A recent comment made by the now-deceased British weapons expert, David Kelly, exemplifies a political tactic often followed by weak states in order to remain secure from outside threats: hyping or obfuscating their defence capabilities in an attempt to dissuade potential aggressors from attack or invasion.

This strategy of manufactured uncertainty may have been recently employed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq, in which the deposed leader remained cryptic regarding the possibility of his country possessing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

David Broucher, a British representative to the United Nations conference on disarmament, testified that in February Kelly told him that his Iraqi contacts feared that if they were to allow full inspections, the United States would become too informed about Baghdad's defence capabilities and therefore Iraq would be more vulnerable to attack.

This fear highlights the difficulty that governments find themselves in when they are labeled as a threat by one of the world's only great powers, the United States.

UN sanctions

In such instances, Washington demands that the states reveal their entire defence capabilities. When refused, they are often subjected to harsh UN sanctions that can cripple their country's infrastructure and economy.

Such states find themselves in a perilous situation, one where their failure to disclose their military potential could either increase or decrease the chances of an attack by the United States.

In the case of Iraq, Saddam Hussein opted against full disclosure and instead remained ambiguous about his possible retaliatory capabilities. Washington called his bluff and effectively removed the leader from power.

Despite this success, other states that have earned the negative attention of Washington are also following Saddam's strategy of deception and are attempting to hype or obfuscate their defence capabilities.

These states have learned that the more powerful a state is, the less likely an aggressor will attack it. North Korea is the clearest example of a country following this doctrine.

Once the Bush administration began to harshly denounce North Korea, even threatening preemptive action, Pyongyang began to hype its defence capabilities.

Indeed, Pyongyang told the Bush administration that it was actively pursuing nuclear weapons despite previous claims to the contrary.

North Korea then backed out of international nuclear agreements and began to take measures toward developing nuclear arms. Occasional anonymous North Korean officials made statements claiming that it already had nuclear weapons.

In effect, North Korea quickly clouded its nuclear programme in secrecy as to confuse potential aggressors about its military prowess. It is likely that during this time of secrecy Pyongyang is indeed attempting to develop nuclear arms in order to increase the costs that are associated with attacking a nuclear-armed and military-ready state.

Iran is another country that is attempting to cloud sections of its defence capabilities in secrecy. Tehran has claimed it has no intention of developing nuclear weapons and is only engaged in a peaceful nuclear energy programme; however, this peaceful programme could also be used to quickly produce a nuclear arsenal.

If Tehran is allowed to continue its current nuclear programme, there will be confusion by potential aggressors as to whether Iran now has the capability to become a nuclear-armed state. Indeed, the International Atomic Energy Agency recently uncovered particles of highly enriched uranium at an Iranian nuclear facility, suggesting the possibility that Tehran is closer to developing nuclear arms than the international community had believed.

Basic logic

These cases show that when the US threatens to attack states that try to build up their defence capabilities, it only forces these countries to continue expanding their military programmes rather than stifling them.

In fact, states targetted by Washington such as North Korea and Iran - even potential great powers such as China - are following basic power and interest logic in which they are seeking to increase their power in order to stifle Washington's interests.

These threatened countries can look to another case of when a weak state was threatened by the US.

In the 1950s, China was threatened by a US nuclear attack three times: once during the Korean War and twice over disputes about Chinese islands being used by the Taiwanese military to launch attacks against the mainland.

Once China tested its own nuclear bomb in 1964, Taipei no longer considered invading the mainland, and US President Richard Nixon visited Beijing to normalise relations between the two countries.

If Saddam Hussein attempted to follow China's example, he failed miserably. But Saddam's failure was more due to the fact that Washington was well aware of Iraq's military weakness; indeed, this is why it opted to attack.

Other states not hampered by sanctions or ones that haven't recently been devastated by war have decided to drastically strengthen their defence potential with the option of also developing nuclear arms in the same way China did in 1964.

These actions would make any attack by an outside aggressor such as the US very costly and possibly undesirable.

Furthermore, with the Bush administration already taxed due to the occupation of Iraq - and also of Afghanistan - it remains to be seen whether they have the military potential and domestic support to launch another large-scale military operation, whether it be in Iran, North Korea, or other states hostile to the interests of Washington.

Report Drafted By: Erich Marquardt

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe.