The new revolution in Iran
Farish A NoorPublished: Apr 19, 2001 7:12 PM | Updated: Jan 29, 2008 10:21 AM
By now the verdict from the latest election results in Iran is clear. The people of Iran have opted to go with the reformers led by Mohammad Reza Khatami and they have voted out the conservatives of the old school.
The reformers have taken Tehran, won control of more than two-thirds of the Iranian Assembly and it is clear that the tide has turned against those who hope to keep to the dogmatic approach of the past.
This is not to say that the reformers in Iran wish to go back to the old days of the Shah during the Pahlavi era. Reformers like Abdul Karim Suroosh have always maintained that the fundamental principles of the Iranian revolution were sound, and that they were based on ethical guidelines and premises that were irrefutable.
The Iranian revolution's call for an end to tyranny, abuse of power and the Shah's dependency on the West were broad-based demands that were accepted by practically all sections of Iranian society then - from students and workers to peasants and urban-based intellectuals.
The mistake of the revolution, however, was that it opened the way for the rise of the ulama as the new spiritual leaders and guides for the revolution and the masses. From a popular revolt which brought together all sections of Iranian society, the revolution's guardians quickly turned it into a religio-political movement that was led by a select group of charismatic leaders who wielded enormous scriptural authority and power.
The rise of the ulama, embodied in the form of the Ayatollah Khomeini, created in turn a vanguard movement made up of ulama and religious functionaries who eventually took control of the entire apparatus of the state and all aspects of social life in Iran - from its economy to its culture, from military and strategic affairs to international relations.
This new form of ulama-led politics became a model and inspiration for many Islamist movements in other parts of the world.
In time, the revolutionary vanguard of the Iranian revolution settled into their own comfortable niches of power. As the ulama became more and more powerful, the institutions they had at their disposal were used not only to pursue their ideological ends, but also to serve partisan interests.
In the wake of the revolution, thousands of dissidents and opponents were rounded up, tortured, imprisoned or executed by revolutionary councils and committees manned by ulama and religious functionaries who believed that they were doing God's work by eliminating the enemies of the revolution.
That a revolution which claimed freedom and equality as its goals could be turned around to serve the interests of a privileged few is nothing new, of course. The French revolution eventually opened the way for the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and a military elite who turned revolutionary France into an authoritarian state with a secret police and various invisible committees and tribunals that sent thousands to the guillotine.
Such is how revolutions devour their own children, and such were the contradictions of the Iranian revolution as well.
It was these contradictions that contributed to the emergence of a second generation of reformers, led by men like Abdul Karim Suroosh and Mohammad Reza Khatami today. The present leadership of Iran are not trying to do away with the principles of the Revolution itself. Nor are they trying to undermine the spirit and ethos of Islam upon which their state and nation are built upon.
But they are exposing the rot that has been allowed to fester in the body politic of Iran, and to expose the abuse of power and authority that has been carried out by the self-appointed guardians of the faith, the ulama.
The state of affairs in Iran today is therefore of great interest for the rest of the contemporary Muslim world. The Iranian situation has shown that social change and revolution cannot be accomplished by slogans and empty promises alone.
Iran's attempt to chart its own destiny and carve its own image after the 1979 revolution may have been a bold step, but it was also an ambitious venture which fell on the shoulders of religious leaders who were not able to live up to their own expectations.
Over the past two decades, the ulama who were once regarded as infallible and incorruptible have shown that they are mortals with human failings as well. The numerous cases of corruption and abuse of power by ulama and religious leaders have convinced the people of Iran that the process of nation-building calls for the participation of society as a whole, and not an exclusive class of religious savants and clerics.
For Muslims elsewhere in the world, the lesson to be drawn from the Iranian revolution and its aftermath are equally clear. While the problems and difficulties encountered by many modern and developing Muslim societies today may seem daunting, Muslims still need to resist the temptation of falling for promises of "miraculous" changes brought about by cosmetic forms of Islamisation.
The Iranians have learnt that an Islamic state and an Islamic society cannot be created overnight through propaganda campaigns and painting everything in an Islamic shade. The task or genuine social and economic reform requires more than slogans that talk of a new Islamic era under the leadership of the ulama, but offers little else in concrete terms.
DR FARISH A NOOR is a Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist. He is currently researching the topic of Islamist movements in the Malay world. The opinions expressed here are his own.
The reformers have taken Tehran, won control of more than two-thirds of the Iranian Assembly and it is clear that the tide has turned against those who hope to keep to the dogmatic approach of the past.
This is not to say that the reformers in Iran wish to go back to the old days of the Shah during the Pahlavi era. Reformers like Abdul Karim Suroosh have always maintained that the fundamental principles of the Iranian revolution were sound, and that they were based on ethical guidelines and premises that were irrefutable.
The Iranian revolution's call for an end to tyranny, abuse of power and the Shah's dependency on the West were broad-based demands that were accepted by practically all sections of Iranian society then - from students and workers to peasants and urban-based intellectuals.
The mistake of the revolution, however, was that it opened the way for the rise of the ulama as the new spiritual leaders and guides for the revolution and the masses. From a popular revolt which brought together all sections of Iranian society, the revolution's guardians quickly turned it into a religio-political movement that was led by a select group of charismatic leaders who wielded enormous scriptural authority and power.
The rise of the ulama, embodied in the form of the Ayatollah Khomeini, created in turn a vanguard movement made up of ulama and religious functionaries who eventually took control of the entire apparatus of the state and all aspects of social life in Iran - from its economy to its culture, from military and strategic affairs to international relations.
This new form of ulama-led politics became a model and inspiration for many Islamist movements in other parts of the world.
In time, the revolutionary vanguard of the Iranian revolution settled into their own comfortable niches of power. As the ulama became more and more powerful, the institutions they had at their disposal were used not only to pursue their ideological ends, but also to serve partisan interests.
In the wake of the revolution, thousands of dissidents and opponents were rounded up, tortured, imprisoned or executed by revolutionary councils and committees manned by ulama and religious functionaries who believed that they were doing God's work by eliminating the enemies of the revolution.
That a revolution which claimed freedom and equality as its goals could be turned around to serve the interests of a privileged few is nothing new, of course. The French revolution eventually opened the way for the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte and a military elite who turned revolutionary France into an authoritarian state with a secret police and various invisible committees and tribunals that sent thousands to the guillotine.
Such is how revolutions devour their own children, and such were the contradictions of the Iranian revolution as well.
It was these contradictions that contributed to the emergence of a second generation of reformers, led by men like Abdul Karim Suroosh and Mohammad Reza Khatami today. The present leadership of Iran are not trying to do away with the principles of the Revolution itself. Nor are they trying to undermine the spirit and ethos of Islam upon which their state and nation are built upon.
But they are exposing the rot that has been allowed to fester in the body politic of Iran, and to expose the abuse of power and authority that has been carried out by the self-appointed guardians of the faith, the ulama.
The state of affairs in Iran today is therefore of great interest for the rest of the contemporary Muslim world. The Iranian situation has shown that social change and revolution cannot be accomplished by slogans and empty promises alone.
Iran's attempt to chart its own destiny and carve its own image after the 1979 revolution may have been a bold step, but it was also an ambitious venture which fell on the shoulders of religious leaders who were not able to live up to their own expectations.
Over the past two decades, the ulama who were once regarded as infallible and incorruptible have shown that they are mortals with human failings as well. The numerous cases of corruption and abuse of power by ulama and religious leaders have convinced the people of Iran that the process of nation-building calls for the participation of society as a whole, and not an exclusive class of religious savants and clerics.
For Muslims elsewhere in the world, the lesson to be drawn from the Iranian revolution and its aftermath are equally clear. While the problems and difficulties encountered by many modern and developing Muslim societies today may seem daunting, Muslims still need to resist the temptation of falling for promises of "miraculous" changes brought about by cosmetic forms of Islamisation.
The Iranians have learnt that an Islamic state and an Islamic society cannot be created overnight through propaganda campaigns and painting everything in an Islamic shade. The task or genuine social and economic reform requires more than slogans that talk of a new Islamic era under the leadership of the ulama, but offers little else in concrete terms.
DR FARISH A NOOR is a Malaysian political scientist and human rights activist. He is currently researching the topic of Islamist movements in the Malay world. The opinions expressed here are his own.
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