Amid the continuing discords in Northeast Asia and also other publicly aired disagreements in bilateral issues between China and the United States, President Hu Jintao will officially visit Washington on Wednesday and to be met by America's President Barack Obama who had officially visited Beijing in November 2009.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) first established diplomatic relations bilaterally in 1979 or 30 years after the Communists defeated the Nationalists whom the US backed in the bitterly fought Chinese Civil War in 1946-1949.

Professor Dr Lee Poh Ping, a Senior Research Fellow at UM's Institute of China Studies (ICS), President of the Malaysian Association of Japanese Studies (Majas) and long-standing Malaysian observer of United States' foreign policy, spoke to Malaysiakini on various issues affecting the current state of Sino-US relations.

Malaysiakini: The current state of Sino-US relations is admittedly fairly discordant. What, in your observation, is the most serious area of the discord? What are the other areas?

Professor Dr Lee Poh Ping: As you suggested there are many areas of discord between both.

infantryOne can quite easily list them: Taiwan, human rights, lack of transparency in Chinese military build-up, intellectual property rights, currency revaluation and etc. I would suggest underlining all these is the perception of a rising China and a declining America.

An America that is anxious that its global hegemony might be challenged by China could magnify problems with, or see problems where they should not be from, the presumed challenger.

I do not wish to say that many of the issues have no independent basis or excuse Chinese faults. Americans believe in human rights deeply and many of the economic problems are a function of global interdependence rather than that of clashing hegemonies.

Moreover, China can be faulted, chief among which, are not assuming more global responsibilities when it is becoming so economically intertwined globally, a lack of sensitivity to neighbours' concern about its potential might and a poor human rights record.

But if one considers them a bit more deeply, many of the problems become problems more often as a result of strategic and economic exigencies rather than in themselves. Take the case of human rights.

The US closes its eyes to human rights violations by its allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, yet makes a big noise when the Chinese government is seen to violate human rights. Also, even towards China, the US turns the human rights campaign off and on such as when China was needed as an ally against the then USSR, US criticism of China's human rights record was toned down.

NONEOr when US multinationals needed the China market, President Clinton (left) in the early 1990s in an about-face dropped the linkage between MFN and human rights.

There is an observation that there are two phrases of the China policy of the Obama administration and that there is a sharp U-turn in early 2010. Is that true? If yes, what has happened in the United States?

I am not quite sure that there is a substantive difference in what you call the two phases. Obama's first phase, the charm offensive, only involved postponing the meeting with the Dalai Lama and the sale of arms to Taiwan. He did not cancel both. I think it is an American strategy to put the Chinese on the defensive by saying we tried to be nice to you (without giving anything) and you did not respond.

China is now felt, perceived or said in the United States to be more assertive or even aggressive in its foreign and defence policies. Is that right? If yes, what has happened in China?

There may be some truth in this. However like most things, there are two sides to the story. Take the supposed Chinese aggressiveness over the Senkakus/Diayou islands, Korea, and the South China Sea. In the first, the Chinese responded only when Japan , under Foreign Minister, Maehara, decided to try the Chinese captain under Japanese domestic law.

The many previous such clashes were settled diplomatically. For the Chinese to accept this would mean conceding to Japanese sovereignty over the islands. The Chinese did not condemn North Korea over the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling because they were not entirely convinced the North Koreans were totally to blame for both.

As to the South China Sea, have you come across an unequivocal official statement by the Chinese government that the Spratlys is a core Chinese interest?

The reportedly faster-than-expected development of China's high-tech weaponry, especially the J-20 stealth fighter jets and DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), seems to have caused fairly serious concerns in the United States. How would these new weapons, if and when they are fully operational, affect, directly or indirectly, the national defence and security of the United States?

I do not think those weapons, if operational, can directly threaten the US. What they may threaten is US naval dominance in the seas around China.

The American and Chinese economies rank first and second in the world now and they are also very interdependent. In your observation, what role does the calculation of economic cost and benefit play in the formulation or evolution of foreign policies in the United States and China?

One has to keep the strength of both economies in perspective. According to calculations in US dollars, China's GDP is 5 trillion. The US economy is about 3 times higher, 14.7 trillion (Though the US economy is about 2 times higher measured in PPP terms).

Economic considerations figure very greatly in both foreign policies. In fact it is the fear of economic disaster for both sides if things go out of hand is what largely keeps the relationship on an even keel.

NONEWhat is your expectation of President Hu Jintao's (left) visit to Washington? Would it substantively ease the Sino-US discord or is it going to be just symbolic?

Bilateral summit meetings are very important in the relations of superpowers. This can be seen in the Cold War where US and Soviet leaders meet every now and then. Not only are they symbolically important in that they also suggest that despite differences, things need not go out of control.

Such meetings are preceded by discussions by relevant officials to ensure that there is some understanding that difficult bilateral issues, if unresolved, would not be allowed to destroy the summit. The meeting between Obama, the leader of a superpower and Hu Jintao, the leader of a would-be superpower, should be seen in this light.

JAMES WONG WING ON is a former member of Parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily. He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew, he and a team of journalists won the top awards of the Malaysian Press Institute (MPI) for 1998 and 1999.