The results of the 16-day long 'Operation Anaconda', the biggest and most important military engagement of American forces that has just ended, are rich in statistics rather than in any substance.

Eight American fatalities, two MH-47 Chinook helicopters disabled, no 'enemy' soldier captured since they adamantly refused to surrender, were among some of the supposed achievements of this mission this when it concluded this month.

But notwithstanding the claim of killing "hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters", there was no word that the elusive 'VIP fugitives' Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, were among them.

A week into the campaign, on March 8, US President George W Bush had grudgingly admitted, "These people evidently don't want to give up. And that's okay, if that's their attitude, we'll just have to adjust, and they'll have made a mistake".

At the conclusion of the campaign, the comments of General Tommy Franks, commander-in-chief of the US Central Command, which oversees the Afghan theatre of operations, were apt. He termed the security situation in Afghanistan as "murky and troublesome".

Operation Anaconda involved about 1,000 US troops, including Special Forces, 200 commandos from allies like Canada and Australia, and a couple of thousand Afghan forces, including a thousand-man detachment of the Afghan Interim Government.

Anaconda took place 50km from the Pakistan border, and the fighting was 150km south of Kabul, with anonymous "US officials" telling the American Associated Press news agency on March 16 "numerous al-Qaeda fighters fleeing the battles are believed to have escaped into Pakistan".

Daunting task

Given this context, it is no accident that soon after distributing medals for bravery in action to American soldiers in Afghanistan and formally proclaiming the end of 'Operation Anaconda', General Tommy Franks flew into Pakistan for an unscheduled visit on March 17.

Presumably the purpose of his journey was to seek President Gen Pervez Musharraf's cooperation in mopping up remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, should any have escaped the Pakistan Army's dragnet and managed to enter Pakistan covertly.

The daunting task that lies ahead was made more evident on the day of General Franks' arrival, which saw a major act of terrorism directed against a Church congregation in Islamabad's diplomatic enclave, near the American embassy.

The attack last weekend resulted in five fatalities, including the wife and daughter of an American diplomat.

That the attackers managed to strike so close to the American Embassy, one of the country's most guarded installations in ostensibly Pakistan's most secure city, is an indication of the gravity of the threat posed by the fallout of the Afghan War on the Americans and their Pakistani allies, the Musharraf military regime.

In fact, within a month, this has been a "hat trick of terror" in terms of the timing of striking at sensitive targets.

On Feb 21, American journalist Daniel Pearl's macabre videotaped murder was announced soon after Musharraf's American visit.

On Feb 26, worshippers at a mosque were gunned down in the vicinity of the Pakistan Army's General Headquarters (GHQ) and on March 17, another heavily-guarded citadel of symbolism and power, the American Embassy in Islamabad, was near the church attack.

Given that the security situation remains "murky and troublesome" as General Franks put it, what are larger lessons to be drawn from Operation Anaconda? Three are particularly relevant.

First, an insight into the historical context of America's Asian military adventures is necessary.

At the height of the Vietnam War in 1968, the Viet Cong launched their 'Tet Offensive' coinciding with the Vietnamese New Year, which the United States won militarily but lost politically over the longer term.

It was then that an American general had made his famous comment on how to exit from Vietnam, "We should simply declare we have won and just get the hell out of Vietnam".

Determined enemy

A similar refrain, albeit, on a smaller scale, is being felt in Afghanistan, given the resilience of the resistance, which refuses to surrender, and the failure to capture or kill either Osama or Mullah Omar.

The March18 interview of Osama's half-brother, Sheikh Ahmad, who told the CNN that his brother is "alive and well" is certain to throw another spanner in the works of the American game plan.

Second, as Israel is discovering in dealing with the Palestinians or as the United States did in Vietnam, military might alone is not enough to defeat a determined enemy even if it is dispersed.

Politically, the extended use of force can be counter-productive. This what the United States is discovering in Afghanistan, since there are Afghan sources who dispute US claims that "only al-Qaeda is being targeted" and say there are recurring reports of civilians also being killed by US bombing.

Third, if the United States gets bogged down in Afghanistan, the entire capacity of Washington to expand its 'war on terrorism', for instance to Iraq, will be called into question.

The results of Operation Anaconda, which was declared a 'victory' by the US, was followed by a day later with another attack on American bases and Afghan allied forces on March 20 in Khost in eastern Afghanistan, a stark reminder of the limitations of American military power.

These limitations also adversely affect US political and diplomatic clout, as evidenced in the conclusion of Operation Anaconda, which coincided with the end of Vice-president Dick Cheney's 10-day Middle East journey, a trip that resulted in a virtually unanimous view against any military action against Iraq.

Thus, more second thoughts are bound to emerge as to the direction of both the American war in Afghanistan and the 'war against terrorism'. (IPS)