Most regional analysts have had their eyes glued on three countries in Southeast Asia over the past four or five years due to the critical state of their internal politics which suggested imminent systemic change from an old order to a brave new future.

The mood was very much reflected in the timely publication of the now well-known The Asian Renaissance by its even more famous Malaysian author. But, in all fairness, it must be noted that others such as former Philippines president Fidel Ramos and his cohorts, as well as former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan, were also at the forefront of this effort to prepare the region for the new millennium.

Their laudable goals were exemplified by the regional gatherings that were regularly organised either in the context of the 'One Southeast Asia' or 'Southeast Beyond 2000' projects and Malaysia's former deputy minister Anwar Ibrahim was another of the leading lights in that forward-looking movement. Not only did they concern themselves with the quality of the emerging younger generation of potential leaders, but they also focused on basic questions of accountability, transparency and humanitarian values.

Of course, no one could have predicted the speed with which one of the three countries that was regarded as ripe for change, namely, Indonesia, would be engulfed in regime collapse and internal turmoil. Similarly, the sequence of events in post-Ramos Philippines, too, did not go according to plan as the somewhat tumultuous turn of events that saw the removal of President Estrada and the rise of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has demonstrated.

Nevertheless, it was the first of the three, Thailand, that caught the imagination of most observers following the bloody events of 1992, when constitution-making and democratisation became the order of the day. Thus, the first new democracy was born in the land of the routine military coup de etat and the accession of the Democrat Party to power in 1997 was welcomed as a timely and appropriate prelude to the promulgation of the revolutionary new Constitution.

Sustainable

But, then, it was soon to be proven that all the best legal brains in the country and the tortuous constitution-making that the Thais had subjected themselves to in the mid-1990s could not, by themselves, ensure that the democratic spirit would be sustainable. Although every hypothetical situation that would weaken their newly-won democracy had been painstakingly provided for, the new order was unable to anticipate the sheer force of unlimited wealth in politics.

And so it was that the Thai Rak Thai party of Thaksin Shinawatra with the incalculable resources of his telecommunications empire won an overwhelming victory in the elections of 2000. Basically, Thaksin rode on a populist wave of an almost dreamy euphoria aroused by his generous promises of an utopia to a populace that had lost its patience with the slow pace of the Democrats under Chuan Leekpai and their coalition partners.

Like all good things, however, Thai Rak Thai's unprecedented success was to face almost instant challenges from a variety of sources. The new administration had hardly taken office in a flurry of excitement and optimism before it was rocked by the first of a series of public relations crises. Under the reformist constitution it is mandatory for any new administration to have every one of its cabinet members make a full declaration of his or her personal assets and it was discovered that Thaksin's own personal submission in a previous administration when he was deputy prime minister had left out significant holdings.

Despite his protest that it was a genuine oversight on his part due to the labyrinthine nature of his personal fortune, a constitutional court was immediately convened and after months of intensive evaluation delivered a verdict in his favour by the slimmest of margins.

Had the review gone against him, he would have had to step down as prime minister and it was little solace either to him or the party that his name had been cleared in a not entirely convincing manner. Nevertheless, in keeping with his carefully-groomed image as a visionary new leader, Thaksin went ahead to bring the goodies that he had promised to his duly grateful electorate by launching various initiatives at economic restructuring.

At this stage, one has to factor into the analysis the character of the Thai media and its seminal role during the post-1992 constitutional turmoil for, more than any other player, it was the mainstream newspapers and electronic media that sought to keep the new administration on its toes. Thus, almost paradoxically, Thaksin who had built his mega-empire through his telecommunications business was all of a sudden faced with what he and his close advisers sensed as a not-too-friendly press and radio and TV coverage.

From what seemed to be minor skirmishes involving one of his own media companies in 2001, the government was before long in the thick of things when it did the unthinkable in February 2002 by taking on the Far Eastern Economic Review over a small item that had drawn attention to what appeared to be an expression of disapproval by none other than the King at Thaksin's style of governance. Not only were the magazine's two local correspondents, an American and an Englishman, threatened with expulsion but its managing editor and another senior staff member in Hong Kong were also threatened with a similar fate should they attempt to enter Thailand.

This soon turned into a test of strength between the government and the influence of the Dow Jones publishing group which was joined by the Thai media, particularly the leading English newspapers. Eventually, a measure of peace and calm was achieved with both sides backing off; the Review offered an apology of sorts while the administration dropped its threat of expulsion.

Defensive stand

Hardly had the international headlines over the matter died down, before another domestic controversy broke out over the attempts of the Anti-Money Laundering Office targeting selected members of the Thai media that had been ostensibly critical of the administration.

As with the previous misunderstanding, Thaksin's men took an unrealistically defensive stand when the news first broke and from then on all their attempts to evade any direct involvement in what was apparently the result of a major leak of official documents looked increasingly feeble and unconvincing. Thus, a clear pattern of poor public relations and seeming lack of transparency became the stigma of the government in just its second year in office.

But the two incidents related to the media served to draw the battle lines, so to speak, between the 'reformers' and the 'nationalists' in Thai society as the pro-freedom of the press faction was opposed by others who felt that the nation should not succumb to external pressures. Thus, the latter became in a sense apologists for the Thaksin administration on the somewhat questionable basis of standing up for an undefined national interest whereas those who stood up against interference in the media were made to appear to be pro-West, meaning American media giants.

The reason why this otherwise not altogether predictable conflict over media freedom is highlighted here is that, almost subtly and beneath the surface, the evaluation of the Thaksin leadership has inspired a rather unusual and unique comparison with other Southeast Asian conditions, notably that of the Malaysian one under Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad.

As a direct consequence of the internal debate over the question of the freedom of the press during the Review fiasco in Bangkok, the assertion was being quietly made that what Thailand really needed to lift the economy out of the post-1997 disaster is a single-minded leader like the now aging Malaysian model.

What is even more intriguing about this is that Thais of varying political hues seem strangely unanimous in their assessments of the need for a visibly proactive and unchallenged Thai leader who should be able to emulate if not better the Mahathir record both at the national and international levels. It is a moot point if Thaksin needs such an impetus as he has the wherewithal to practically engineer an appropriate governmental apparatus that can function as an effective one-man operation like other regional leaders have succeeded in establishing, the most recent example being the Cambodian one.

Test case

The 'nationalists' in particular feel that Thaksin should not have backed down over the case of the action against the Review and have pointedly showcased Mahathir as a test case of someone who had stood up against the Western media without suffering too much damage, either to himself personally or to the nation.

Indeed, more than the question of the freedom of the press is the underlying implication in the Thai dilemma that a democratic constitution and a subservient administration may not be the ideal panacea to the sort of crushing economic and social pressures that the country is currently experiencing.

One is, therefore, tempted to ask if Thaksin and his boys, especially, the 'Gang of Three', have not orchestrated the entire 'media crisis' as a Machiavellian stratagem to prepare Thai society for a fundamental re-interpretation of the constitutional framework that had been so painstakingly fashioned by idealistic reformers in the aftermath of the Suchinda Kraprayoon excesses of 1991-92.

Given these bleak circumstances in the functioning of Thai democracy, particularly, the dangerous excesses that an unlimited source of financial wherewithal could easily lead to, the old fears of a conservative backlash in the aftermath of the democratic dawn have been revived. It almost seems as if the much-touted Asian Renaissance of the last decade of the 20th century is still-born and has a while to go before its potential can be fully realised by a younger and more idealistic leadership in key countries in the region.

Undoubtedly, the post-1997 financial and economic crisis coupled with the uncertainties in global affairs following the Sept 11 terrorist attacks in the US have not helped the democratic cause in many parts of the world. Is the Thaksin phenomenon in Thai politics a harbinger of other alternative approaches to evolving societies and will it tempt interested parties in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines to use the lethal combination of political influence and financial power as a way out of their domestic travails?

JAYAVARMAN III is the pseudonym of a Southeast Asian analyst who has taught and worked in regional universities and research centres.