In the wake of Sept 11, the spook industry has never had it so good. Now, more than ever, practically every hack writer, tabloid journalist, psedo-social scientist and self-proclaimed security 'expert' can write and publish anything and get away with it, provided that their works have the subtitle 'terror network' added on the cover.

In time, we are bound to be treated with the 'al-Qaeda cookbook' and the 'Osama bin Laden do-it-yourself Jihadi kit'. For now, however, we will have to make do with books about international terror networks and transnational subversive movements instead.

So much nonsense has been written about Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda that one would have thought that we would all be suffering from 'Osama fatigue' by now. So when the security expert, consultant to the US Congress and Australian Parliament, and principal investigator for the United Nations' Terrorism Prevention Branch Rohan Gunaratna came out with his latest offering 'Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror'(1), many scholars of international politics and security studies were hoping for an antidote to all the twaddle they had been fed so far. We were, sadly, disappointed.

Having said that, it would be unfair to state that everything Gunaratna has said in the book is inaccurate or off the mark. In fact, the earlier chapters in the book show that he has clearly conducted some extensive and in-depth analysis into the al-Qaeda al-Sulbah (The Solid Base) organisation that was first formed by the Palestinian-Jordanian activist Sheikh Abdullah Azzam in the 1980s.

Hard to dispute

Much of what Gunaratna says about the background of Osama bin Laden is also true, and his assessment of the man, his character and background are hard to dispute.

In all fairness, Gunaratna also points the finger of accusation to the main sponsor and benefactor of the al-Qaeda themselves: the US government, which was quite happy to use the Mujahideen and later the al-Qaeda for its numerous covert operations in Afghanistan as they fought out Washington's dirty little proxy war against the Soviets in that devastated country. For this at least Gunaratna should be acknowledged and given the credit that is due to him.

The major problem comes with the rest of the book, where Gunaratna tries to weave an elaborate byzantine narrative about al-Qaeda's alleged linkages with other Islamist organisations and movements worldwide.

What is even more worrying is the way that he makes such general claims (such as that one-fifth of international Islamic charities and NGOs have been 'infiltrated' by the al-Qaeda) that seem totally unsubstantiated or proven in any way.

If and when proof is required, the author merely cites 'interviews with security agencies' in various countries all over the world.

International concern

One inevitably ends up with the conclusion that al-Qaeda is truly a colossal international concern, growing and extending its tentacles all over, infiltrating every known public institution and spawning its sleeper cells in the most unlikely of places.

Reading the book is like taking a trip back in time to the McCarthy era where the Western bloc was convinced that the so-called 'free world' was about to be devoured by the Soviet Juggernaut that was armed to the teeth with the latest weapons technology that was so advanced that even the brains of the Pentagon and Silicon valley could not figure how they worked.

The reason why they could not understand how the Soviet war machine worked was, however, quite simple: it simply did not exist. As Stephen Rosskamm Shalom has argued in his book 'Imperial Alibis' (1993), the herd mentality that was generated by the manufacturing of consent during the Cold War (and after) was based on the simple premise that the free world was threatened by a highly sophisticated Soviet army that was capable of wiping out the populations of the West.

This in turn justified the creation and expansion of the military-industrial complex led by the United States of America and the curtailing of civil liberties, all in the name of 'protecting Western democracy' and its values. The fact that half of the Soviet mobile forces during the initial stages of the Cold War in the 1950s was actually being pulled by horse and donkey carts was conveniently hidden from the duped masses.

Same old story

One cannot help but feel that the same old story is being told here. We are told that al-Qaeda is 'an essentially modern organisation that exploits up-to-date technology for its own ends', that it uses 'satellite phones, laptop computers, encrypted communication websites for hiding messages and the like'. (pg. 11).

Al-Qaeda has, we are told 'a robust capacity for regeneration' and 'a very diverse membership that cuts across ethnic, class and national boundaries'. (pg. 54) We are also warned about the utter ruthlessness of the organisation, and how it would stop at nothing to achieve its goals like some nasty 'James Bond' villain.

Gunaratna warns his readers that al-Qaeda 'will have no compunction about employing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons against population centres' (pg. 11). If the intention was to scare the reader senseless, the author has succeeded admirably. If the aim was to drive the frightened masses into the protecting arms of 'Big Brother' USA, the author may well have also succeeded, for who else can save the world from this all-contaminating evil, save the world's only remaining superpower with the biggest arsenal of nuclear weapons and hi-tech weapons, the USA?

Aside from the dubious political message imbedded within the book, one also has to ask why Gunaratna has spent so little time on asking the really serious question of how and why so many Islamist movements the world over now think of the US government as its main nemesis.

The lack of historical depth is something that stands out in this two-dimensional reading of Islamist politics, leaving the reader with precious little understanding of why Muslim-US relations have become so strained of late. Gunaratna simply does not go deep enough in his account of the factors behind the phenomenon of Muslim anger and frustration with the US, and in particular fails to highlight the most problematic factor of all: America's support of the Zionist establishment in Israel, which is the root cause of so much anti-American feeling in the Arab world today.

Likewise, Washington's support for the numerous petty dictatorships and corrupt feudal elite in so many Arab countries also accounts for why so many Arab-Islamists see the US as their biggest stumbling block.

Negative impact

What the author fails to emphasise strongly enough is the fact that many of these organisations are not really anti-American per se (in fact most of them are ambivalent towards the United States), but that they see the foreign policy of Washington having a direct and negative impact on their own political culture in their respective societies.

The other major failing of the book is its attempt to construct an international network when there simply isn't any. Here I would take issue with Gunaratna's description of Malaysia and Indonesia in particular: two countries that happen to be within the scope of my own academic research interests.

Gunaratna devotes an entire chapter to al-Qaeda's alleges transnational linkages to and with other 'militant' Islamist movements abroad. He paints the picture of a highly sophisticated, decentralised and organic entity that is capable of functioning in several theatres simultaneously. But the linkages that he draws are feeble and ephemeral to say the least.

Take, for example, the case of Malaysia which Gunaratna describes as 'a victim of its own geopolitics' (pg. 194) and the 'operational base' for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. (pg. 192.) Among the 'radical', 'militant' organisations that he lists as part of this nebulous and decentralised network are the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Abim) and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). (pg. 197) The other groups he adds to the list are even more outstanding: one of the organisations he cites, the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (Muslim Unity Front, APU) does not even exist any more.

Chain of equivalences

How are PAS and Abim part of this extensive al-Qaeda network? Here Gunaratna simply draws together a chain of equivalences that strings together Islamist movements that share similar concerns and causes. He notes that both PAS and Abim have expressed sympathy with the Moro liberation struggle in the Southern Philippines, led by groups like the MNLF and MILF. This, for Gunaratna, is enough damning evidence.

As al-Qaeda is alleged to have links to MILF, and MILF is alleged to have links with PAS and ABIM, a 'global network' is instantly created, as if by magic. Never mind the fact that the support shown to the Moro liberation struggle has also come from other non-Islamist quarters, such as leftist-secular liberation movements in Africa and Latin America, and never mind the fact that the Moro opposition movement itself is highly complex and made up of Islamists, socialists, communists and nationalists from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. (Not all Moros are Muslim, incidentally: many of those who joined the MNLF were Christians.)

Gunaratna also falls back on the defensive trope of Osama bin Laden as the great enemy of the free world to back up his argument. He cites PAS's support for Osama and the Taliban as proof of PAS's 'radical' character and points out that posters of Osama were seen hanging in the offices of PAS in Kuala Lumpur. (pp. 197-198) This seems enough to put PAS on the list of 'radical militant movements' that are a threat to world peace.

But here again Gunaratna's analysis fails to go any deeper than the surface level. Granted that there will always be hot-heads and firebrands who will parrot the discourse of the likes of Osama to make a point, wearing an Osama bin Laden T-shirt does not automatically make one an al-Qaeda member. (In Hanoi, I came across a seven-year old girl who was wearing an Osama T-shirt while her sister wore a Mickey Mouse T-shirt instead. Surely one is not going to label the child an al-Qaeda 'sleeper agent'?)

A cult icon

What Gunaratna fails to understand is that Osama bin Laden has become a symbol of anti-American resistance not only for Muslims, but also for millions of non-Muslims all over the world: his image was instantaneously elevated to that of a cult icon from Brazil to China, and I have personally come across Thai, Cambodian and Vietnamese youth wearing Osama T-shirts for the simple reason that they see him as an emblem of anti-American protest.

If that is the case, then surely Washington (and Gunaratna) should rethink their argument that Osama is the embodiment of militant Islam, and perhaps revise his status to that of a symbol of radical anti-establishmentarianism instead.

The author has also clearly failed to understand the various movements and organisations he cites as being radically anti-Western and fundamentalist.

Abim, for instance, happens to be the biggest Muslim NGO in Malaysia which has concentrated most of its time and energy towards social welfare, education and relief work abroad. The organisation recently lent its support to a multi-religious campaign to protect all religious cites the world over, and is actively engaged in inter-religious dialogue with other faith communities in Malaysia's multiethnic society.

Constitutional approach

These are hardly the features of a radical movement bent on world conquest and mayhem. PAS, on the other hand, is a legitimate political party with a long and complex history of its own. While a very small number of members and leaders may be (cautiously) labelled 'radical' in their approach, it remains a fact that an overwhelming majority of its leaders have opted for a constitutional approach to politics.

PAS has also attempted several projects aimed at improving its image as a non-communitarian party, going as far as planning to build a 'Chinese-styled' mosque in predominantly Malay Malaysia, to show that the party does not discriminate against its constituents. How then could either organisation be put in the same category as the al-Qaeda? What could possibly link them all together, save the rudimentary fact that they happen to be made up of Muslims?

Worst of all, Gunaratna's general overview does terrible damage to the image of Malaysia, which has been perhaps the most outspoken and active country that has consistently challenged the culture of violence and terrorism in Muslim societies today.

Successive Malaysian leaders have gone out of their way to condemn all forms of terror and have promoted a modernist, progressive and dynamic school of Islamic thought for decades.

Discourse of Islam

Malaysia's economic success was partly due to its ability to harness the discourse of Islam and to show that Islam can be a force for progressive economic and political development. Yet all these facts are lost as they are absorbed by the tapestry weaved by Gunaratna.

The bottom line is that while one cannot and should not deny the existence of Osama or the al-Qeada, neither should one go around creating imaginary enemies when they don't exist. If Washington and the powers-that-be in the West really want to understand the root causes of anti-Westernism in the South today, they should begin with an auto-critique of their own skewered economic and political policies vis--vis the South and developing world.

The anger of Osama and his ilk have more to do with the constant attempts by Washington to foil the economic and political endeavours initiated by Muslims the world over. As long as the governments of the West do not revise their own policies towards the Muslim world, this anger will remain.

Creating an imaginary enemy may help the governments of the West brush their own economic and political crises under the carpet in the short run, but it will bring us no closer to realising a truly just, equal and democratic world order. Until that day comes, the Cold Warriors in the West will simply be battling the demons of their own creation.


Endnotes:

1) Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror By Rohan Gunaratna, Hurst and Co., London, 2002. ISBN no. 1-85065-671-1 (paperback). 272 pages.

2) See: Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, Imperial Alibis: Rationalising US Intervention After the Cold War, South End Press, 1992. ISBN no. 0896084485

This critical review of Rohan Gunaratna's Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror was first published on July 6, and republished now in the light of the controversial allegations that have now surfaced about the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition and al-Qaeda being ideological partners.