The long-forgotten term 'forward defence' has recently been publicised again in Malaysia by Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad. In his New Year address to the nation, he asserted that "there are already arrogant countries claiming they have the right to take 'pre-emptive action' or 'forward defence' that would affect Malaysia".

On Jan 7, the New Straits Times published a letter written by one Lt Col (rtd) Fathol Zaman Bukhari from Ipoh, explaining in a rather succinct, rational and educational manner the general theory and practice of forward defence.

This analysis hopes to build on that rational discourse with more facts and figures, as well as outlining the historical perspectives in defence planning.

According to Fathol, forward defence literally means putting a defence forward of one's position, such as the strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) of defending Western Europe during the Cold War by establishing defence positions "as far forward as possible".

Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham (see Dictionary of International Relations, London, Penguin, 1998) gives a more formal definition: "(a) form of extended defence where a state intends to engage an enemy as soon as its territorial frontiers have been crossed."

In other words, under the concept of forward defence, a state will not wait until its enemy has reached its borders or territory before committing the act of self-defence, but engage the forces of its enemy as far away from its borders and territory as possible.

Forward defence gives a country 'strategic depth' in defence or, as Fathol says, "greater room for manoeuvre".

Operation Matador

Seen from this perspective, Nato was, during the Cold War, an institutionalised form of forward defence of the US against the then Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991) was also an institutionalised form of Soviet Union's forward defence against the Western European allies of the US.

During the Cold War (1947-1991), Western Europe and Eastern Europe were therefore the forward defence positions for the US and Soviet Union respectively.

The direct and massive involvement of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of communist China in the Korean War (1950-1951) was also a form of forward defence conducted by the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) against the possible invasion of its territory by the American and South Korean forces.

The Roman Empire, too, had its forward defence positions in, for example, what is now southern Germany and southwestern France. Ancient China had such positions in Korea, areas now belong to the northern regions of Vietnam and Burma, and eastern parts of Central Asia.

Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War and the Japanese invasion of Peninsular Malaya and Singapore in December 1941, the British-led Malaya (military) Command already had a secret and contingent plan of forward defence codenamed Operation Matador.

For the British Army planners of Operation Matador had already foreseen that, in the event of Japanese forces attacking Peninsular Malaya, they would first land at Pattani and Songkhla (then called Singola) on the Kra Isthmus, and then used these two positions in southern Thailand to launch land invasions southward.

According to the original plan of Operation Matador, to neutralise that Japanese strategy, the British and Indian forces would launch a 'pre-emptive strike' by forcibly crossing the Malayan-Thai border and occupying the areas of Pattani and Songkhla before the Japanese struck.

In a 1995 investigative study of the Malayan Campaign, British specialist writer of military history, Peter Elphick outlined the essence of Operation Matador in the following terms:

"British and Indian forces, having attacked across the border, would be dug in behind the landing places and lying in wait for the Japanese. About sixty hours were needed to launch the invasion, mop up any possible Thai resistance, and dig defensive positions.

This was approximately the length of time that the Japanese troopships would need to reach the Thai beaches from their bases in Indo-China. So, the British had to attack as soon as a Japanese invasion fleet sailed from Indo-China" (see Singapore the pregnable fortress, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1995: pp.143-144).

Finally, although the Japanese did act according to what the British Army planner of Operation Matador had forecasted, the plan was not executed for both political and military reasons.

Australia's forward defence

First, there was no sufficient military resource to spare, and second, since Thailand was a technically sovereign and nominally 'neutral' country, it was considered by some to be diplomatically sensitive and politically unacceptable.

It could be argued that had Operation Matador been executed effectively according to the original plan, Peninsular Malaya and Singapore would not have fallen so swiftly and easily.

In any case, their fall enabled the Japanese troops to swiftly move further southward to defeat the Allied forces in the Battle of Java Sea, and thereafter seriously threaten Australia for a while.

In fact, historical records suggest that Australia had also long foreseen the importance of Peninsular Malaya and Singapore as its forward defence positions. It was for this reason that it supported the strengthening of defence capacity of both Peninsular Malaya and Singapore as early as the late 1930s, and also sent troops and equipment to participate in the Malayan Campaign against the Japanese invasion.

According to Peter Elphick, as at 23rd December 1941, about 20 percent of regular forces under the Malaya Command were Australians, while Indians and Britons constituted 49 percent and 25 percent respectively (see ibid: p 273).

The bitter experience has since strengthened in Australia the geopolitical concept of Southeast Asia being its forward defence position. It was for the fear of being invaded or threatened from its north that Australia joined, among others, the 1955 US-anchored Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (Seato), 1957 Britain-anchored Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA), and the 1971 Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

From the real-life examples of forward defence as stated above, it is clear that its concept and practice are not new or confined to the US, Australia or other 'Anglo-Saxon' nations alone. The Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (PRC), among others, also had (and still have) their forward defence positions.

In fact, it could be argued that almost all countries have some kind of forward defence conceptualisation and planning, although it may not be exactly termed as such, or publicly admitted.

For example, the diplomatic, political support given by Malaysia, Thailand, and other Asean countries to the armed resistance forces in Cambodia when the country was invaded and occupied by the Soviet-backed Vietnam in 1979-1989 can be seen as a form of forward defence against any possible Vietnamese southward drive.

In that strategic context, Thailand was the forward defence position of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia. Of course, in the end, the Soviet-backed Vietnam did not do what it was forecasted to do because it also partly feared an attack from China on its 'rear'. At that time, China joined the US, Australia and Asean in checking and balancing the expansion of Soviet power in Southeast Asia.

Peaceful methods

Above all, forward defence does not necessarily mean that the country that practises it has to forcibly invade or occupy another country in order to establish forward defence positions like what Operation Matador once conceptualised.

The forward positions of one country in other countries can also be established peacefully through the signing of bilateral or multilateral security agreements or treaties that recognise each other's shared security interests, and organised joint programmes of defence such as the existing Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) established within the framework of FPDA, and the bilateral Malaysia-Australia Joint Defence Programme (MAJDP).

For example, although Western Europe was a forward defence position of the US during the Cold War, the Western European countries also needed the military strength and resources of the US to augment their own defence capabilities against a common threat. Thus, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was signed and Nato established to serve the shared security interests of the US and Western Europe.

The Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (1957-1971), for example, gave Australia forward defence positions in Peninsular Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak; but at the same time, as the Indonesian Confrontation (1963-1966) shows, both Malaysia and Australia shared the benefits together. For, in order to defend its forward positions, Australia also helped to defend Malaysia against a common threat at a time when Indonesia defence capability, enhanced by the military aids of the Soviet Union, clearly overwhelmed that of the newly formed Malaysia.

According to one estimate, "at the peak of hostilities" between Malaysia and Indonesia during the Confrontation, Australia and other Commonwealth allies like Britain and New Zealand, committed to the defence of Malaysia "70 warship, all the combat aircraft used, and 50,000 troops, including Gurkha fighters" (Pamela Sodhy, The US-Malaysian nexus Themes in superpower-small state relations, Kuala Lumpur, ISIS, 1991; p 249).

The forward defence strategies of Australia and New Zealand worked to the benefit, not detriment, of Malaysia when the nation was still a militarily weak country confronted by a powerful, gigantic and territorially ambitious neighbour. In business management, it is called a 'win-win' situation.

To anticipate a purely 'logical' question on why Malaysia can't establish forward defence positions in Australia and New Zealand, too, it must be stated clearly that there is simply no credible and effective threat to Malaysia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and security in the region.

Modern defence planning, the making of which is always constrained by the availability of economic resources and their opportunity costs, are not made on the basis of abstract logic or vainglorious reciprocity, but on solid geography, real history and earthly utility.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of malaysiakini and Strategic Analysis Malaysia (SAM). Wong is a former member of parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily). He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew, he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute (MPI) for 1998 and 1999.