On Jan 27, Harmid Karzai, Afghanistan's interim president, strode out into the streets of Kabul, with his burly and heavily-armed American bodyguards out of television camera shot. His job: to sign in the new constitution. And it has been a long time coming, even if the peace in Afghanistan, as in Iraq, is a long way from being won, especially in a 'nation' of sorts, and, more importantly, one without a 'state'.

But never mind. On Jan 4, Washington quietly celebrated 'deliverance day'. After weeks of intense debate, the 502 delegates of the loya jirga or grand council, gave Hamid their nod for a new constitution. Ebullience reigned.

Grand council chairman Sebaghatullah Mojadeddi recited a poem: "There's rain coming and flowers are growing over my body." And prayed: "I'm so happy the ending is so pious and beautiful." Even The New York Times rejoiced over democracy blooming in the war-savaged nation.

When post-war Iraq sank deeper into abyss as anti-Western militants launched waves of guerrilla attacks on coalition forces, Washington quickly paraded Afghanistan as a 'model' for post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.

Last week the Bush administration decided to begin handing over political power to its handpicked Iraqi Governing Council, from the middle of this month, even if without a solid plan. The move came just as Karzai secured accord from a guarded loya jirga .

But so confident is Hamid that he's already paving the way for Afghanistan's first democratic presidential election, this June. The president will be directly elected. There will be a two-chamber national assembly, and an independent judiciary a boast no developing nation has fulfilled.

Desperate to become Afghanistan's first democratically elected president, Hamid also plans to merge democracy and Islam. So the proposed name-change to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, to be ruled by civil law, not the rule of law, and in step with, not contrary to, the beliefs and provisions of Islam.

Intriguing months ahead

The next few months will surely intrigue. As Hamid drives his presidential campaign, likely to be funded by Washington, so will vested interests also manoeuvre. He will seek cosy political deals with his domestic opponents who, like Pakistan's radical Islamic parties, are vehemently against the government's unswerving support for the US. Clearly, Hamid doesn't have a groundswell of political support in Afghanistan. And his moves won't guarantee a less fluid politico-security situation, especially if the edifice of the forthcoming poll starts to crumble.

He faces a frightfully difficult task of winning the presidency outright, and with it the political legitimacy he'll need to rule and bring meaningful political and economic development (US-led 'nation-building') to Afghanistan. And if Hamid stays a vassal of Washington as seems likely his enemies, backed by drug and warlords and al-Qaeda, will taunt him like coalition forces in Iraq have been facing. An even chance, too, the elections will be called off if things get really messy.

Voter turnout will be farcical. Over one million Afghans, who fled to the border regions of Iran and Pakistan, and others seeking asylum in Western countries, remain reluctant to return home despite the financial incentives or the patriotic tunes being drummed into their ears by pro-Hamid elements. Which explains why he was frantic to strike a deal with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the leader of the Uzbeks, and one of the warlords present at the loya jirga . He, more than others, can spoil Hamid's party.

Abdul Rashid, wily and unpredictable, and who basically distrusts Hamid despite his own forces being armed and paid by Washington during the war to oust the totalitarian Islamic Taliban regime, agreed to drop his demand for the constitution listing Uzbek as the national language. He'll also let thousands of Pashtuns, the majority ethnic group displaced in the north, to return to their homes. And with silent approval from the US, hundreds of Taliban fighters will be freed from Abdul Rashid's prison in Shiberghan.

For Hamid, the fat lady hasn't sung yet. For starters, there's no economic basis with which to feed the teeming millions of destitute and unemployable Afghans. And the draft constitution mirrors his own political ambitions.

It parallels president Gen Pervez Musharraf's own aspirations in neighbouring Pakistan. Like Pervez ( photo ), Hamid wants a constitution that supports a strong presidency. Although moderate delegates who fear the warlords back him, that's not enough for Hamid to stave off a major rebuff once the ethnic minority leaders resile from the constitution's implications.

Like the radical Islamic and secular parties in Pakistan, Hamid's opponents will insist on a strong parliament to counter presidential power. If he dithers even the slightest bit, the opposition will also demand greater provincial power, opposing the strong central government that he wants. And, worse, no nation building will be possible if the ethnic/tribal leaders insist on official recognition of their languages on equal footing with Pashtuk. Whether Hamid gives ground or not, there's trouble ahead either way.

He needs a simple majority to pass a version of the constitution that's suitable to him. But if he pushes as hard as Pervez has, he can expect life to turn ugly and violent, just as the latter has found out recently. It will also seriously damage the legitimacy of the process leading up to the June poll.

And Hamid will do worse by turning to Washington for help, thus permanently destroying his own thin legitimacy. If Washington wants democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia, it can't be seen to back strongman rule in Afghanistan or anywhere else for that matter

But then, Washington's policy is a labyrinth of contradictions and hypocrisy. After all, it is supporting Pervez to the hilt as long as radical and militant Islam is ascendant, and while Iran struggles more and more uncertainly for a post-cleric future. Yet neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan is a model that the US vaunts.

MANJIT BHATIA is managing director of AsiaRisk - a political and economic research and risk analysis consultancy in Australia. The writer specialises in international economics and politics and the Asia-Pacific region.