According to a Dec 7 report in the pro-Umno Berita Harian and New Straits Times, the secretary-general of the National Front, Mohamed Rahmat, claimed that the ruling coalition "has the power" to "act against" the two controversial MCA Penang assembly representatives. The former Information Minister and ex-secretary general of Umno also said that, although "the power" has never been used, it is in effective existence.

He reportedly suggested that a National Front disciplinary board to be set up, and Umno deputy president Abdullah Ahmad Badawi be appointed the chairman of the BN disciplinary board.

However, Mohamed Rahmat did not clearly specify or cite the provision in the agreement of association of the component parties of the National Front that empowers the coalition or any agent of it to take direct disciplinary action against members of its component parties. It is not immediately clear if the "power", if it legally exists at all as claimed, include direct expulsion of members from MCA as publicly demanded by Umno and Gerakan.

It is also unclear if the meaning of "member" mentioned by Mohamed refers to institutions (component parties) or individuals (members of the component parties). All these legal and constitutional questions are certainly of great interests to MCA's lawyers and legal experts.

Serious controversy

Setting up a BN disciplinary board now to deal with the cases of the MCA duo retrospectively will probably also become a new or even more serious controversy itself. The time limit of the retrospective power of the board could also be subject to political and passionate debate all over the country by 15 component parties and their countless leaders and members at all levels of their organisations.

For example, past cases or incidents of alleged 'misconduct', 'indiscipline', 'defiance' and 'injustices' could be brought up by MCA against Umno and Gerakan or vice versa, or MIC against the People's Progressive Party (PPP) or vice versa for retrospective judgements and punishments.

If that happens, the chairman of the BN disciplinary board will probably need to be a physically healthier person with more time to spare like Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (photo), not Abdullah Ahmad Badawi who is already the deputy prime minister, deputy Umno president and Home Minister. He is also charged by Umno to recapture Trengganu from PAS.

Also, there is still no idea of who would become panel members of the proposed BN disciplinary board, and the system of elections or appointments of the members of the board, and many other procedural questions have not been settled and agreed upon by the allies. It takes time and deeper thoughts for such board to be set up.

Amidst all these new arguments about jurisdiction, constitutionality and legality of disciplinary actions, Ling's MCA seems to be remarkably determined and resolute in dealing with the duo in its own ways. Ling himself also still sounds and looks pretty cool.

Recommend suspension

According to a Dec 5 exclusive report published in the front page of Sin Chew Daily, the MCA disciplinary committee was expected to only recommend a three to six-month suspension against the two MCA Penang state assembly representatives who refused to vote against an opposition-sponsored motion last month.

Quoting highly placed sources in the MCA top leadership, the report also said that the inquiry would most likely be completed by the end of December or, at most, before the National Front supreme council convenes a meeting to discuss the matter in January next year.

According to the report, some MCA leaders opined that although Lim Boo Chang and Tan Cheng Liang undoubtedly abstained from voting against the opposition-sponsored motion to shelve the controversial Penang Outer Ring Road (Porr) project, it is "not a serious breach of discipline that calls for expulsion".

These unnamed MCA leaders reportedly opined to Sin Chew Daily that the Speaker of the Penang State Assembly was also not blameless because he did not act in accordance to standing orders and ring the bell before calling for division.

" The failure of the speaker to ring the bell before calling for division had also caused other state assembly representatives not being present in the House when voting took place."

Moreover, according to the reported MCA opinion, since Porr is only a local issue, and not vital questions pertaining to constitutional amendments, and the DAP-sponsored motion was only calling for postponement, not cancellation of the project, the "mistake" made by Lim and Tan are "not that serious".

Precedent in Umno

Earlier, the Chinese version of the official homepage of MCA also published an article detailing names and incidents of Umno state representatives failing to object to, or even supporting, PAS motions to introduce Islamic criminal laws in Kelantan and Trengganu, which the National Front opposes. Neither Umno nor Gerakan have responded to these public counter-charges of MCA.

The reported opinions and position of MCA, if insisted upon by MCA, would certainly lead to a clash between MCA and, at least, Umno. On Nov 29, the supreme council of Umno reached an unqualified decision to demand MCA to sack Lim and Tan.

Later, Umno president Dr Mahathir Mohamad publicly conveyed the demand through the mass media. Mahathir is also the chairman of the National Front coalition. Gerakan president Dr Lim Keng Yaik has also repeatedly call for expulsion of the MCA duo. These are all on public records now.

Earlier, upon returning from Paris, Mahathir was quoted by the official media as saying that Lim and Tan had committed a serious breach of party discipline because "if everyone votes according to conscience, there would be no more party".

An amoral or realist analysis of the situation is rather clear by now: Ling's MCA and the transitional Umno has taken up two polar and irreconcilable positions. It is now a zero-sum game and some other balancers or opportunists may have to throw in their weight either behind MCA or Umno.

Four balancers

There are, at least, four balancers or opportunists in the coming 'Peloponnesian War' between MCA and Umno, namely (1) Dr Mahathir Mohamad himself, (2) Gerakan, (3) MCA's Team B and (4) other minor or junior component parties of the National Front, such as the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and People's Progressive Party (PPP).

The paramount interest of Mahathir is certainly to 'pragmatically' or 'opportunistically' work for the 'unity' of all parties and factions so that all of them would give him 'undivided' support before he 'retires' honourably. If he cannot achieve the maximum objective, he has to lean on the stronger group, individually or collectively.

With these self-interested calculations in mind, it is most likely that his weight would slightly, secretly and skilfully tilt in the favour of Ling's MCA as it commands the largest organisation and share of political and financial resources for regime security. Mahathir has always been a supreme realist whose sense of right and wrong is only contingent upon what is expedient to serve 'larger interests' as defined by him.

However, favouring Ling's MCA, real or perceived, would estrange the next generation of Umno's top leaders who seem to secretly fear that a weak Umno and strong and uncontrollably assertive MCA in the post-Mahathir period would be 'destabilising' vis--vis Umno's hegemony in the National Front as well as the government. The secret fear explains the hardline taken by, among others, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Najib Tun Razak.

Seen against these backdrops, Ling's MCA has, consciously or unconsciously, driven a wedge between the short-run or tactical interests of Dr Mahathir Mohamad on one hand, and the longer-run or strategic interests of the next generation of top Umno leaders on the other.

Thus, to accept or not to accept MCA's no-expulsion disciplinary action against Lim or Tan could widen the divergence within Umno itself, or bring the differences into surface from now to next January, or even beyond.

Antagonistic position

As for Gerakan, the 'natural' and 'instinctive' option is to take up an antagonistic position against Ling's MCA because the fear of MCA's 'encroachment' into Gerakan's base in Penang. MCA has a 'historical claim' over the post of Penang's Chief Minister that has been in the hand of Gerakan since 1969.

Moreover, Gerakan, if it hopes to grow stronger, has a long-term interest to see to it that MCA be weakened nationwide. Calculated in this rational and realist manner, the interests of Gerakan and the future top leadership of Umno converge on 'the MCA Question'.

However, politics in peacetime is not a cold-bloodedly objective science. Gerakan, if popularly perceived to be too close to Umno with the objective of undermining MCA, would certainly enrage the mass of MCA's Chinese supporters, and it could also alienate even greater mass of Malay/Muslims who still dislike Umno, Mahathir and all those who assist them to regain their pre-1999 power and influence. Penang is the home base of Abdullah as well as ex-deputy premier Anwar Ibrahim.

In other words, Gerakan, if it is not careful in the balancing act, may become the "common enemy" of the massive supporters of MCA, the Alternative Front (BA) and DAP. Umno in Penang is certainly not strong enough to assist Gerakan to withstand the onslaught of these combined forces, especially if MCA has also learnt to speak the political language of multi-ethnic liberalism, democracy and citizens rights for all Malaysians, like Keadilan, DAP and PRM.

The positioning and situation of MCA's Team B is not unlike that of Gerakan. Relatively weak and caught in between an MCA-Umno showdown, it naturally gravitates itself towards Umno, hoping to use Umno to counterweight Ling's MCA and to find political space for itself. To be sure, Umno also reciprocally hopes to use Team B to balance against the increasingly assertive Team A.

However, unlike Gerakan which has at least a physical and political base in the form of a government in the Chinese-predominated Penang, a history and an ideology of its own, Team B has none. It is a merely hastily and loosely assembled group of individuals whose only "ideology" is their common distrust and dislike against Ling and Team A.

Common enemy

In short, Team B has no bargaining chips or leverages except its ability and willingness to disrupt Ling's MCA, and balance against it to the favour of Umno. Like Gerakan, Team B could, if it is not prudent, become the common "enemy" of the mass of supporters of Ling's MCA, the Alternative Front (BA) and DAP.

Worse still, it is certainly not to the interest of Gerakan to allow Umno to support and strengthen another 'Gerakan' in the form of MCA's Team B. In other words, Umno could be seen using MCA's Team B not only to weaken Ling's MCA, but also check against Gerakan, if and when the occasions arise in the future.

However, Team B is not without hope or advantage at all. Its leaders have, unless and until proven to the contrary by Team A or other parties, relatively "cleaner" images and backgrounds in politics and commercial businesses. Team B is also perceived, by those who do not see the 'hidden hands' of Umno, to be 'underdogs' in the power struggle in MCA.

Some of the Team B leaders also give the public an impression that they know a great deal of some allegedly "fishy" business transactions and "grey" networks among some top Team A leaders which may compromise the integrity of the party. If that is true and they decide to publicly release the details in responsible and honourable manners for the altruistic cause of 'saving the party', Team A's hold on the party may be in jeopardy.

As a general rule, other minor or junior component parties in the National Front, like MIC, PBS or PPP would adopt the strategy of jumping on the bandwagon of the relatively stronger party.

Smart survival

PPP, for examples, has an interest to obtain allocation of some parliamentary or state seats in the coming general elections, and that can only be realistically achieved at the expenses of either MCA or Gerakan or both, but not Umno. PPP has not been allocated seats for a long time, and it has therefore nothing to lose but everything to gain from a MCA and MIC disfavoured by Umno, or a widening crack between Umno-Gerakan on one hand, and MCA-MIC on the other.

MIC, however, seems to have an ambivalent attitude. The rule of smart survival dictates that it should side with Umno against Ling's MCA. However, as a major party with a history of claiming to represent the Indian ethnic minority and a more 'socially responsible' one vis-a-vis PPP, it also needs to anchor itself sometimes on some policies and strategies of MCA because many of the Umno's ethnically discriminative policies, real or perceived, affect both Chinese and Indian Malaysians.

Moreover, it is not to the real interest of MIC to see Ling's MCA broken up by the Umno-inspired Gerakan or Umno-backed Team B because it would set a 'bad precedent' for Umno to do the same against itself.

Umno could follow the same 'divide-and-rule' principle to weaken MIC by admitting the Indian Progressive Front (IPF) into the National Front, and strengthen the Indian-based People's Progressive Party (PPP) simultaneously if and when MIC can longer count on the support of an empathetic MCA.

Abdullah, for example, accepted invitation recently to officiate a party convention of the MIC-bashing IPF, although it is still not a component member of BN because of the objection from MIC.

One winner, one loser

Naturally, to Samy Vellu's MIC, IPF and PPP are merely its own versions of 'Team B' and 'Gerakan'. Seen against these considerations, it is to the interest of MIC to see a strong but empathetic and friendly MCA under the control of Ling in the National Front. Seen in this perspective, Ling's MCA provides Samy's MIC with a powerful line of 'forward defence' against any Umno's creeping 'interference'.

The Sarawak United People's Party (Supp) may share the assessment of the situations with Ling's MCA and Samy's MIC. In the language switch controversy, Supp was a staunch ally of MCA.

With these convergence and divergence of interests among the various component parties of the National Front in mind, Umno and MCA have to win friends and contain foes, inside and outside the National Front all over the country, to strengthen their irreconcilable positions and cases, from now to next January when the supreme council of the National Front meets, or even beyond.

Whether Umno or MCA will call a division or recorded voting in the BN supreme council meeting next month is worth observing. However, with or without a division, the outcome of the BN supreme council meeting will produce only one winner and one loser for all to see.

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia (SAM) which produces the subscriber-based political report, Analysis Malaysia. Wong is a former member of parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily. He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew, he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute (MPI) for 1998 and 1999.