One may easily jump to the conclusion that the result of the recent polls displays Malay re-unity, the rejection of PAS' Islamic state, the increasing irrelevance of Anwar Ibrahim and the return of Chinese voters to the 'grand old' opposition party DAP.

Away from home, it is rather difficult for me to follow closely how our mainstream media would have (mis)lead the whole nation to believe this. I can imagine what Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and DAP chief Lim Kit Siang would have claimed while celebrating their 'victories'..

The election results, to this writer, was shocking. It was as if Malaysia was transported via a time machine back to the 1980s and early1990s, returning to racial polarisation in politics.

On one side of the divide, the Malay party Umno overshadows the ruling coalition while on the other end, the Chinese-based DAP is the major opposition force.

Prima facie, this appeared to be the case as Umno resumed its ground in the Malay heartland - bagging 53 out of 60 Malay-predominated constituencies (i e constituencies with more than 70 percent Malay voters) in the peninsula, the Malay forces in the opposition PAS and Parti Keadilan Nasional (Keadilan) suffered severe setbacks, and DAP performed credibly well.



However, given the electoral system employed in Malaysia, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, was inherently most disproportionate, and the disproportionality was intensified by the extensive degree of gerrymandering (see Lesson from GE 1999 and 'Gerrymandering Power Index'). The gap between appearance and reality had always been noteworthy.

Different story

Put aside all other malpractices and irregularities of the election, a comparison of vote shares and seats won by each party in 1999 and 2004 tells us another side of the story (the following figures are based on the result for parliamentary seats in the peninsula):

1) Being the greatest beneficiary of the system and mal-apportionment, Umno gained advantage from an overwhelming 56.83 percent disproportionality (that is, the disparity between the percentage of seats gained and percentage of popular votes). Consequently, by a swing of only 6.85 percent popular votes, Umno bagged as many as 36 new seats.

2) Conversely, as one of the major victims this time around (-10.50 precent disproportionality), PAS lost 20 seats from its previous 27 despite its nominal increase of vote share (from 17.41 percent to 17.50 percent). This is most acute in the Malay heartland, where a loss amounting to 3.92 percent of popular votes cost PAS19 seats.

3) Meanwhile, DAP changed its fate from being a victim to become the second largest beneficiary of the system. Notwithstanding that it lost one seat in a mixed constituency as the consequent of -7.88% disproportionality, it benefitted from as much as 30.09 percent disproportionality in Chinese-predominated constituencies, which helped the party win two new seats.

4) Keadilan became a victim. Should Malaysia's electoral system be Proportional Representation (PR), Keadilan would have won 20 and 15 seats in 1999 and 2004 respectively, instead of five and one. The disparity is especially prominent in mixed constituencies, that is, despite obtaining 13.27 percent vote share, Keadilan only managed to retain its seat in Permatang Pauh.

Yet, both MIC and Gerakan won eight seats with popular votes of 5.1 percent and 4.99 percent respectively.

This analysis reveals that our FPTP system is a double-edged sword. With the exception of MIC and Keadilan being disadvantaged in both elections, other parties had benefitted and suffered from the disproportionality. Even Umno suffered a disproportionality of -3.68 percent in Malay heartland in the last election.

As Chinese voters were widely perceived to be reversing their support to DAP, the figures show that the variation of vote shares of MCA, Gerakan and DAP in Chinese-predominated constituencies were minimal.



As for Malay voters, albeit the suspiciously extraordinary high turnout in northern states, a reversal of Malay votes to Umno was apparent. But does this mean "Malay re-unity"? In whatever system, the swinging of median voters between different banners is phenomenal. Furthermore, in the Malay heartland, 40 percent of the voters still cling on to the opposition.

In any case, what are the lessons we can draw from these facts?

To DAP, it is important to realise that its victory was exaggerated, partly due to the unexpected loss of PAS, and possibly owing to the re-election of Kit Siang (left) and his deputy Karpal Singh (right). By retreating to its traditional domain, the Chinese voters, DAP managed to secure its seats in Chinese-predominated constituencies, but at the cost of losing its ground in mixed constituencies. Hence, secretary-general Kerk Kim Hock lost in Kota Melaka.

DAP should know better about the risks that lurk in its new strategy.

The proportion of Chinese-predominated constituencies will keep decreasing, as depicted in the latest redelineation, there is only one such constituency out of 21 new seats in the peninsula, not to mention East Malaysia. Furthermore, the present Chinese-predominated constituencies may become mixed constituencies in future.



On the other hand, PAS must revise its unilateral Islamic policies if it aspires to be a real national party, instead of a provincial party. A loss of nearly 4 percent of vote share in the Malay heartland may be caused by the alienation of liberal Muslims. Though the party managed to retain its popular votes, it would be difficult to increase its support if it failed to appeal to the median voters, i.e. liberal Muslims and non-Muslims.

Last but certainly not least, Keadilan must hang in there. A 9.26 percent popular vote may not be noticeable, but it constitutes a solid ground to build on. There is an urgent need to reinvent reformasi and create new strategies.

Constrained by the electoral system, democratisation is virtually impossible via the election process. This writer is convinced that mass mobilisation is vital, but this is not confined to demonstrations and assemblies.

Parti Sosialis Malaysia's (PSM) endeavour to organise and educate disadvantaged groups is most inspiring.

Therefore, do not be crestfallen fellow reformists. Shed the unrealistic goals and focus on the ground. Let us embark on a brand new reformasi!

LI LING SEAH is a MA student in Comparative Democratisation at the University of Essex. The prospect of democratisation and multiethnic politics are her core interests.