suluk intruders.
Looking back, there was in fact open information already available in August 2008, indicating that the Malaysian Armed Forces and police were already aware that the descendants of the Suluk sultanate were actively recruiting people for their army in Sabah at that time.
In a news report, the then Commander of the 2nd Joint Force Command, Brig-Gen Sheikh Mokhsin, had pointed out that the Bangsa Sulu Royal Army (BSRA) was inciting the Suluk people of Sabah to join the army and that the security and armed forces have identified the BSRA as a national security threat.“The PDRM is monitoring their activities. However to date they are only ‘touring’ Sabah and have yet to cause any discernible security threat”, a report in the Oriental Daily of Aug 11, 2008, says.
In a press conference held on 10 August 2008 the armed forces had revealed that its military intelligence had identified Sabah’s various security threats, one of them being the BSRA. However the PDRM failed to act on the information revealed, setting the stage for the 2013 Lahad Datu invasion incident.
The then deputy prime minister cum defence minister Najib Abdul Razak was also made aware of the BSRA threat. On Aug 13, 2008, he said “We are now investigating into the case concerning the Suluk sultanate descendants’ incitement of Sabahans of Suluk descent to join the BSRA”.
However from 2008 to 2013, there was no public information about whether the Malaysian security forces were taking any action to contain the activities of the Suluk sultanate's descendants to recruit Sabahans of Suluk descent into the BSRA. This too was reported by the Oriental Daily on Aug 14, 2008.
As the government was already aware of the Suluk sultanate descendants’ recruiting activities in Sabah but yet chose not to take any action on it until the 2013 Kg Tanduo intrusion took place, it shows the ineptness and failure on the part of the federal police force's estimation of the intelligence gathered.
Had the intelligence assessment been effective, our police force would have in 2008 itself been able to stop the BSRA’s terrain spying and recruiting activities in Sabah and maybe even charge anyone involved in the subversive activities. However that’s all water under the bridge now.
Losing contact with MH370
Since March 8 this year, when Flight MH370 went missing, the weaknesses of the RMAF, Immigration Department, airport security and Malaysia Airlines were on full display for the magnifying glare of the whole world.
After MH370 went missing, investigations conducted by the Immigration Department revealed that there were two Iranians who had used stolen passports to board the plane. MAS also admitted that the co-pilot had, in previous flights, invited passengers into the cockpit – which is a clear violation of aviation rules. It clearly shows the weaknesses on the part of the Immigration Department and airport security.Even though the Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi vehemently stressed that the Immigration Department had followed all operational procedures, Interpol revealed that as the Malaysian airport security authorities had not verified with its case databases, the Malaysian authorities had not been able to identify who the people holding the stolen passports were.
Had the airport security procedures been followed through, the airport security would have been able to apprehend the suspects and also prevent cases of illegal boarding on the plane.
On the first day when the MH370 plane went missing, the first presumed spot of disappearance was in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand area. However, subsequent developments in the case show the big weaknesses of the RMAF security.
Due to unknown reasons, the RMAF’s radar monitoring personnel had neglected spotting the MH370 plane veering off its designated commercial flight route path in the northern Peninsular Malaysia. RMAF personnel also failed to notify, demand identification from the off-course MH370 plane or even scramble fighter jets to intercept it.
On the fifth day of the missing Boeing 777, RMAF chief Gen Rodzali Daud (left) admitted that the RMAF radar personnel had spotted a commercial plane veering off its commercial flight route and head towards Penang. However the air force personnel had assumed that the commercial plane did not harbour hostile intentions, so there was no further action taken.If the RMAF chief's words are to be believed, then the country’s air defence is almost non-existent.
Any terrorist needs only to hijack a commercial plane and fly it through the Malaysian airspace to any intended spot in the country to attack it.
In the 9-11 attack, terrorists hijacked commercial flight planes and flown them off the commercial flight route and rammed them into the New York’s World Trade Centre buildings. In the MH370 incident, if terrorists had hijacked the plane and directed it to to Penang and rammed it into the Komtar tower, it would be have been unthinkable, perhaps becoming Malaysia’s equivalent of 9-11 tragedy.
RMAF Major Zaidi Ahmad, who is currently being court-marshalled for filing a police report on the Election Commission’s indelible ink fiasco, had said in a Facebook posting that RMAF did not send fighter jets to intercept the U-turned MH370 plane was because its military doctrine has not been amended, even after the outbreak of the 9-11 incident.
Zaidi also said that the Malaysian Air Force has yet to have a procedure of sending jets to intercept any commercial plane that strays from its flight path.
As military doctrine is usually classified as military secret, it would be difficult for outsiders to verify Zaidi's opinion. But what is certain is that the MH370 plane had appeared on the RMAF radar but the air force spent two to three days before certifying that the plane was indeed MH370.
Looking back on the incident, it seems like a mockery of the RMAF motto, ‘Sentiasa Di Angkasa Raya’ (Always in the air).
MH 370 – A coincidence?
On paper, this tragedy can’t be ascertained and there are a lot of unknown variables to it. However, there must be a reason for the incident, perhaps even several reasons coming together to allow the tragedy to happen: a perfect storm.
First, the failure of the Malaysian airport security to link up with the Interpol database. It resulted in two unidentified passengers using stolen passports to board MH370. Had the security measures worked, it would not only had stop the unauthorised passengers but also prevented any possible terrorist attack.
Second, since the 9-11 incident, the United States has been deploying plainclothes policemen on commercial flights and also stringently requires that all overseas incoming flights to the US to deploy plainclothes policemen as well.
MAS has also been required by the US to do so. Now, arising from the missing MAS aircraft, it seems to indicate that deploying plainclothes policemen on flights is a good deterrent to the potential hijacking of planes.
Third, when the MH370 plane flew from the Malaysian air command area into the Vietnamese air command area, all the communications on board the plane was switched off, resulting in both countries’ air commands being confused.It resulted in both sides assuming that the plane had flown into or was still in the other’s air command area when in actual fact the plane had flown westward.
Apart from showing that the persons controlling the plane may have deliberately done so, it also showed that the areas between the air commands of different countries, long a no man’s land, have been neglected for too long by the aviation world.
Fourth, the plane flew westward through the northern Peninsular Malaysia airspace unrestrictedly. As stated above, the RMAF, for some unknown reasons, allowed an unidentified aircraft to fly through the country’s airspace. Had the RMAF followed in the US footsteps of tightening procedures on aircraft interception action in the wake of the 9-11 tragedy, then the MH370 plane would have been intercepted and not flown into the Indian Ocean.
Fifth, since 1995 when the last MAS airplane tragedy happened, in these last 19 years MAS and the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) have not faced any serious aircraft incident. In the MH370 incident, MAS, the Department of Civil Aviation (DCA), the Transport Ministry and the Defence Ministry have poorly coordinated and analysed the information from the domestic and international fronts. It has shown the ineptitude of the Malaysian side, especially in facing and handling an international aircraft accident.
Sixth, even though the probability of aircraft accidents and related deaths are very much lower compared with road accident deaths, when an aircraft accident happens, it would cause a negative impact and a far-reaching impact, as well as cast a big shadow over the concerned authorities. Therefore, the investigative works and implementation of the preventive measures to prevent future aircraft accidents are very important.
The fact that the US, United Kingdom and France, countries with big aviation industries, have specialised departments that can investigate aircraft accidents should not be surprising. However, even small countries such as Singapore, Thailand and Mongolia too have already established their air accident investigation bureaux. To date the Malaysian DCA still lacks such an independent investigative bureau that would raise the country’s air security standards.
In all, the above reasons have demonstrated that the various government institutions have been lacking in catching on with the modern developments.
Waiting for the institutional reforms
In the real world, there is no such thing as “what if?”. If we allow the “what if” logic, then the tragedy would not had occurred. By extension, that would also mean that institutional rots need not be rectified.
Just as the Lahad Datu intrusion was no accident, the reason being the failure in intelligence gathering. If the Malaysian police political arm the Special Branch can cease its aim and activities of monitoring the opposition parties and the defunct Malayan Communist Party and instead carry out intelligence gathering on terrorist activities and criminal cases, then the Lahad Datu incident may have been prevented and crime rates will drop.
Currently, what we need is not political reforms but wholesale replacement of the institutions and to institute a new Criminal and Security Intelligence Organisation in their place.
The MH370 flight tragedy was no coincidence. The biggest problem with the Malaysian security institutions is that they have been operating unaccountably for far too long and lack checks and balances and oversight mechanisms. Whenever a big incident or accident occurs, high-ranking official is held accountable, resulting in a worsening, care less attitude.If the Malaysian Parliament was to have a select committee investigating and monitoring into the country’s security arms, such as the police, Armed Forces and other legal enforcement agencies, then the blunder by the RMAF in not intercepting the U-turned commercial plane and the airport security’s lax screening of passengers would have been investigated exhaustively and rectified.
If the Malaysian Parliament was to have a select committee to look into the transport matters, then the Genting bus accident investigation conclusion would not have been handled so carelessly. Sea and land transport safety levels would be raised and the absurd contradiction between the National Automobile Policy and National Transport Blueprint would be avoided.
Institutional reforms are a hard and slow but a necessary process. The MH370 tragedy has merely accentuated the unavoidable need for it.
LAM CHOONG WAH is currently a senior fellow at Research for Social Advancement (Refsa). He holds a Bachelor's degree in aerospace engineering from USM and a Master’s degree in strategic and defence studies, UM.
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