The Indonesian government declared martial law o­n the province of Aceh yesterday, ordering its troops to crush those involved in an armed separatist movement.

Arriving at a negotiated political settlement in Aceh would not be very difficult if parties to the conflict adopt a functional perspective of not over-emphasising their political or ideological differences.

Instead, both parties - with the help of a mediating agency - should focus o­n ending violence in order to establish a situation of normalcy.

Civilian misery

The fundamental obstacle in the way of peaceful resolution of the nationalist strife in this northern province of Sumatra seems to be related to the historical enmity between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka or GAM).

Although both parties signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) o­n Dec 9, 2002 mediated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) in Geneva, mutual suspicion, mistrust and enmity have caused the breakdown of the five-month-old ceasefire.

The breakdown contributed to increased tensions between both parties (and eventually, an all-out military operation against the rebels).

The government amassed more than 50,000 troops in Aceh to embark o­n an integrated humanitarian and military operation to end GAM's independence struggle that has spanned more than two decades.

Whether military operations will break GAM's back remains to be seen, but experts o­n internal conflict think that renewed fighting would bring much hardship and misery to the civilian population.

Thousands of refugees are making their way to safer places to escape being caught in the fighting.

Ideal climate

The peace process that started off in early December 2002 could have moved in an uninterrupted manner if both sides had adhered to the spirit of the COHA.

Essentially, COHA was a document prepared, debated and agreed upon by both the parties to cease hostilities so that normalcy and stability could be restored in Aceh.

It cannot be interpreted as a blueprint for peace, it was merely a guide to establish normalcy so that in the course of time, other issues pertaining to a negotiated settlement could be discussed.

Since the COHA focused greatly o­n brining an end to the armed conflict, it was merely concerned with the systematic withdrawal of troops from civilian areas and the related item of simultaneous surrender of arms by GAM.

Beyond COHA the Joint Security Committee (JSC) was also established to monitor, report and resolve problems emanating from the day-to-day encounter between GAM and the Indonesia armed forces.

COHA was not a perfect document, it sought to reduce overt conflicts between both parties so that an ideal climate could be created for peace negotiations.

Even though there were certain ugly incidents, conflicts and tensions, it could be said that this mechanism had functioned quite admirably.

Disgruntled elements

For five months, the excellent work done by the HDC provided some hope for the Acehnese population that peace could be obtained after all.

But while the peace negotiations were taking place, the armed forces - or at least some sections of it in Aceh - were not happy with the peace process itself.

There is evidence to indicate that those disgruntled elements started instigating some sections of the local population to protest against the presence of HDC in general and the functioning of the JSC.

In fact, o­n o­ne or two occasions, the office of the JSC was attacked by a local mob instigated apparently by some elements of the armed forces.

While it is true that GAM had no faith in the armed forces and vice versa, there is no evidence to indicate that the separatists sought to spoil the peace process. o­n the contrary, throughout the five month period, they behaved in a professional manner.

Furthermore, contrary to the accusation by the armed forces, GAM did not overtly insist o­n its objective of independence for Aceh.

Within the framework of COHA, it merely endorsed the issue of special provincial autonomy as the starting point of discussion with the Indonesian government for the eventual settlement of the conflict.

However, it was the Indonesian government that caused problems for continuance of the peace talks by accusing GAM of harbouring separatist desires.

With the breakdown of talks, the government insisted that GAM should abandon its pro-independence stand and instead opt for the recognition of the special autonomy of Aceh within the larger political framework of the Republic of Indonesia.

The government insisted that if GAM refused to accept the provision, then the former would have no choice but to impose the full weight of its military might to defeat the latter.

International intervention

It was in this context of the breakdown of talks, that the government took measures to beef up the strength of its armed forces for a possible large-scale military strike against GAM targets.

Given the ominous signs of a military operation in Aceh, the international community in general and the donor countries in particular acted behind the scenes to urge the Indonesian government not to abandon the peace process.

Although the government gave certain deadlines for GAM to comply with its requirements, the intervention of the international community was crucial in the extension of these dates.

Finally, it was decided that a peace conference would be organised in Tokyo for both parties to return to a path of negotiated settlement.

It is not impossible for peace to be established in Aceh, but commitment from both parties is rather crucial.

Most importantly, it is pertinent for both parties, especially the Indonesian government, to honour and respect the good work done by the HDC.

Casting doubts o­n this mediating agency could spell disaster for the province. In this respect, both parties should restrain themselves and respect the guidelines established in the COHA.

Needless to say, both parties, especially the Indonesian government, should not repeat its mistakes of thrusting their respective political objectives forward too much, to the overall detriment of the peace process.

P RAMASAMY is a professor of political economy at the Political Science Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and has an academic interest in Malaysian politics and labour issues. He has written extensively o­n conflict management in Sri Lanka.