By all standards of definition and analysis, the opposition as a whole has lost badly in the just-concluded 11th general election of Malaysia.

Of course, given the traditional and structural handicaps in a playing field that has never been level, not many reasonably informed people would expect the opposition to make additional gains over and above that of 1999, or even to preserve the gains it made in the previous poll.

Yet, from a strategic as well as operational perspective, the fact of an uneven playing field does not explain everything. Otherwise, how does the opposition explain the substantial gains it made in the 1999 polls, or even the relatively better outcome achieved by DAP in this polls?

The point is that while most people did not expect the opposition to do well, they also did not envisage the almost crushing defeat of the opposition, especially for PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Keadilan).

Seen in this light, the critical reasons must have come from sources other than the uneven playing field. Some of these critical reasons seem to be as follows.

One, the 'feel good' or 'feel better' effect brought on after the retirement of former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad and his succession by the apparently more amicable, approachable and softer Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

The majority of people, especially the Malay/Muslims seem to be prepared to give the latter an opportunity because Abdullah is seen to be more in tune with their psyche, and also less confrontational, combative, ideological and argumentative.

'Hard guys'

True, it may still be rationally argued that Abdullah is merely a 'smiling version of Mahathir' in the sense that the ethos, political culture, institutions and ideology of Umno and the Barisan Nasional have not changed much essentially.

But electoral politics on the ground is always about popular feelings, sentiments, perceptions and impressions, not political science. And the mainstream media certainly wasted no time in exploiting this feel good factor.

Paradoxically, the feel good effect is also a negation of the leadership style of Mahathir as well as PAS president and former Parliamentary opposition leader, Abdul Hadi Awang who are both 'hard guys' despite the differences in their ideologies, educational backgrounds, political organisations and also physical age.

Interestingly, DAP chairperon Lim Kit Siang, who won the Ipoh Timor parliamentary constituency with an impressive majority, was seen, during the campaigning period, as also a 'baby-hugging

uncle,' as opposed to that of a muscle-flexing Robocop in the 1995 polls where he lost badly in Penang.

It is also interesting to note that a scheduled trip to Terengganu by Mahathir to campaign for Umno was cancelled or blocked by Umno strategists at the eleventh hour.

In this sense, it can be seen that the 'soft/softer' projections had overcome the 'hard' image.

PAS overzealousness

Two, since 2002, after the death of former PAS president and opposition leader Fadzil Noor, the new top leadership of PAS under Abdul Hadi also performed a disservice, however unintentional or unwitting or even well-meaning, to the opposition by stirring up hair-splitting ideological and theological debates.

These effectively served to confuse and disunite the opposition on one hand, and on the other to marginalise PAS and the opposition from the majority of uncommitted voters of all ethnic and religious backgrounds.

True, it may still be argued that he needed to do that to empower the hardcore supporters of the party and other Muslim oppositionists to raise their morale, but given the fact that fence sitters are always far larger in number than hardcore supporters in parties all over the world, the benefit of this does not seem to be over and above the cost incurred or to be incurred.

And the cost of such strategy is now clear: Not only have non-Muslims been alienated, but even the majority of Muslims in Terengganu and Kelantan do not approve. Keadilan is, in a major way, a victim of PAS overzealousness and backfiring image-making.

Strategically and operationally, DAP seems to have made a correct, however self-serving decision, of distancing itself from PAS in this election for defensive purposes. However, it should be observed that the DAP, which has become even more Chinese-centric in a limited space, can still make a breakthrough and resume the offensive in the longer run.

The third reason for the mauling is that the top leadership of PAS and its hardcore supporters seemed to have suffered from 'groupthink,' a situation or state of mind in which ideological or theological fixations replace empirical observations and analytical feedback. 'What-ought-to-be' was confused with 'what-is.'

Not immune

No doubt there is always a need for group solidarity and morale boosting exercises for all quarters including political parties existing in a competitive environment, But excessive group solidarity and morale boosting exercises also block empirical, analytical and critical feedbacks that do not fit squarely into ideological or theological fixations.

Seen from a historical perspective, DAP, too, once suffered from groupthink but it seems to have learned from bitter experience, particularly the 1995 polls. PAS, probably submerged in the euphoria following its 1999 victories, had not.

Keadilan, a new opposition party only five years old, has therefore much to learn from both the positive and negative lessons of PAS and DAP from a historical perspective. The lack of personal experience in politics, as in war fighting, can always be compensated by reading and learning from history or the experiences of others.

The fourth reason is that although the top leadership of PAS should bear a heavier burden of political responsibility for yesterday's debacle, the DAP too, is not immune to criticism.

These criticisms include the last-minute appointment and assignment of candidates which caused tactical confusion, logistical problems and even bitterness, anger and resentment among its own ranks as well as among that of its fellow oppositionist, Keadilan. This served to demoralise candidates as well as party workers on the ground.

For many years, even opposition-inclined voters complained about DAP's 'airborne candidates' which appear from nowhere and land on their constituencies on the eve of nomination day and are not known in the area at all.

Not many DAP candidates are as nationally or internationally well-known as Lim Kit Siang or Karpal Singh. They need time to build up a reasonable degree of familiarity among local voters and local party members and leaders.

Feedback overload

Although it has succeeded in defending its gains made in the 1999 polls in term of parliamentary seats, DAP still faces the strategic problem of how to break out from the defensive fortresses and resume a strategic offensive.

A successful generational shift in the top decision-making centre of the party is crucial to its long-term survival as a viable and more stable opposition party.

And last, but not least, is that although it is now wiped up (at the time of writing), Keadilan's natural advantage still lies in the future of its young leadership and hardcore supporters who are still committed to its cause. They are and willing and capable of learning lessons and reflecting on the experiences their party and that of other opposition parties.

Keadilan's problems are (a) that it is caught in between PAS and DAP and has appeared to be indecisive and lacks leadership, (b) that its organisational network is still weak and operated by too many young idealists who are politically as well as socially inexperienced and (c) that many liberal idealists seem to have confused the party's organisation with that of a free-for-all debating club to the detriment of organisational coherence and discipline, collective sense of purpose and clarity of minds in strategy-making.

Paradoxically, while PAS suffered from groupthink, Keadilan's effectiveness is impaired by an overload of feedback, information, academic theories and youthful outbursts which distort decision-making and slow down operations and mobilisation.

Keadilan needs to establish mechanisms and institutions within the party for making decisions and conduct operations that will bring in votes, not academic or intellectual satisfaction.

Of course there are hundreds, if not thousands, of localised factors of chance and luck that can be found by the opposition to explain its collective, as well as individual, defeats.

But the above-mentioned five reasons seem to be the dominant and overarching ones. Discourses must now be opened on the mistakes and errors to be identified and rectified before 2009.


JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia (SAM). Wong is a former member of Parliament for Kampar (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily). He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew, he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute (MPI) for 1998 and 1999.