Co-written with Ustaz Muhammad Uthman el-Muhammady

As the impending war o­n Iraq looms ever closer, the divide between the hawks of war in Washington and the doves of peace has grown wider than ever before. What is more, it has become clear that this division is not o­nly between those who are for and against the war, but also between those who are committed to the school of brutal realpolitik and those who are calling for an ethical reform of global politics.

It is not surprising that among the strongest critics of American neo-imperialism today we find spokespersons of religion and ethics. In Europe, the harshest criticism of US unilateralism has come from European thinkers and philosophers of ethics, who have questioned the moral basis for the war against Iraq. Not to be left out are the representatives of the Church, with the Pope being the most vocal opponent to the US-led war effort to date. The Archbishop of Canterbury has even gone as far as telling George W Bush and Tony Blair that theirs is a war "without moral basis" and that they have no right to use and abuse the ethical discourse of Christianity to justify their own 'crusade' against Iraq and its people.

In Asia, among the most critical voices have been the leaders of the Buddhist Sangha, and already we have witnessed demonstrations in places like Bangkok and Tokyo led by Buddhist pacifists and anti-war monks and priests, alongside students, unionists, secular NGOs and peace activists.

But the Muslim world is still at an impasse, for the simple reason that the Muslims themselves are divided over the issue. The recent OIC summit at Sharm el-Sheikh managed to issue a broad-based statement against war and the use of violence, but many Arab governments remain uneasy about having to live with Saddam's regime next door.

To make things worse, the appalling human rights record of the Iraqi government itself makes it hard, if not impossible, to defend Saddam Hussein himself or his actions in the past and the present (against the Kurds for instance). Under such circumstances, what can and should be done?

Sunni answer to tyranny

It must be remembered that politics in Islam is never far removed from ethical considerations. What is more, these ethical considerations in turn shape the form and content of Muslim politics, and they set out the parameters for political conduct in both the private and public spheres.

Muslim politicians today may be weighing the economic costs and benefits of supporting (or resisting) the US war effort - the Turkish government has already been told that US aid and investment to Turkey will be cut thanks to the Turkish Parliament's decision to vote against allowing US troops to operate in their country - but these realpolitik considerations must come after the more important ethical o­nes.

Islamic history and the corpus of Islamic legal (fiqh) writing over the past o­ne and a half millennia provides us with a rich repertoire of ideas and guidelines when having to deal with such complex and troubling issues. Four generations of ulama have had to deal with the question of tyranny and injustice in the Muslim world (and it must be remembered that many of the ulama had to pay the price for speaking the truth to power, often with their lives).

The central question is this: When Muslims are forced to live under a despotic or tyrannical ruler, do they have the right to resort to violent rebellion and should they turn to other states and powers to assist them in toppling their own government? As far as the thinkers of the orthodox Sunni tradition are concerned, the answer is simply 'No'.

Generations of ulama have debated the question of the right to rebellion and foreign intervention as the Muslim world itself has never been immune to crises. While defending the right (or even the necessity) for political change from within, they have all agreed o­n o­ne crucial point: that the end result of any social upheaval (or more serious still, external intervention) must take into account the welfare (maslaha) of society and that it should not lead to even greater chaos (fitnah) where even more people will suffer in the long run.

In cases where foreign intervention would actually lead to a country being colonised or controlled directly or indirectly, the principle of national sovereignty has to be upheld before all else. This can be done when carefully analysing the political record of the intervening power/s themselves, what they have done to/in other countries and what their likely objectives and goals are when intervening in the politics of another nation undergoing crisis.

Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's (b. 1058 - d. 1128) (1) stand o­n the question of helping other powers or states overthrow a Muslim leader - no matter how bad that leader might be - is clear. In his Kitab al-Rasa'il al-Qudsiyyah he argues:

"(10) The tenth fundamental: If piety and learning should not be possessed by a seeker of the imamate, and if deterring him could lead to inevitable civil strife (fitnah) in society, then we must decide that his imamate is legally binding (in'iqad) .For in such situation we have o­nly two alternatives: the first is to cause strife in an attempt to replace him, in which case the Muslim community will suffer more damage than from want of the qualifications (of piety and learning in the leader). These were stipulated as advantageous for the welfare (maslaha) of the community; but obsession with these advantages must not lead to demolishing the welfare (of the community) itself. (Otherwise it would be) like him who builds a palace but demolishes a metropolis. The second alternative is to decide that there is no (legally constituted) imam in the land and that all legal decisions are incorrect. This is impossible." (2)

A similar argument was put forward by Imam Abu al-Hassan al-Asha'ari (b. 874 - d. 935) (3) - regarded by many as the definitive voice of Sunni orthodoxy - in his work, the Kitab al-Ibadah fi Usul al-Diniyah:

"We (of the Ahlis-Sunnah, the mainstream Muslim Community) approve prayer for the welfare (al-islah) of the imams of the Muslims (i.e. those who are the wali al-amr among them) and the confession of their imamate (that is their assuming the position of wali al-amr of Muslims) and we regard it an error (or we regard as astray) o­n anybody's part to approve going out (to fight against them or oppose them) even when they have clearly abandoned rectitude (that is committed injustice and/or oppression); and we believe in abstinence from going out against them with the sword (that is fighting them) and abstinence from fighting in civil commotion (fitna) among Muslims." (4)

These arguments need to be put in context: The ulama were not suggesting that Muslims are forever forced to endure any form of bad governance under their leaders. Nor do they have to sit passively by while their own leaders exploit and abuse their power; rob the nation of its wealth, or deprive the citizens of their rights.

In cases where their leaders have clearly gone beyond the pale of civilised conduct or abused the trust of the people, the masses have every right to stand up for their rights, and even oppose their leaders.

But al-Ghazali and al-Asha'ari were not prepared to endorse either counter-productive all-out rebellion (which might lead to a radical dislocation and crisis in society) or foreign intervention into domestic affairs for fear that as a result these countries might be colonised by other powers who may be worse.

The Sunni ulama were clearly opposed to any such moves as they realised that such intervention would be done not for the sake of the Muslims themselves, but rather for the sake of the intervening power and its own interests.

In the long run, a society can o­nly liberate itself from tyranny if its struggle is a local o­ne: foreign support may help in cases of all-out rebellion against a violent dictatorship, but military intervention does little to help build a grassroots democratic culture anywhere in the world. Guns and bombs may kill tyrants, but they do not a democracy make.

Lessons for Muslims

There are three important considerations to be drawn from this: The first is that the Muslim world needs to understand and realise that it has to sort out its own problems without turning to powerful countries like the United States for help whenever there is a crisis. For too long we have witnessed the shameful spectacle of Arab leaders running to the door of the White House whenever they have a problem with their neighbours. The Arab states must realise that the fate of the Arab-Muslim world lies in their own hands, and not the lobbyists and oil magnates of the USA.

A culture of open mediation and constant dialogue has to be inculcated in the hearts and minds of Muslim leaders, along with a democratic civic culture where abuse of power and tyranny cannot grow and prosper in the first place. Had this been achieved long ago, the Muslim world today would not be suffering under the yoke of so many tyrants and dictators, many of whom happen to be the cronies and servants of Western political and economic interests in any case.

The second thing that Muslims need to understand is that living as we do in the global age of the present, we need to develop an Islamic approach to politics that responds to the needs of the contemporary age we live in: The demand for democracy, human rights, just government and economics are all legitimate demands that have to be met, and yet the Muslim world lags behind in all these areas. That is why despite the wealth that the Muslim world possesses, Muslims remain disenfranchised, weak, marginalised and alienated, and Muslim states have no clout when they speak o­n international affairs and have no credibility before their own electorates.

An Islamic approach to governance is not about building more mosques and madrasahs, policing faith and ritual practices in the private and public spheres o­nly: It is about showing that Islam is a force of social change and improvement that will benefit the human race as a whole.

Until that happens, all we have is cosmetic Islamisation that serves the interests of despots and tyrants who have done nothing to improve the image of Islam in the world we live in.

The third and final point is that the leaders and governments of the developing Muslim world must realise by now that powerful nations like the USA are not their real friends and allies. The record of US intervention
abroad since the end of World War II has been appalling, and it is the US - along with its covert agencies like the CIA - that has been at the forefront of propping up weak and feeble dictatorships and crony governments the world over.

From Iran to the Philippines, the US has shown that it is not a force for good or positive change, but rather that its foreign policy is designed to serve and appease o­nly its own economic, military and political interests.

Under such circumstances, how can this ever be a case of 'justifiable' intervention?

Endnotes:

1) Imam Abu Hamid Ibn Muhammad al-Ghazali lived between 1058 and 1128. His education was based o­n the prevalent curriculum at Nishapur and Baghdad. He later became a professor at the Nizamiyah Madrasah of Baghdad. His diverse educational background meant that he was exposed to both orthodox Sunni education as well as Hellenic ideas and Sufi influences. His greatest achievement was being able to close the gap that had emerged between the proponents of the two traditions, by foregrounding a rationalist approach to
normative religion as well as social concerns like politics, law and economics. As a rationalist he defended the epistemological claims of hard sciences like mathematics and physics as being sound and logical. He
incorporated Hellenic (especially Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic) ideas and methods to develop a foundationalist approach to philosophy that would later inspire generations of western philosophers like Rene Descartes. But al-Ghazali also argued that human knowledge was limited due to the limitations of the human intellect and the natural subjectivism of human thought. In this respect he anticipated the solipsists and relativists of the European tradition centuries before as well.

2) From Imam al-Ghazali, al-Risalah al-Qudsiyyah, English translation, pl58. The author would like to thank Ustaz Uthman el-Muhammady for this quotation.

3) Imam Abu al-Hassan al-Asha'ari lived between 874 to 935. Till today he is still regarded as the bedrock of orthodox Sunni religious, philosophical and political knowledge and theory. Like al-Ghazali who came after him, he tried to bridge the gap between the Sufi-inspired hermeneutic tradition and the more orthodox legalist tradition of the time that was prevalent in Baghdad. In an attempt to bring together the different schools of thought within the Islamic intellectual tradition he wrote the Maqalat al-Islamiyn where he compiled the major works of the Sunni theologians and laid out their main arguments in a simple, accessible question-and-answer format.

4) From Imam al-Asha'ari, Kitab al-Ibanah fi Usul al-Diyanah, translated by Walter C Klein, American Oriental Society, 1940, p54.

Note: The author would like to thank Ustaz Muhammad Uthman el-Muhamaddy for helping with the writing of this article. Ustaz Uthman el-Muhamaddy is a senior fellow to the Institute for Islamic Understanding; the translator (into Malay) of Yusuf Ali's translation of the Kitab al-Quran and the o­nly Ulama I know in Malaysia who has been promoting the study of the philosophical and historical works of Ibn Khaldun in Malaysia. Those who would like to attend Ustaz Uthman's lectures of the study of Ibn Khaldun can contact the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement (Abim).